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ABSTRACT
The central questions posed by this thesis are: what are the effects of labour market regulations 
pertaining to job security in India, and why are these regulations so difficult to reform? The thesis 
finds that job security regulations have a negative effect on both efficiency and equity. They have 
a significantly negative impact on employment in all categories. They benefit a small minority of 
highly educated and high human capital workers, while excluding the large majority of the labour 
force from secure, protected work. They also have a negative impact on output, as they discourage 
investment. This is shown through a ranking of twenty four Indian states according to the 
strictness of job security regulations. Highly labour regulated states have lower levels of 
investment, leading to a negative impact on output, employment and real wage. In this way, these 
regulations harm both efficiency and equity. In saying this, this thesis supports the distortion view 
of job security regulations as held by the World Bank, and refutes the institutional view as held by 
the International Labour Office (ILO). The findings of this thesis show that the result of high 
levels job security regulations do not cause a necessary trade-off between efficiency and equity 
(sacrificing the former to get more of the latter), but that the result is a negative impact on both 
efficiency and equity.
The thesis then asks why policies that reduce both efficiency and equity are so difficult to 
reform in a democracy like India. It explores this by doing an inter-state analysis of policy reform 
in ten Indian states, considering each state as a separate democracy. It finds conclusive evidence 
that political factors influence the capacity and motivation to carry out labour policy reform, and it 
analyse what factors these might be.
We use a multi-pronged political economy approach in this thesis. We use extensive 
historical and institutional analysis, combined with fairly simple, but powerful, empirical analysis. 
Most of our empirical analysis relies largely on simple and straightforward ordinary least squares 
(OLS). We are encouraged by the fact that we use four different datasets, and all four give us the 
same significant result. This gives us confidence in the strength and robustness of our findings.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The central questions posed by this thesis are: what are the effects of labour 
market regulations pertaining to job security in India, and why are these regulations so 
difficult to reform? The thesis finds that job security regulations have a negative effect 
on both efficiency and equity. They have a significantly negative impact on 
employment in all categories. They benefit a small minority of highly educated and high 
human capital workers, while excluding the large majority of the labour force from 
secure, protected work. They also have a negative impact on output, as they discourage 
investment. This is shown through a ranking of twenty four Indian states according to 
the strictness of job security regulations. Highly labour regulated states have lower 
levels of investment, leading to a negative impact on output, employment and real wage. 
In this way, these regulations harm both efficiency and equity. In saying this, this thesis 
supports the distortion view of job security regulations as held by the World Bank, and 
counters the institutional view as held by the International Labour Office (ILO). The 
findings of this thesis show that the result o f high levels^ofi security regulations do not 
cause a necessary trade-off between efficiency and equity (sacrificing the former to get 
more of the latter), but that the result is a negative impact on both efficiency and equity.
The thesis then asks why policies that reduce both efficiency and equity are so 
difficult to reform in a democracy like India. It explores this by doing an inter-state 
analysis of policy reform in ten Indian states, considering each state as a separate 
democracy. It finds conclusive evidence that political factors influence the capacity and 
motivation to carry out labour policy reform, and it analysafwhat factors these might be.
We use a multi-pronged political economy approach in this thesis. We use 
extensive historical and institutional analysis, combined with fairly simple, but powerful, 
empirical analysis. Most of our empirical analysis relies largely on simple and 
straightforward ordinary least squares (OLS). We are encouraged by the fact that we use 
four different datasets, and all four give us the same significant result. This gives us 
confidence in the strength and robustness of our findings.
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1.1 BACKGROUND
“India suddenly looks attractive as a place to do business. Flights to India are packed 
with businessmen andfund managers seeking to reap the benefits o f India's three-year- 
long liberalisation programme. Foreign capital is finally making an impact in this 
country—both on the stock market which has gone through the roof and within industry. 
So, have we finally arrived on the International arena? ”
"India Unlimited"
Business India 1/17-30/1994
“India has slipped to the fifth position in the ranking o f “hot markets ” for the year 
1996-97from a position in the top three in the early nineties....India happens to be one 
o f the top three markets from where investors have exited in 1996. ”
“India fifth in emerging markets ranking”
Indian Express 24/11/96
“Millions o f state employed and private sector workers in India have gone on 
nationwide strike to protest against proposed changes to labour laws in the country, 
which have been described as 'anti-worker'. ”
Adam Moynott
BBC South Asia Correspondent, BBC World Service 
April 16, 2002
In 1991, in the face of an acute balance of payments crisis, India instituted an 
economic reforms package, the central core of which was a World Bank-International 
Monetary Fund endorsed stabilisation and structural adjustment programme. The basic 
premise of this, like structural adjustment programmes all over the world, was that the
2
Indian economy had, in the past, not been allowed to function on the basis of the free 
play of market forces. Huge tariff barriers and overvalued currencies had prevented the 
free flow of goods and services internationally. Macroeconomic policies combined with 
large state intervention and heavy regulation of domestic economic activities had led to 
severe distortions in the factor and product markets leading to all round inefficiencies, 
stagnation, inflation and balance of payments crises. In addition, fiscal profligacy on the 
part of the government in public expenditure, particularly in providing for unnecessary 
and ineffective subsidies and budgetary support to non-performing public enterprises, 
had resulted in large fiscal deficits, fuelling inflation already ignited by the slow growth 
of output.
Based on this diagnosis, the philosophy of structural adjustment stressed the 
urgency to change policies to allow free play of market forces in the domestic and 
external economic operations and reduce the role of the government to the minimum 
(Government of India, 1993a; 1993b). Resource allocation and economic outcomes 
were to be left to the market. Macroeconomic policies were to be geared primarily to 
monetary stability and control of inflation. The State would not only withdraw from all 
commercial sectors of economic activity and concentrate on preservation of the legal 
framework that facilitates the smooth functioning of private business, but also remove 
interventions and regulations that tend to distort the factor and product prices.
The primary aim of these economic reforms was to generate new investment, 
both foreign and domestic, in all sectors of the economy—particularly the core and 
infrastructure sectors. The long term success of India’s economic reform process 
depended upon sustained growth in industrial output and investment. Without this, there 
could not be a genuinely competitive industrial base from where India could launch an 
export drive to reduce systematically its debt service obligations over time.
The prospects of industrial growth and investment depended on the signals that 
India gave to the rest of the world as well as her own entrepreneurs. The 
macroeconomic reforms of 1991 sent out some positive signals, resulting in an initial 
boom in the interest shown in investing in India by foreign and domestic investors. 
However, the actual volume of investment on the ground has been disappointing in the 
decade following these reforms, and has not matched the initial interest and excitement
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generated by the announcement and commencement of India’s economic reform 
programme. Foreign investment has been largely of the portfolio kind—'hot money’, 
which is frequently the way out of India in search of greener pastures (for example now), 
generating bearish tendencies that have put the Indian stock market into deep slumps too 
many times relative to its pre-reform stability.
Foreign direct investment has remained largely at the project approval stage, not 
many approved projects having actually been translated into tangible investment. Many 
approved projects have in fact been subsequently withdrawn by multinational 
companies. Domestic investment has been concomitantly shy, despite many tax breaks 
and other incentives to invest, and with the opening up of the economy, there are fears of 
capital flight if the Rupee were to be made fully convertible on capital account.
According to many, a major reason for the disappointing investment record of 
the last ten years is the presence of labour market rigidities and the absence of an exit 
policy for industrial enterprises in the country.
"If we have the fundamental right to start a business, we also should have a right to close it as 
well Freedom o f entry and exit is a basic pre-requisite o f  any competitive business 
environment."
Rahul Bajaj
Prominent Indian Industrialist
"An exit policy is an integral part o f a wider policy initiative aimed at achieving, over a period 
o f time, a more efficient deployment o f labour and other resources, a sustained expansion o f  
employment opportunities and an overall rise in labour as well as total factor productivity."
-New Industrial Policy, 1991
"An exit policy is that which seeks to capture the efficiency gains from structural reforms 
initiated in the economy."
Dr. Manmohan Singh
ex-Finance Minister o f India
Architect o f reforms
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"Labour class is not the only section which is affected by structural adjustment o f the New 
Economic Policy (NEP). In fact, all sections o f society are being affected and hence each 
section has to sacrifice one thing or the other, little more or less, in the process o f
transformation Some amount o f retrenchment, retraining and redeployment has to be
tolerated in the process o f industrial restructuring. Because, to continue the employment o f  one 
unproductive labour in a capital intensive public sector unit, the cost is not merely his wages, 
but also the cost o f servicing the capital including accumulated losses. So, it is not the time fo r  
brooding over the negative impacts o f NEP, but it is the right time fo r  exchanging views to 
reorient the exit policy and to tackle effectively the issues at the implementation level in such a 
way that the economy reaches its destination through proper means."
Ministry o f Finance 
Government o f India 
White Paper on Exit Policy
“An "exit policy" must be introduced, allowing closure or heavy restructuring o f  unprofitable 
companies. India’s labour unions are very strong, and, currently, all incorporated companies — 
whether private or state-owned — must go through the bureaucracy to get permission to close or 
downsize. ”
ZoherAbdool Karim 
Economics Editor 
Asian Business 2/1994
This view is summarised by the influential policy expert Jeffrey Sachs (Sachs 
and Bajpai, 1998), when he says that “labour intensive manufacturing exports require 
competitive and flexible enterprises that can vary their employment according to 
changes in market demand and changes in technology, so India remains an unattractive 
base for such production in part because of the continuing obstacles to flexible 
management of the labour force” (12). Further, he states that, “an exit policy needs to be 
formulated such that firms can enter and exit freely from the market. While the reforms 
enacted so far have helped remove the entry barriers, the liberalisation of exit barriers is 
yet to take place” (12).
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Labour rigidities are blamed for two main weaknesses of the Indian economy 
here, which are in turn discouraging new investment and hence hindering the economic 
growth process. First, labour rigidities are hampering operational flexibility of 
enterprises by making them persist with sub-optimal technologies and resource use, thus 
rendering them unequal to the task of keeping up with changing market conditions and 
technologies. Second, they are both causing industrial sickness due to the previous 
factor, and are perpetuating it by preventing restructuring and exit once an enterprise 
becomes sick. In this manner also they are scaring away new investment in the country. 
Industrial sickness is said to occur when the total losses of an enterprise exceed its 
capitalisation. It is a problem that afflicts thousands of public and private sector 
enterprises. In the past, the central and state governments have merely taken over “sick” 
industries, in order to avoid unemployment, even when these sick units have not 
produced any output of any kind for several years.
1.2 CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The central research questions of this thesis are: (i) What is the impact of rigid 
labour market regulations, and who do they benefit ? (ii) What are the state-level 
variations in the rigidity of the letter and the enforcement of labour market regulation, 
and what is the differential impact of this variation? (iii) What is the political economic 
explanation for the persistence of these labour market regulations in the Indian 
democratic and federal set up, especially if we find that they tend to benefit a small 
minority and disadvantage the larger majority of the labour force? In order to justify 
why we ask these questions, we provide the background and context leading up to the 
asking of these questions below. This chapter is divided into the following sections. 
Section 1.3 discusses the various policy approaches to studying labour policy that exist 
in the academic literature. We explain what approach we shall be taking, and why. 
Section 1.4 provides a brief sketch of employment trends in India. Section 1.5 discusses 
employment protection, or job security, regulations. Unlike purely industrial relations 
text, we shall be using employment protection, employment security and job security 
interchangeably in this thesis. That is what most labour economics academic texts (as 
opposed to industrial relations texts) do. Section 1.6 summarises existing literature on 
employment protection legislation in India. Section 1.7 re-states the central research
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questions in light of the discussion contained in Sections 1.3 to 1.6, and describes the 
organisation of the rest of the thesis.
1.3 POLICY APPROACHES TO STUDYING LABOUR POLICY
It would be useful at this stage to survey briefly the various policy approaches for 
the analysis of labour issues, structural adjustment and economic development in 
contemporary literature. To provide a framework for this section, it relies for the most 
part on the large body of work done by the International Labour Office (ILO), to provide 
a framework for this section. The basic disagreement between the Bretton Woods 
institutions and the ILO are focused on in the next section.
1.3.1 Economic Approaches
Summarised below are the main disagreements between the two major economic 
approaches to evaluating labour policy. There are two main economic approaches to 
looking at labour policy—one espoused by the Bretton Woods institutions, and the other 
backed by the ILO. They can be broadly categorised (inasmuch as any such categories 
are sensible) as neo-classical distortion view and new institutionalist institutional view.
ILO (1994, 36) notes that “in the extensive literature on structural adjustment, 
rather little thematic attention has been paid to the role of labour issues in the design and 
implementation of structural adjustment programmes. This is as true for national labour 
issues, in the form of a country’s labour law, as it is for the ILO’s international labour 
issues.”
It further observes that, if anything, there has been a widespread tendency in 
economic literature to refer to labour institutions as comprising part of those “rigidities” 
or “distortions” that impede the smooth functioning of the labour market. The view has 
beep widely expressed that excessive protection for the workforce—whether in terms of 
minimum wage protection, or protection against dismissal--has damaged long-term 
prospects for employment creation, bringing benefits to a select few in the formal sector 
at the expense of the unprotected majority (Abraham and Houseman, 1994; Adison and
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Grosso, 1996; Ahluwalia, 1992b; Basu, Fields and Debgupta, 2001; Bentolila and 
Bertola, 1990; Koshiro, 1992).
The ILO, however, does not agree with this approach, thus laying the foundation 
for the basic tension between the Bretton Woods institutions and the ILO on this issue. 
Some analysts at the ILO have pointed out the more positive role of labour issues in 
creating an atmosphere of trust and comprehension among employers themselves, and in 
adapting employment systems to the requirements of technological change and progress. 
Commissioned ILO research, based on industrialised countries of Western Europe, has 
pointed to the opportunities provided by labour standards for innovative and dynamic 
forms of industrial restructuring (Sengenberger, 1991).
In many developing countries, both labour market institutions and their 
regulation framework have come under attack from the advocates of greater flexibility in 
Washington, DC. A clear example is an influential report on its adjustment lending, 
issued by the World Bank (Horton, S. et al, 1991; Horton, S. et al 1995), which is highly 
critical of labour legislation and regulations in certain countries, when they are seen as 
inhibiting the capacity of enterprises to adjust to changing circumstances. This report 
singles out recent developments in some countries of Francophone Africa in particular, 
where labour codes are being revised in order to liberalise wage determination and the 
hiring and laying-off of workers.
The ILO (1994) points out that Washington economists have been the moving 
force in policy-making and analysis on structural adjustment. On the other hand, their 
own main concern has been with the implications of labour issues for market operations, 
and in particular for the functioning of labour markets (Weeks, 1991; Lansbury and 
Zappala, 1991). They observe that in neo-classical economic analysis, the underlying 
premise is that employment and wage matters are best left to the working of market 
forces, and that external policy interventions to allocate or remunerate labour will lead to 
inefficiency and misallocation of labour use in the long term. In its more extreme form, 
they argue, the neo-classical paradigm has rejected most labour market regulations as 
distortions to the free operation of the market. In practice, they claim, that the main 
issues at stake have related to minimum wage protection, employment security and 
severance pay, and restrictions on hiring and firing. But the paradigm has been, on the
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whole, in their opinion, naturally hostile to trade unionism, or to collective bargaining at 
the industrial or national levels, which can negotiate wage agreements beyond what is 
construed as the “market-clearing” level. The arguments are that policy should be 
concerned with outcomes rather than procedures, and that the market ultimately offers 
the best outcomes in terms of improved wages and living conditions for all. In our own 
opinion, we think that the ILO critique of the “neo-classical” paradigm is overly 
simplistic, and needlessly ideological. More of that will be discussed later, as the thesis 
progresses.
ILO (1994) also claims that the World Bank’s “neo-classical” paradigm is 
antithetical to ILO’s own philosophy, in that it essentially “ignores the value of labour 
standards as instruments of social justice” (Plant, 1994, p. 57). For an illustration of this 
conflict, we can look at Freeman (1992), which summarises the arguments for and 
against considering labour market institutions and policies as a help to economic 
development in a paper prepared for the World Bank’s 1992 Annual Conference of 
Development Economics. This paper deliberately puts together certain viewpoints 
attributed to economists in the World Bank and the ILO respectively, drawing on policy 
literature published by both organisations over the past decade. Surveying the recent 
disagreements concerning the value of institutional interventions in the labour markets 
of developing countries, the paper argues that most World Bank economists see 
government regulation of wages, mandated contributions to social funds, job security 
and collective bargaining as “distortions” in an otherwise ideal world. ILO economists 
by contrast tend to stress the potential benefits of interventions, holding that regulated 
markets adjust better than unregulated labour markets to shocks, and endorsing tripartite 
consultations and collective bargaining as the best way to determine labour outcomes.
The Bretton Woods approach has been subjected to sharp criticism by a school of 
economists, broadly referred to as the “new-institutionalists”, who defend labour 
standards and institutions by the criteria of productive efficiency as well as of social 
justice (Boyer, 1988; Rodgers, 1989,1991,1996). The two schools of thought have 
been succinctly compared, in a publication of the United States Department of Labour 
(Herzenberg, et al, 1990). The principal disagreement between the two perspectives is 
not seen as a normative one, although new institutionalist thought tends to place more 
weight on the moral imperative to raise labour rights and issues. Both schools agree that
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productivity and output growth are critical to the welfare of workers, but they disagree 
as to the type of labour interventions and labour market policy that would best achieve 
these goals. Beyond a minimum list of labour interventions, the neo-classical view is 
that governments should leave the setting of labour standards to the “free” labour 
market. According to this perspective, the premature strengthening of labour institutions 
introduces economic distortions that retard income and job creation. The new 
institutionalists by contrast see labour institutions as tools that may influence the social 
progress of development positively or negatively, depending on how governments deal 
with them (Singh, 1995b).
The theoretical positions of the two schools may also be compared from the 
perspective of today’s global economy. Neo-classical economists, particularly from 
developing countries, express fears that internationally enforced labour interventions 
will be a veil for protectionism, and will close off export opportunities for developing 
countries. Neo-institutionalists express a different concern, that the insufficient 
regulation of labour interventions in the international economy will lock some firms and 
countries into low-productivity methods of production that not only deprive workers of 
their basic rights but also produce poor economic outcomes. From a policy perspective, 
the neo-classical view implies that policy-makers should avoid finding the appropriate 
level and kind of regulation to facilitate the operation of economically dynamic and 
socially acceptable national and international labour markets (Standing, 1989).
To conclude, many ILO social scientists argue that an economist’s approach to 
labour interventions is likely to be a functional one, subordinated to economic 
objectives. As suggested above, the basic disagreement between different economic 
schools of thought is not a normative one. They often agree on desirable outcomes, but 
disagree as to the means for achieving these outcomes. In other words their entry point 
for examining labour interventions is outcomes, rather than the value of the principles 
and procedures in themselves.
This thesis takes issue with this implied trade-off between efficiency and equity 
in the labour market. Such a trade-off is not a necessary one, and we intend to show, by 
the end of this thesis, that labour deregulation is necessary in India to satisfy both 
efficiency and equity objectives of social and economic policy.
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1.3.2 Legal Approaches
The legal approach to looking at labour policy is mainly through an analysis of 
international labour standards, as set by the ILO over the years. Labour standards are 
essentially legal instruments, the drafting and supervision of which tends to be the 
responsibility of trained lawyers. Lawyers are concerned mainly with principles and 
procedures, rather than with desirable economic outcomes. Protective labour standards 
are expected to constitute “rigidities” in the relationship between capital and labour, 
because that is essentially their function. At the national level they are often the result of 
hard-fought struggles by worker movements, providing safeguards against exploitative 
treatment, and as such have an emotional element in them. At the international level,
ILO standards are the result of tripartite negotiations, representing a high degree of 
international consensus as to the basic principles of labour protection, and the 
appropriate procedural mechanisms for ensuring this protection.
ILO Conventions are designed as minimum standards of social protection, as 
flexible instruments adapted to the particular circumstances of individual countries. But 
their position in law is unambiguous. They are Treaty Conventions of international law, 
which have binding force of law in member States upon ratification. ILO supervisory 
bodies, in monitoring the application of ILO Conventions in individual countries, have a 
clear obligation to ensure that law and practice are in conformity with basic principles 
relating to tripartism, freedom of association and collective bargaining, minimum wage 
mechanisms, and the termination of employment, among other fundamental issues 
(Tajgman, 2000).
This not being a law thesis, it will not be following the legal approach to 
studying labour policy. Although a narrative and comprehension of the law is necessary, 
we shall do so only to the extent that it helps us in its political economic analysis.
1.3.3 Governance and Human Rights Approaches
The above comments pertain mainly to current debates, concerning the 
arguments for and against the regulation of labour markets. A policy concern of at least
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equal importance is the positive role of the state, in providing the enabling environment 
for development. The World Bank’s working definition of adjustment embraces the 
strengthening of institutions, and poverty alleviation broadly defined. In addition there 
has been an ILO-inspired emphasis on the social dimensions of adjustment, involving a 
focus on social policy and the appropriate institutional framework for delivering social 
protection.
This raises different questions, which can be analysed under the broad headings 
of governance and public policy, but which can also be addressed from the perspective 
of international human rights law and principles. The World Bank also has of late been 
giving much thought to its role in governance, and in establishing the regulatory 
framework of development. Governance issues are an important aspect of structural 
adjustment. During the stabilisation stage in particular, past adjustment orthodoxies 
have been to reduce public spending drastically, and inevitably to reduce state capacities 
to provide social protection, limiting its role to that of providing an enabling 
environment for private sector activities. But it is these orthodoxies that are rightly 
being challenged in many quarters, as a “reaction too far” (Killick, 1997) against the 
perceived need to reduce public spending in the interests of improved economic 
management. In the 1990s, rethinking the role of the state in the control and distribution 
of public assets has become one of the principal debates in development theory.
Above all in Africa, where the state infrastructure has been weakest, severe 
public sector adjustment can have a devastating impact on labour administration, 
including labour inspection, employment services and training capacities, among other 
things. Furthermore, health care, education and other social services are inevitably 
threatened by austerity programmes. In Eastern Europe, where governments are having 
to deal with mass unemployment for the first time, there are tremendous pressures on 
social security systems to maintain the existing levels of social security benefits and also 
to finance unemployment benefits. The role of employment services has changed, as 
they have not only to engage in job placement but also in devising active labour market 
policies in response to rapidly rising unemployment.
There are important ethical questions here, concerning the minimum rights of 
citizens in the area of social protection, and the minimum duties of states and the
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international community to provide such protection. International human rights law 
distinguishes between civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic, social 
and cultural rights on the other. Separate Covenants on both these sets of rights were 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966, and have both been widely 
ratified. The United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights contains a number of provisions covering ILO’s protective and promotional 
labour standards, including the rights to work, and social security and insurance. Recent
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studies undertaken by the United Nations concerned! the impact of structural 
adjustment on economic, social and cultural rights, and on the role of international 
financial institutions in the realisation of these rights (Turk, 1993). They review the 
impact of structural adjustment on human rights including work, food, adequate housing, 
health, education and development. And they contain detailed recommendations 
concerning the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) respectively, as 
well as separate recommendations to the United Nations human rights organs and treaty 
bodies, and to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). They cover both substantive 
issues and procedural mechanisms for improving cooperation between the Bretton 
Woods institutions and the human rights organs of the United Nations, as well as with 
other UN agencies concerned with social matters.
Again, this thesis shall not be taking this approach to its analysis of labour
policy.
1.3.4 Political Economy Approaches
Many economists are now displaying a renewed interest in both empirical and 
theoretical work on the development and role of labour market institutions, including the 
regulatory framework embodied in labour law and standards. Many labour economists, 
aware of the sterility of the more classical labour market analysis, are urging a more 
inter-disciplinary approach which, for want of a better term, may be called the “political 
economy of labour market institutions”. Using the diagnostic tools of the historian and 
the political scientist—and to some extent also of the lawyer—they are asking how labour 
institutions develop, why and under what circumstances they change, and why they are 
more subject to administrative reform in some regions than others. A critical literature is 
now developing above all in Latin America (where the labour movement has been
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historically influential, and labour law rigorously codified since the mid twentieth 
century, but where the pressures of flexibility in labour laws are now unusually strong) 
(Montenegro & Pages 1999; Heckman & Pages 2001; Mondino and Montoya 2000) and 
in the newly industrialising countries of East and South East Asia (where labour laws 
and institutions have historically been weak) (Banuri, 1991; Haggard, Koo and Deyo, 
1987). Regrettably there appears at present to be an absence of such literature in India, 
though it is arguably the sub-continent where labour laws have been more rigorously 
codified, and where analyses of this nature would appear to be most urgently required.
Some of the most significant research concerning the interrelationship between 
adjustment measures and political or labour market institutions has been carried out by, 
or under the auspices of, the World Bank in recent times when social effects of structural 
adjustment have become a larger policy concern at the Bank (Fallon and Lucas, 1991; 
Fallon and Riveros, 1989). Country case studies have been examining the traditional
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perceptions that labour market institutions in different developing countries are obstacles 
to effective adjustment. The preliminary findings of this research have already been 
published in an edition of the ILO’s International Labour Review (Horton et al, 1991). 
The research has since been published in the form of two edited volumes by the World 
Bank (1995).
1.3.5 The Approach in the Thesis
Clearly, then, there are different ways in which the role of labour interventions in 
structural adjustment, as indeed in all development issues, can be addressed. If one is to 
take a strictly legalistic position, then that will be that certain standards must be applied 
because they have the force of law, whether or not they are perceived as a hindrance to 
certain aspects of economic development. A second approach can be based on moral or 
human rights principles. This does not consider the position of law of national or 
international labour standards, or the level of ratification of international labour 
standards, but rather identifies certain internationally recognised human rights that 
should in all cases be protected and enforced. A third approach can be based on 
economic criteria, assessing the value of labour standards through their contribution to 
desirable outcomes and development objectives. The economic argument for labour 
interventions is that they can positively assist economic development, rather than
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providing any form of impediment. A fourth approach, using the tools of political 
economy and empirical analysis, argues that the role of labour interventions depends on 
factors specific to each developing region. This thesis has used the political economy 
approach for its analytical research. This means that although the analysis essentially an 
economic one, it is, nevertheless, heavily supported and informed by historical and 
political insights and an analysis of how institutions evolve.
Having thus specified the approach that will be used for the rest of this thesis, we 
now take a look at why we need to study labour policy in the first place. To understand 
the importance of discussing labour, we must start with discussing employment issues.
1.4 EMPLOYMENT IN INDIA
“More has been written on the unemployment problem o f India than on that o f any other
country in the world”
-Amartya Sen(1972)
The quote above from Amartya Sen was written three decades ago. But despite 
this intense scrutiny of the unemployment problem in India that Sen refers to, Basu, 
Fields and Debgupta (2000) rightly observe that the difficulty with the writings on 
unemployment in the Indian context has been a lack of conceptual rigour in the true 
identification of the problem, or in quantifying the full extent of unemployment.
Myrdal (1968) argues that the Western conception of unemployment is 
inapplicable in the context of India and when we talk about the problem of 
unemployment in India and feels therefore that there was a need to develop a new 
"conceptual kit" (p. 168). The brief discussion below will highlight some of the views of 
the extent of unemployment.
In evaluating employment in India Papola (1994, pgs. 1-2) identified the 
following broad trends shown by the Census of India, 1991 and National Sample Survey 
(NSS) employment data:
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(1) "Employment growth rate over the previous two decades had been o f the order 
o f 2 per cent per annum whereas the growth rate o f the labour force had been o f  
the order o f about 2.5 per cent. Employment growth decelerated in the early 
1990s to 1.5 per cent per annum.
(2) Employment had grown faster in construction, followed by manufacturing and 
services. Among the major sectors, agriculture had had the slowest employment 
growth over the entire period.
(3) In manufacturing the unorganised sector had shown a relatively higher and the 
organised sector a relatively lower average growth rate o f employment.
(4) The reported deceleration in employment had been particularly sharp in 
agriculture and the manufacturing sectors.
(5) Even though the employment structure had undergone some sectoral shifts away 
from agriculture and in favour o f all other sectors, agriculture still continued to 
employ about two-thirds o f the workforce.
(6) The proportion o f the self-employed, who constitute the majority o f workers, had 
declined. There had been a corresponding increase seen in the category o f the 
casual wage earners.
(7) Employment had grown much faster in the urban rather than the rural areas, but 
most o f the growth had been in the informal sector.
(8) In the rural areas, the non-agricultural sector had shown a significantly high 
employment growth, though it still contributed only about 22 per cent o f the total 
employment. ” (pgs 1-2)
The 1991 Census data on employment revealed that, despite a significant 
acceleration of the industrial growth rate during the 1980s, the share of manufacturing in 
total employment had declined (Bhattacharya and Mitra, 1993). Employment growth in 
private organised manufacturing had been negative during the 1980s, and the
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employment elasticity in the manufacturing sector as a whole turned out to be as low as 
0.2. Employment projections for the 1990s based on sectoral employment elasticities in 
the 1980s suggested that there was a substantial addition to the volume of 
unemployment in the first two years of the structural adjustment programme, i.e. during 
1991-93.
While there are considerable difficulties in accurately measuring the extent of 
unemployment in India, what is clear is that the magnitude of unemployment and 
underemployment is very substantial. The unemployed and underemployed comprise an 
immediate and obvious category of the socially excluded. As a result, it is argued, there 
appears to be a growing casualisation of the workforce, with both men and women 
increasingly relying upon insecure and temporary employment rather than self- 
employment or regular jobs (Ghose, 1992,1994,1996,1999).
Many economists have argued that the trends discussed above are largely the result 
of the employment protection legislation in India. We will be evaluating this claim later 
in the thesis. For now, we provide a brief synopsis of the legislative interventions 
enacted by the state to protect labour.
1.5 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION
Aspects of industrial relations, which are governed by collective bargaining in 
the West, are often determined by legislation in India. According to the Indian 
constitution, labour falls in the concurrent list of the Constitution. This means that both 
the central government and the twenty-five state governments can enact labour laws. In 
practice, most laws, although enacted at the national level, are ratified, enforced and 
implemented at the state level. Their effects in the local labour market depend upon how 
rigidly they are enforced and how well they are implemented. Typically, the state 
governments have played a pivotal role in the labour market.
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, under the Indian Constitution, labour is 
considered a "concurrent" subject - meaning both federal and state governments can 
legislate on such issues. The result: 47 federal laws and more than 170 state statutes 
dealing directly with labour. Broadly, the Indian state has legislated on almost all aspects
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of labour policy—union recognition, terms and conditions of employment, wages and 
bonuses, and on exit and layoff procedures.
The main employment protection legislation, in all this, is the Industrial Disputes 
(ID) Act, 1947, which was the first legislation on exit, layoffs and closures, initially 
applied with different degrees of severity to firms employing between 50 and 100 
workers and to firms with 100 or more workers. As it stands today, it is a highly 
complex statement, riddled with caveats, amendments and state-level differences. Firms 
employing fewer than 50 workers fall outside the scope of this clause, according to the 
federal enactment, though not according to many state-level amendments. When first 
introduced, the ID Act did not restrain employers from laying off or retrenching workers 
or closing down unprofitable businesses provided they notified the workers and the 
unions of the intended changes well in advance.1 The provisions relating to payment of 
compensation for layoff and retrenchment were introduced in 1953. An amendment in 
1964 standardised the compensation at 15 days’ average pay for every year of 
continuous service, and required the employer to give the worker and the government a 
month’s notice.
The ID Act did not restrict completely the right of the employer to close an 
unprofitable business. The amendment in 1957 required the employer to compensate the 
workers affected by closure in the same way as if they were retrenched. In the case of 
firm closure, the government declares the establishment “sick” and the firm is required 
to continue functioning on the basis of government subsidies.
This Act underwent three major national-level amendments since 1947, when it 
was first enacted. Each of the three amendments of the Act in 1972,1976 and in 1982 
seemingly gave greater protection to workers than the preceding one. In the current 
amended version employers employing 100 or more workers must give notice of a 
closure to workers or their representatives and to the government, 90 days prior to the 
date of intended closure. The employer, in his request, has to state in detail the reasons 
for closing down the business. The government inquires into them, hears both parties
1 Basu, Fields and Debgupta (2000) explain that in Indian legal language "layoff' refers to dismissal of workers 
because o f slackness in demand and with the intention of re-hiring these workers when business picks up. 
“Retrenchment” refers to a more permanent laying off of workers.
18
and either grants or refuses the permission to close - usually the latter (see Datta 
Chaudhuri and Bhattachaijee, 1994). Refusal has to be communicated to the parties in 
writing within 60 days of the notice from the employer. Employers with 50-99 workers 
need only to notify the government, while those with less than 50 employees need not 
even do that to close their business. However in practice workers in such firms can 
appeal to other laws, such as the Indian Contracts Act, 1972, to resist dismissal.
Therefore, to summarise, currently, the ID Act (chapter V-A) requires an 
establishment employing 50 or more workers, in the case of valid retrenchment, to 
provide the workers with thirty days’ notice and 15 days’ pay for every year of 
continuous work by the worker at the firm. In the case of closure or sale, the employer 
must fulfil the same conditions, unless the successor takes on these obligations (Sections 
25FF and 25FFF).
For an establishment employing 100 or more workers, the ID Act, under chapter 
V-B, requires prior permission from the government before firm closure or worker 
retrenchment. Applications for retrenchments and layoffs with government seldom 
succeed and, of course, knowing that in advance, firms do not make too many such 
applications. This is evident from a short subsection in the Indian Labour Year Book 
1992, (p. 82) entitled "Retrenchment and Lay-off':
"During the period January - August, 1992, four proposals, two each for 
retrenchment and lay-off were received for consideration by the Ministry o f  
Labour. One proposal seeking permission for retrenchment was rejected whereas 
the other remained under consideration o f the Government. One proposal for 
lay-off was withdrawn while the other was found to be not maintainable."
What is the current received and conventional wisdom about the impact of this 
employment protection legislation?
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1.6 SUMMARY OF EXISTING LITERATURE ON THE IMPACT OF 
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION IN INDIA
Basu, Fields and Debgupta (2000), in their excellent theoretical paper on 
employment protection legislation in India, provide a very useful summary of existing 
literature. As discussed above, they emphasise that over the years, the Indian State has 
enacted and implemented a variety of legislation meant to protect the well being of the 
worker. In doing so, they observe with slight bemusement, there are laws protecting 
trade union rights, laws that abolish bonded labour and child labour from hazardous 
industries, legislation guaranteeing a minimum wage and laws to prevent retrenchment, 
layoffs and dismissal of labour (ibid, p. 1).
They reiterate the fact stated above that in India firms employing more than 100 
workers must seek government permission for any retrenchments they wish to make, and 
the workers in these firms are entitled to three months notice of any such action.2 As for 
plant closings, companies employing more than 100 workers must receive government 
permission before any closure; the government may grant or deny permission for such a 
closing, even if the company is losing money on the operation. Broadly, legislation 
covers measures that protect labour from retrenchment by employers.
They observe that the main aim of these regulations is to protect labour and the 
traditional view of such legislation is that it does work to increase the welfare of labour. 
But, they observe, the reality is quite the opposite. They argue that one of the effects of 
such legislation is that it makes the Indian economy less flexible, another effect is to 
reduce the level of desirable activities and adjustments. “When companies encounter 
adverse business conditions, the retrenchment legislation compels them to maintain 
bloated work forces, leaving fewer resources for investment in new production processes 
and lines of activity. Companies that may wish to close current operations and re-deploy 
their resources elsewhere cannot do so.” (Ibid, p. 12)
2 The Government o f India has announced its intention to raise this limit to 1000 in the latest Indian Union Budget 
(2001-2). No action has, however, been yet taken on this front, one year on. The Annual Labour Report has been 
continuously delayed, as the government finds it difficult to achieve political consensus on this matter.
20
These negative side effects of current Indian law must be weighed against the 
intended main-effect, which is to provide greater labour market protection to Indian 
workers. Few studies have considered the pros and cons of restrictive labour 
retrenchment policies. There is an attempt to formulate a theoretical framework for their 
study by Basu, Fields and Debgupta (Basu, Fields and Debgupta, 2000), which weighs 
the presumed negative side effects of the current Indian retrenchment laws against its 
intended main-effect, which is to provide greater labour market protection to Indian 
workers. Their study uses a model specially designed for this purpose based on “realistic 
institutional assumptions and empirical information” (Ibid, p. 14). They point out though, 
that they are not arguing against legislative intervention. In fact they argue that some 
legislative intervention is required. In fact, they concede that there are important labour 
market interventions, which are well justified (Basu, 1995; Fields and Wan, 1989). We 
hold the same position and concur with the authors when they argue that while it is easy 
to make an intervention that at first sight appears to help workers, in reality often times 
such an intervention does not.
Basu, Fields and Debgupta demonstrate how anti-retrenchment legislation may 
have paradoxical effects. For example they theorise that labour legislation in question 
raises labour costs compelling companies to hire fewer workers than they might 
otherwise have, and may preclude these companies from entering a particular product 
line in the first place. They observe that “this last consequence of the legislation is ironic 
because it suggests that, in terms of overall impact, this seemingly protective law may 
actually be harming labourers rather than helping them, by causing a cutback in 
employment and possibly a lowering of wages.” (Ibid, p. 15)
For the European case, an important path breaking study by Bentolila and 
Bertola (1990), analyses the firm level impact of government policies that increase the 
cost of retrenching workers. It hajinspired many of the subsequent studies on the 
subject. The study uses aggregate data from France, Germany, Italy and the UK to 
analyse the labour demand of a single monopolist in the face of changing hiring and 
firing costs. The conclusion, based on a partial equilibrium analysis, is that a higher 
dismissal cost actually increased long-run unemployment.
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Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) in a closely related study using micro-data 
within a general equilibrium framework found that a tax on lay offs significantly reduces 
steady-state employment.
In the Indian context, many other observers (besides Basu, Fields and Debgupta 
2000) have also claimed that India’s protective labour legislation has hurt India’s overall 
growth and efficiency (see Lucas, 1988; Ahluwalia, 1991; Papola, 1994). Basu (1995) 
has shown in a theoretical framework, that labour legislation may have actually hurt the 
very labour it was meant to protect.
Basu, Fields and Debgupta (2000) assert that the rigid retrenchment laws 
increased the costs of adjusting a firm’s employment level and led firms to consider not 
only current market conditions, but also future labour needs while making their labour 
decisions. A firm will therefore, they hypothesise, be reluctant to hire additional workers 
during an economic upturn if it anticipates significant costs in reducing its work force 
during a subsequent downturn. Table 1.1 (taken from their paper) highlights the effect 
of labour protections under the ID Act for firms employing certain numbers of people.
Table 1.1 
Number of Workers by Firm Size
(Firms with Gross Investment 0 to 2 million Rupees)
Firm Size No. of 
Workers 
1982-83
No. of 
Workers 
1990-91
Percentage
change
0 -49 807,421 957,922 18.6
5 0 -9 9 467,418 443,276 -5.2
100-199 392,592 280,631 -28.5
200 + 505,727 288,135 -43.0
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Note: ‘Firm size’ is measured by employment range
Source: Basu, Fields and Debgupta (2000), taken from Annual Survey ofIndustries 1982 - 83: Summary 
Results, CSO Government of India, New Delhi, August 1986. Annual Survey o f Industries 1990 - 91: 
Summary Results, CSO Government o f India, New Delhi, May 1994.
Table 1.1 (Basu, Fields and Debgupta 2000,21) gives the numbers of workers 
employed in firms of different sizes, size being measured in terms of the size of 
employment for 1982-83 and 1990-91. For reasons of comparability of the data Basu, 
Fields and Debgupta restrict attention to firms that have a gross investment in plant and 
machinery not exceeding two million rupees. What these figures illustrate is quite 
remarkable. There is a severe decline in employment in firms employing more than 100 
workers and a mild decrease in firms employing between 50 and 99 workers over time. 
There is, however, a clear increase in employment for small firms - those employing 
between 0 and 49 workers. Basu, Fields and Debgupta conclude that while one needs 
detailed analysis to ascertain the causes of this, it is interesting to note that these changes 
are well in keeping with the amendments in the ID Act which made retrenchment and 
layoff harder for firms of employment size 50 to 99 and more so for firms sized 100 and 
above. We carry out the detailed analysis that they highlight the need for.
In their important contribution in the Journal o f Development Economics, 
published originally in the World Bank Economic Review, Fallon and Lucas (1991) 
come to similar conclusions in their study that empirically examines the job security 
regulations in India and Zimbabwe, two countries with very restrictive retrenchment 
laws. Using a dynamic labour demand framework, they find that the retrenchment laws 
significantly reduced the demand for workers for any given level of output. In particular, 
they estimated that in India, the 1976 amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act (1947) 
reduced the demand for labour by 17.5 per cent, increasing the pressure on the 
unorganised sector to absorb excess labour supply. They were, however, unable to find 
evidence to suggest that firms adjusted to the retrenchment laws by lowering wages or 
by increasing hours per worker.
The impact on the behaviour of employers is also very striking. The hiring (and 
firing) practices of employers have undergone a significant change as a result of these 
labour legislations. Work by Papola (1994), Ramaswamy (1984), Ahluwalia (1991),
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Datta Chaudhuri (1994) and Mathur (1992,1993) broadly agree that employers in India 
have reacted to restrictive labour laws in many, usually negative ways. Basu, Fields and 
Debgupta (2000) summarise and enumerate those negative ways in the following 
manner:
(i) the greater use o f contract; temporary and/or casual labour;
(ii) the expansion o f leasing-in capacity o f small firms;
(iii) the increase in capital intensity and the adoption o f new labour saving 
technologies;
(iv) the use o f golden handshakes;
(v) the setting up o f production in states where labour is not organised or militant, 
and
(vi) the increasing resort to corruption and bribery in order to avoid the legal 
consequences o f retrenchment. ” (p. 28)
Basu, Fields and Debgupta also highlight another result of restrictive labour laws 
is the continuous attempts made by the employers to circumvent the law and escape 
penalties. They use case studies to illustrate their point and to bring to light the strategies 
used by management:
(a) Use o f Lockout as a means Towards Closure: They use the case of the the Murphy 
Electronics Company in Bombay (Mumbai), which, fearing that the Government would 
not grant permission to close down one of its plants that produced television and radio 
equipment, decided to use lockouts and promoted inter-union rivalries as the pressure 
tactic to get rid of workers. During the period of lockout, the management made 
arrangements to carry on production of Murphy products produced completely by small 
sub-contractors by stamping its own label. The result was that out of the 2,500 workers 
only 497 remained and the strategy helped the management to get the plant to be 
declared a sick unit by the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) in 
1988. This method of “backdoor” firing is very common and can be seen in many 
instances, including Binny Textile Mills, Scooters India Ltd and the Tata Iron and Steel 
Company Limited.
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(b) Sub-contracting: It has been noted by many observers of the Indian economy (see 
Ahluwalia, 1991,1992a, 1992b; Bhattacharya and Mitra, 1993 and Davala, 1992b) that 
sub-contracting out production by big firms to small firms has become a major technique 
by which the large firms try to reduce their costs and pressure the unionised workers to 
leave or accept voluntary retirement schemes. The retrenchment law is silent on sub­
contracting and management can effectively force a lock-out or face a strike without a 
major loss to them. Many companies, like TELCO for example, sub-contract every little 
function to private companies, thus casualising the majority of their effective work force. 
A worker may work in a Tata plant for 20 years or more, and still not be a Tata 
employee (personal fieldwork).
(c) Transfer o f Ownership: It has been noted that while Section 25(0) of the ID Act 
makes it obligatory to seek permission for closure, it does not require any permission in 
cases of transfer of ownership from one company to another (Basu, Fields and 
Debgupta, 2000). It is not incumbent on the new owners to retain all the workers and 
employees of the old company. Alembic Glass Works in Bangalore and Baroda to 
retrench workers successfully used this strategy (Basu, Fields and Debgupta 2000, p.
30).
(d) Total Closures: Basu, Fields and Debgupta (2000) use the case of the workers of 
Mafatlal Engineering, who have waged a long struggle against the management.
Recently Mafatlal Engineering was converted into an employee-owned corporation after 
a long legal struggle. The earlier management wanted total firm closure against the 
wishes of the workers.
These cases are just a representation of a large number of ways firm management 
have addressed the rigid retrenchment laws. Basu, Fields and Debgupta note, “What is 
interesting and, from our point of view, the relevant point in all these examples, is how 
little contracts play a role in the Indian labour market. The existence of exogenous rules 
governing employer-employee relation has relegated independent contracts to a 
relatively unimportant position, robbing the labour market of flexibility.” (p. 32)
They highlight yet another area affected negatively by restrictive labour laws— 
namely the number and frequency of labour disputes. In India the labour market has
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been characterised by disputes, recurrent strikes and work stoppages. They note that 
working days lost in India per thousand workers due to industrial disputes in 1979 was 
1280 as against 10 in Sweden, 60 in Japan, 200 in France, 370 in West Germany, 840 in 
UK and 1080 in USA. It is argued that, by severely limiting the scope of voluntary 
contracting between workers and employers, India's labour laws may have, far from 
mitigating strife, contributed to it. In particular, the incidence of lockouts in the private 
sector has risen sharply. In 1973, there were 6,764 work days lost to lockouts. In 1988, 
the figure was 21,417 (Ministry of Labour, 1989). In part, they suppose, this may be a 
response to the amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in the 1970s and 80s, 
as discussed above. Even if we ignore the effects of such laws on the economy as a 
whole and focus instead on labour welfare, it is difficult to come out with unequivocal 
results. Basu, Fields and Debgupta, thus summarise at one place the arguments and 
hypotheses of a large body of Indian economists thinking about this area. We take this 
analysis further, and ' test some of their theories.
This thesis aims to analyses and understand the impact of employment protection 
legislation of the kind described above. It also asks the further question: Why do 
different democracies have variable success in reforming their labour market 
regulations? Recent politico-economic literature has begun to address this important 
question. In particular some attempts have been made to analyse the likelihood of labour 
market reform programmes surviving the political process. The main argument of this 
literature is that the labour market reforms that are discussed are not Pareto-improving 
moves. Instead, they redistribute income from formally employed insiders to the 
formally unemployed (or informally employed) outsiders. This point has been put 
forward by Saint Paul (2000), who argues that "many of the reforms that would reduce 
unemployment are unpopular because they would remove regulations that benefit the 
insiders." (p. 2). Thus, given that outsiders outnumber the insiders, why is it that 
reforms fail politically? Why do democracies not select programmes for labour market 
reform that do make everybody better off? This thesis uses different states of the Indian 
Union as different democracies to try and answer this question.
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1.7 CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ORGANISATION OF THESIS
To recapitulate, this thesis asks the following questions:
1. What are the foundations of labour legislation, especially employment protection 
(or job security) legislation in India? How can we best situate the evolution of 
labour regulations in the larger context of the evolution of the political economy 
of India over the last half century or more?
2. What is the impact of job security regulations in India? How do we explain our 
results?
3. Can we rank the different Indian states in order of strictness of job security 
regulations?
4. If yes, then can we analyse a state-wise impact of differing levels of job-security 
regulations in different Indian states?
5. If yes, then what are some of the political economy variables that could explain 
the differing success in achieving job security deregulation by different states of 
the same Indian Union?
The story being told through this thesis is the following:
Chapter 2 examines the foundations of labour legislation, particularly job 
security legislation, in India, and attempts to situate it in context of the political- 
economic-historical evolution of the Indian state. It establishes the nature of the 
patrimonial state in India, and the various patterns of interest groups and rent-seeking 
behaviour that this gave rise to. It describes how employers and organised labour have 
influenced the labour regulatory framework to further their rent-seeking objectives. It 
also points out that unlike developed industrial economies, job security regulations in
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India were not fought for and won from below, but imposed from above by an educated 
elite steeped in western liberalism.
Chapter 3 summarises the qualitative fieldwork research carried out by myself
in the period 1995-98. These include structured and unstructured interviews and 
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primary observations, ~ . diary. This is combinejlwith important
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insights provided by the Bombay Labour Flexibility Survey, on which I was a Research 
Associate. This chapter, along with Chapter 2, sets the stage for the quantitative analysis 
in Chapters 4 and 5. It shows how and why we formed the impression that labour laws 
in India do not help labour, but instead help to preserve, propagate and perpetuate a 
political economy of rent-seeking based on five decades of a cosy relationship between 
the state, capital and organised labour.
Chapter 4 assesses the impact of job security regulations in India, using firm-
level data collected by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE), as well
as household-level National Sample Survey (NSS) data. This analysis is done at a
national level, and not broken up by state. We find that the analysis on both sets of data
produces the same result: increasing job security has an adverse impact on both firm-
performance, as well as worker welfare in India. There is a significant negative impact
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on employment. Although we begin the thesis with an open , looking at all sides 
of the debate, our findings strongly support the distortion view espoused by the World 
Bank. We find that male, educated, high human capital workers working for large firms 
are most likely to comer protected jobs, while the majority of the labour force remains 
unprotected. Further, we find that firm-level data tells us that job security regulations 
have a negative impact in employment growth.
Chapter 5 ranks twenty-four of the twenty-five Indian states on the basis o f the 
strictness of the job security regulation as enforced in those states. All states function 
within the constitutional parameters set by the Indian constitution, but have a limited and 
significant amount of policy discretion stipulated by the Constitution, and also because 
enforcement o f regulation takes place at the state-level, and can, and does, differ from 
state to state. As such, these states present an ideal sample to carry out a controlled 
regression analysis to show the differential impact of job security regulation strictness in 
these states, as well the causes for this differential impact. The former is done in this
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chapter, and the latter in Chapter 6. Chapter 5 finds that high levels of job security 
affect employment of nearly all categories negatively, and unemployment of nearly all 
categories positively. This further reinforces our support of the distortion view.
Chapter 6 asks the question: What factors help to explain differences in labour 
(and other) economic policy choices among these state-level democratic governments? 
It outlines the different arguments in the political economy literature that offer answers 
to this question. Subsequently, this chapter tests the applicability of these arguments to 
ten state governments in India, from 1985-1997, to explain why these states differ in 
their degree of market openness. These states make for useful comparisons. Since the 
1980s, they have varied widely in their ability to initiate and sustain market reforms 
despite the fact that most of their policy makers and governmental leaders have pledged 
their support for more orthodox reforms. Using a Time-Series Cross-Sectional (TSCS) 
data set, this chapter constructs a model of policy choice for the ten states. It includes a 
number of variables that represent political and economic constraints on policy choice. 
The findings suggest that a centralised executive and a highly polarised party system are 
important for initiating and sustaining more orthodox policies.
Chapter 7 pulls together the arguments from the different analyses contained in the 
different chapters, and provide a conclusion to the story that we have outlined above.
*  *
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CHAPTER 2
EVOLUTION OF JOB SECURITY REGULATION IN INDIA
As in many other developing countries, the huge labour market in India is 
characterised by a large pool of ill-paid workers in insecure employment who are de 
facto unprotected by law, coexisting with a small unionised segment holding relatively 
secure, career-oriented jobs. It has often been suggested that in a situation of 
superfluous labour, stringent provisions of labour laws and power of trade unions 
together are to be blamed for the effort on the part of employers to avoid hiring regular 
employees and (to the extent possible) have the work done through subcontracting or by 
casual workers—efficiency wage theories notwithstanding (Mathur, 1989; 1991a; 1991b; 
1992; 1993). Available Indian data in recent times do indeed show such a rise in . ■ 
insecure employment, both in absolute and in relative terms, although it may be difficult 
a priori to ascribe any specific portion of that rise to the factors mentioned above.
While the quantification of such effects is useful, it is equally important 
to decipher whether such phenomena, to the extent they exist, are socially acceptable, if 
not on moral at least on pragmatic grounds (Datta Chaudhuri, 1994). For if they indeed 
are acceptable, enacting laws alone will not amount to much. The issue has to be 
analysed in the context of the complex pattern of inter-linkages between the social and 
political foundations of labour legislation in the country as well as its moral and ethical 
roots. Also important is the manner in which public opinion is moulded in matters of 
what is ethical and what is practicable. Even more important are the connections 
between the two in popular belief, the linkages between social sanction and judicial 
decisions, and the actual operation of labour laws in the context of a highly fragmented 
labour market (Holmstrom, 1998; Solow, 1990). The next section is an attempt to chart 
out these inter-linkages with reference to Indian industry as it exists today.
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.1 discusses the inter-linkages 
between wages, earnings and terms of employment in India. Section 2.2 discusses the 
philosophical foundations of labour legislation in India, and highlights the implications 
of it being a case of altruism from above, rather than hard-fought concessions from
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below. Section 2.3 discusses the linkages between labour law and society and polity in 
India. Section 2.4 asks the question: what do labour rigidities really mean for the Indian 
case, with its highly segmented market containing a small protected “rigid” section and 
very large and increasingly unprotected segments for the rest of the labour force?
Section 2.5 provides an exhaustive discussion of job security in India. Section 2.6 
carries that discussion forward by providing a history of job security regulation in India. 
Section 2.7 moves further from the chronological evolution of job security regulation, to 
the legislative evolution of job security regulation in India. Section 2.8 discusses 
various aspects of the implementation of such regulations. Section 2.9 provides a 
discussion about job security, labour flexibility and employment. Section 2.10 
speculates about how much security can and do job security regulations actually 
provide? Section 2.11 concludes the chapter, and together with Section 2.10, sets the 
stage for Chapter 3, where the qualitative fieldwork research is presented.
2.1 WAGES, EARNINGS AND TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT IN URBAN 
INDIA
The labour market in urban India is highly stratified. As of 1983 total 
employment in urban India was of the order of 57.84 million, of which 24.21 million 
was said to be within the organised sector; 16.87 million in the public sector and 7.34 
million in the organised private sector (Mukhopadhyaya, 1997). Thus at least three out 
of five urban workers were in the unorganised sector. This is only the lower bound, 
because a number of workers who are employed by large units may have been working 
as casual or contract workers. In absolute and in relative terms, worker vulnerability has 
been high and may in fact have been rising in recent years.
There are a number of macroeconomic indicators of this increased vulnerability. 
Between 1973 and 1983, the number of causal wage labourers in Indian cities and towns 
rose from 4.8 million to over 10 million. In 1983, over two-fifths of the total male 
workforce and nearly half of the female workforce were self-employed. A large 
majority of these self-employed people were in low-productivity, low-income services 
and trading activities. This is corroborated by the 1980 Economic Census data, which 
show that of all those working in urban enterprises nearly one-third were in own-account 
units, namely very small establishments that are run, predominantly, with the help of
31
unpaid family workers and not even one hired person in a regular basis. A large number 
of the remaining two-thirds were employed by small establishments outside the purview 
of the Factories Act, at precarious pay and terms of employment.
In 1990-91, the entire organised sector employed, on a rough reckoning, about 8 
per cent of the total employed labour force in the country. Only about 8 million (7.4 
million according to the Ministry of Labour and 8.2 million according to the Central 
Statistical Office) of these worked in industries (manufacturing and electricity, gas and 
water); they constituted just over 29 per cent of the organised sector employees and just 
over 2 per cent of the total employed labour force of the country (ILO, 1996).
But, the employment security regulations strictly apply to establishments 
employing 100 or more workers. According to the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), 
5.8 million people worked in industrial establishments employing 100 or more workers. 
If it is assumed that all public sector employees in non-industrial activities enjoy the 
benefits of employment security, the total number of people enjoying these benefits 
works out to 22 million or 6.5 per cent of the total employed labour force in the country 
(ILO, 1996).
So, a small group of workers, especially those in the public sector, and a yet 
smaller number in the organised private sector have been in a rather enviable position. 
However, for various reasons, employment in the latter has been stagnant, at times even 
declining, in recent years (World Bank, 1989, Kannan, 1994; Bhalotra, 1998).
Official documents define a public sector establishment as one that is owned, 
controlled or managed by:
(i) the Government or a department of the Government;
(ii) a government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act of 1956;
(iii) a corporation or a cooperative society established by a central or state Act which is 
owned, controlled or managed by the Government; or
(iv) a local authority.
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While terms and conditions of employment vary quite a bit between different 
branches of the public sector, regular employees in all branches of the public sector 
enjoy full employment security. Since profits are not supposedly the guiding principle 
of operation in public sector concerns engaged in the production of goods and services, 
accountability for poor performance is low, so much so that the popular image of public 
sector enterprises (PSEs) is one of de facto non-accountability for inefficiency. 
Employees of PSEs under the central government, like the Steel Authority of India Ltd., 
or Coal India Ltd., totalling about 2 million workers, enjoy constitutional guarantees in 
line with those enjoyed by government civil servants in the various administrative 
departments of the central government.
At the same time, they enjoy a number of benefits available to industrial workers 
which are not available to the latter. To cite an example, they are entitled to a dearness 
allowance (DA) or cost-of-living neutralisation formula, fixed at Rs. 1.65 per point rise 
in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), whereas the corresponding figure applicable to 
central government employees under the ruling of the fourth pay commission is Rs. 1.23. 
By past experience, it is indicated that DA revision takes place once about every four 
years for employees in PSEs, which is about three times as often as central government 
employees can hope for. Strong union pressures have resulted in a steady upward trend 
in the pay and allowances of public sector employees. The average emoluments of 
employees of PSEs between 1970-71 and 1984-85 registered an increase of about 344 
per cent, while during the same period, the CPI increased by only 270 per cent. All this 
happened during a period of low or negative profits and dwindling productivity in many 
of these undertakings.
Clearly, productivity and ability to pay of the undertaking have not been criteria 
in pay fixation. A regular unskilled worker in a central public sector concern earned 
about Rs. 50 a day, while a miner, covered by the Minimum Wages Act (MWA) was 
paid Rs. 12 a day, and in most parts of the country, an agricultural labourer, also covered 
by the MWA, could hope to make at most Rs. 11a day, and that in the rare cases where 
the letter of the law was followed. While degrees vary, the story was similar in most 
branches of the public sector, as well as in the administrative departments, whether at the 
central or state level (Mukhopadhyaya, 1997).
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This is not to suggest that the entire problem of inefficiency and stagnation in 
public sector undertakings is one of workers’ overpay, and that efficiency and 
productivity in these concerns would automatically go up if one could by some device 
contain their workers’ demands for pay increases. The point being emphasised here is 
simply that emoluments and conditions of work vary enormously across different groups 
of workers, well beyond what is warranted by differences in skills or productivity. 
Moreover, paradoxically enough, the heterogeneity is sustained, among other things, by 
the selectivity of labour laws, as applicable to specific groups of workers. This is 
paradoxical because labour laws were supposed to get rid of just such heterogeneity, due 
to which one group of workers is disadvantaged relative to another, not due to 
differences in efficiency or productivity, but because of the arbitrariness of the law.
2.2 PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LABOUR LEGISLATION IN 
INDIA
Almost in line with the fragmented nature of the labour market, the set of labour 
laws, consisting of legal statutes and case material, currently in existence in the country, 
can be looked upon as falling into two broad modal categories—one for formal sector 
employees and the other for unorganised sector workers, although one can find a number 
of instances where they do cut across both categories. In broad terms again, the 
evolution of these two kinds of law can be traced to somewhat different sets of factors 
(Deshpande, 1979; 1992; Deshpande and Deshpande, 1992).
Much of the legal structure and philosophy in India is inherited from the British 
and is rooted in the doctrines of common law. The statutory rights of collective 
bargaining as conferred by the Trade Unions Act of 1926 was more a reflection of 
similar legislation enacted by the United Kingdom rather than the result of an indigenous 
labour movement (James, 1959; Bhattachaijee and Datta Chaudhri, 1994a, Jackson 
1972; Ramaswamy, 1988,1994). Here, as elsewhere, such legislation was instituted as a 
counter to the prevailing common law doctrine of criminal conspiracy which suggests 
that the concerted action of an organised group may affect society in a different and far 
stronger manner than if the same act were committed by individuals. Similarly, the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1923 was enacted to counter the common law doctrine 
of criminal negligence.
34
It seems obvious that statutes that purport to invest workers as a group with 
various rights, including the right of association, could not have derived their major 
substance from tenets of moral philosophy, which have a strong individualistic bias. 
Thus, the guiding principles behind such legislation may be traced not so much to the 
prevailing libertarian theories of justice, but more to such factors as the international 
socialist and working class movements, changing forms of social justice, as embodied in 
the concept of the welfare state, the success of the Russian Revolution and the founding 
of the ILO in 1919, to which India was a signatory.
It is important to realise that these and most other pieces of post-independence 
labour legislation dealing with industrial relations, like the Industrial Disputes Act of 
1948 and some of the social legislation measures like the Employees’ State Insurance 
Act of 1948 or the Employees’ Provident Fund Act of 1952, are meant to protect the 
rights of, and confer benefits to, only regular workers in the organised sector. Under the 
Industrial Disputes Act, ad hoc or casual workers are not entitled to any compensation in 
the event of a lay-off. They and others of their kind in small establishments are not 
covered by the Employees’ State Insurance Act, nor are they entitled to provident fund 
benefits. There are some special Acts covering specific groups of workers, for instance 
the Plantations Labour Act of 1951, the Dock Workers (Regulation) Act of 1948 and the 
Motor Transport Workers Act of 1961 or the Mines Act of 1952, which have some 
provisions covering workers in such establishments. Provisions vary from case to case, 
depending on the size of the establishment, the nature of the industry concerned, and the 
status of employment. In any event, for a large majority of workers, the benefits 
conferred by such legislation are negligible, or even non-existent.
However, there is another set of statutory measures, by and large of a fairly 
recent origin, which invoke certain fundamental rights and principles laid out in the 
Constitution of India, and which are targeted mainly towards unorganised sector 
workers. According to a ruling of the Supreme Court of India, the fundamental rights 
(Part III) conferred on the citizens of India in the Constitution of the country, along with 
the Preamble and the Directive principles of State Policy (Part IV), constitute the core of 
the Constitution, which is not subject to amendment by Parliament. The Indian 
Constitution confers a number of fundamental rights to all citizens irrespective of caste,
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creed, religion or sex. The Directive Principles of the Constitution provide for such 
constitutional goals as the right to work (Article 41), just and humane conditions of work 
(Article 42) and a living wage for all (Article 43). Time and again such constitutional 
provisions have been invoked to enact fresh labour laws. Examples of such statutes in 
recent years are the Child Labour Act of 1987, the Inter-State Migrant Workers 
(Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act of 1979, the Equal 
Remuneration Act of 1976 and the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act of 
1970.
Such statutory laws, aimed at achieving constitutional goals, form an integral 
part of the labour law of the country. The Preamble to the Indian Constitution upholds 
the principles of liberty and equality and fraternity. It abrogates discrimination on the 
grounds of sex, creed, or religion and preaches equality in the eyes of law for all. The 
links between such principles and the received tenets in the liberal theories of justice are 
reasonably direct and straightforward, even when one takes latter day versions of such 
theories as expounded by Rawls (1971) or Barry (1973). There might be some 
disagreement on the question as to whether similar statements can be made about the 
provision of preferential treatment of disadvantaged groups, like members of the 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes as specified in the Constitution.
The principle of equality is subject to a lot of inner tensions. Nevertheless, one 
could invoke the tenet of procedural justice to uphold such constitutional provisions. In 
fact, the Rawlsian second principle of justice has been used to support the affirmative 
action programmes in the USA (Goodman, 1979), and similar arguments can be invoked 
to establish the system of reservations for disadvantaged classes in the Indian 
Constitution as well (Anand, 1987). While elaboration of these linkages is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, one can perhaps make the statement that the philosophical basis of 
such constitutional provisions, and through them of labour laws, that have been enacted 
invoking such provisions, can be traced not so much to the group-based working-class 
movements, but to prevailing individualistic theories of justice and human rights.
In other words, these laws are not the result of bottom-up “taking” by a working 
class movement, but rather the result of top-down “giving” by a liberal elite, educated 
and steeped in western liberalism. But where western protective labour law has been
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hard fought and hard won, this is not the case in India, particularly after independence in 
1947.
The implications of this are somewhat paradoxical. To the extent that the worker 
has certain legal guarantees invoked by individualistic notions of justice, the violation of 
such law puts him or her as an individual against an immeasurably more powerful 
opponent: namely the employer. Given the prohibitively high transactions costs of legal 
disputes and enormous difference in the economic, political and organisational power of 
the two parties involved, such individual rights have no cutting edge and are virtually 
non-justiciable (Mukhopadhyay, 1997).
Thus the distinction between the first kind of labour laws and the second (i.e. 
those enshrined in legal acts of parliament, as opposed to those implicit in the 
constitutional provisions), is not merely in terms of their historical and philosophical 
roots, but also in terms of their 'implementability’, to coin a word. In the case of the 
first set of regulations, which applied to organised sector workers, the workers are 
unionised and are generally well aware of their rights and privileges, while the 
government can have good control on implementation of the letter of the law. For the 
second group, implementation of laws is an administratively difficult, if not infeasible, 
proposition, while workers themselves are either unaware of their legal rights or 
powerless to enforce their enactment. Thus the dichotomy in labour law persists 
alongside fragmentation in the labour market. This is a very important point indeed.
2.3 LABOUR LAW: LINKAGES WITH SOCIETY AND POLITY
The linkages between labour laws on the one hand, and social sanction and 
public opinion on the other, cut both ways. At one level, one can argue that, to the extent 
that the constitution of the country reflects the goals and aspirations of the polity, all 
statutes that seek to codify the constitutional provisions have social sanction behind 
the?* At a less abstract level, all laws, including labour laws, have to be passed by a 
Parliament, which consists of elected representatives of the people and, hence, by some 
kind of transitivity argument, cannot grossly violate the prevailing majority opinion—at 
least not consistently. Case law, which forms and integral part of the legal structure, 
reflects the prevailing values and norms of social justice as embedded in the social and
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moral philosophical thinking of the court sometime invoking principles that go beyond 
the strict wording of the law. Finally, in a democracy, that part of statutory law that 
embodies the public policy of the executive also cannot run grossly counter to prevailing 
public opinion—at least in the Indian democracy, by virtue of the way governments are 
formed.
However, laws do not operate in a vacuum. The legal process evolves in 
conjunction with the prevailing economic system, public policy and the mode of 
functioning of the executive. For instance, what has emerged as the most important 
statutory provision on industrial relations in India, i.e. the Industrial Disputes Act of 
1947, has very little to say on collective bargaining as a method of settling industrial 
disputes. Its main emphasis is on tripartite arbitration as a conflict resolution mechanism 
with the third party, that is the State, as the single most important repository of power. 
This is in sharp contrast to the experience of the United States of America on the United 
Kingdom until recent times, where official policy has been to foster the growth of 
healthy and responsible collective bargaining practices pretty nearly overshadowing the 
role of the legal process in industrial disputes (Kahn-Freund, 1967; Commons, 1950; 
Katz, 1993).
Contrary to this, the official policy in India since the early 1950s has been 
systematically biased against a healthy development of collective bargaining practices 
on the twin pretexts that the unions are not strong enough to face the employers across 
the bargaining table without the support of the State, and that unmitigated industrial 
disputes will hamper productivity and slow down economic growth. As a result, since 
the beginning of the fifties, the official stance has almost always been towards 
maintaining industrial peace through compulsory tripartite arbitration (Ramaswamy, 
1984). (That this has not succeeded is of course obvious from the high number of man- 
days lost to industrial action by workers, or “lock-outs” by employers). The larger trade 
unions in the country have come to depend on the state machinery as a crutch for 
support, and the State has been a ubiquitous presence in all kinds of wage negotiations 
and industrial disputes (Bhattachaijee and Datta Chaudhri, 1994b; Bhattachaijee, 1987a, 
1987b). In the process, these unions have not merely developed a dependent and greedy 
mentality with little sense of responsibility, but have also become irrevocably 
politicised. In fact, the large unions in India operate more as labour wings of the major
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political parties. The rights without responsibilities approach of the big Indian trade 
unions has resulted in the emergence of what the Planning Commission has termed as 
“high wage islands” in a sea of low earnings. The continuous growth of the public sector 
in India has come to be seen as not as a necessity spurred by economic logic, but as a 
means of patronage distribution in return for political support. Under the Industrial 
Disputes Act, economically non-viable large private sector units cannot close down 
easily- a provision meant to assure employment security to organised sector workers. 
Once such units are declared sick, they are taken over by the Government.
The policy is favoured both by inept management who can write off their losses 
with impunity and by workers’ unions who become entitled to greater benefits in the 
process (Saibaba and Mohana Rao, 1992; Sangma, 1995; Seth, 1993). The perverse logic 
of the situation has done nothing to promote industrial efficiency in the country. 
Similarly, nationalisation of industrial units has generally found favour with workers’ 
unions. It is difficult to discern how much of the enthusiasm for public take-overs can be 
explained in terms of pecuniary gains to interested parties and how much by adherence 
to socialist ideals.
At the other end of the spectrum are the large masses of unprotected workers 
who can derive little solace from the fact that the Directive Principles of the Constitution 
of the country guarantee them “a decent standard of life”. Their reservation price is low 
and, lacking any kind of organisation, they are not in a position to demand decent wages 
or secure employment. Nor does the economic rationale work in their favour, for if the 
public image of formal sector labour is one of less efficient and less responsible labour, 
it may even seem only fair that small-scale employers will strive to retain their small- 
scale stamp by restricting the number of regular workers to below the magic mark of ten 
employees with power or twenty without, while getting into all kinds of flexible work 
arrangements with unattached labour for extra work (Mukhopadhyay, 1989; Standing 
and Tokman, 1989).
Income security for workers need not necessarily breed inefficiency, except 
under very special circumstances. The seeming unaccountability of a large section of 
public sector employees is the product of the manner in which growth of responsible 
“norm” - based collective bargaining practices has been thwarted in India, and the virtual
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absence of any productivity related incentive structure in public sector concerns. One 
must not also forget that the entire system functions in a highly politicised atmosphere, 
where it would be patently unfair to single out the workers’ unions as the sole agents 
responsible for the poor performance of this sector.
However, in popular belief the step from positive statements to normative pre­
conceptions is only a small one. If unionised workers have in some situation been seen 
to act irresponsibly, the verdict may well be that it is sensible to switch to unorganised 
workers, so long as that option is open. It is little wonder that regular employment in the 
organised private sector has been virtually stagnant for many years now. The numerous 
methods used by employers to restrict the number of regular workers on their payroll are 
well known. It is easy to confuse issues, and by-passing the letter of the law may even 
come to gain a measure of sanctity in the public eye if it can be backed by evidence of 
irresponsible use of it by sections of the “ other party”.
Meanwhile, given the overall direction of developmental strategy in the country, 
the constitutional provision of ensuring “ a living wage to all workers—agricultural, 
industrial or otherwise” (article 43 of the Indian Constitution), continues to have very 
little cutting edge in terms of the prevailing economic reality. Thus laws that invoke 
such constitutional provisions also tend to end up as paper tigers. They come to be seen 
as no more than pious pronouncements or at best, goals to be achieved by society in 
some distant future (Mukhopadhyay, 1989).
The concept of labour market rigidities, therefore, needs rather more careful 
consideration before being accepted as a valid cause of industrial inefficiency, or, 
viewed from the opposite angle, a key component of the solution. The catch-all term of 
“labour market rigidity” needs to be unpackaged, and its several dimensions viewed 
separately (Ghose, 1995). All actions and features which are deemed to interfere with 
the open-market, unfettered and unencumbered striking of labour contracts in the labour 
market, have been labelled “rigidities” (Kulkami, 1996). Some of these could be 
structural in nature; others could be institutional, or creations of government action, 
though it must not be too quickly assumed that such intervention has always rendered 
labour more, rather than less, expensive; some could reflect more customary or 
traditional (i.e., non-market) social arrangements; others could be the products of
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concerted organised intervention by labour organisations and unions. Some of these 
“rigidities" could well have been constitutionally codified and thus enjoy legal sanction, 
reflecting a more basic social contract, if not consensus.
2.4 WHAT DO LABOUR RIGIDITIES MEAN IN INDIA?
There are several people who have put forward several reasons for arguing that 
the existence of labour market rigidities, as conventionally defined, in India is largely a 
myth, or at the very least, an exaggeration (Saith, 1992, Mathur, 1992; Patnaik, 1996; 
Kannan, 1994). Some of their arguments are summarised below.
First, it is necessary to adopt an appropriate macro perspective. The urban 
labour force may be divided between the “organised” and the “unorganised” segments.
In the former could be placed the employees of large-scale manufacturing, services and 
public administration. Small-scale manufacturing and other amorphous service activities 
would constitute the other component. As mentioned above, in India, the share of the 
labour force in the organised sector is less than one-tenth of the labour force.
The rural labour segment of the total labour force in any case dwarfs the urban 
segment; in turn the urban organised segment is but a small proportion of the total urban 
work force. The workers in the rural sector, the urban small scale sector and the 
informal sector, petty services, trade and commerce, are all generally beyond the 
purview of any nominal or effective legal or union protection. They are essentially 
unorganised, with very few exceptions. They are also highly mobile spatially and in 
terms of activities and forms of employment. As such, for the overwhelmingly large 
proportion of the workforce, the argument of labour market rigidity simply does not 
apply.
Second, even within the organised manufacturing sector, which falls within the 
ambit of labour laws, the effective power of labour unions is varied. More often than 
not, organised labour has a temporary disruptive capability, but there is little evidence 
that union actions have led to extra-market increases in wages or perks.
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Third, the formal or legal declaration of rights for workers does not necessarily 
mean that they are observed, or that they can be legally enforced by the courts through 
actions by the workers, since the legal system is a law unto itself. For instance, the 
existence of the statutory minimum wages is often cited as evidence of labour market 
rigidities without any accompanying evidence to show that these minimum wages are 
actually above what the market would throw up, or even if such minimum wages are in 
fact, higher, that they are ever really enforced.
Fourth, even in the organised manufacturing sector, in the context of which the 
existence of labour market rigidities is most often presumed, it is overlooked that most 
large enterprises circumvent such problems through the device of sub-contracting parts 
of the production process to auxiliary units which operate with impunity outside the 
scope of factory laws.
Fifth, there is evidence of increased recourse to casual labour in the production 
process; such labour is often fully, perhaps overly, flexible.
n
Sixth, wherever possible, production is carried out on piece wage paym ent^ 
implying that at least the relationship between time, productivity and payment is 
amenable to the use of interlocking markets; these usually allow the employer to extract 
superior net terms from labour than might otherwise have been possible.
Seventh, for the great mass of'self-employed’ labour, flexibility is built through 
the ex-post determination of the implicit wage rate. Studies of the returns to self- 
employment generally come up with the finding that the implicit returns to labour are 
well below the poverty line equivalent.
Eighth, there is evidence that when long-standing wage payment arrangements 
throw up wage rates which conflict with what might have been labour-market outcomes, 
the former are steadily eroded. Institutional arrangements also respond to market 
conditions, and embody greater flexibility than might be attributed to them by casual 
observers.
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Ninth, there is evidence of spontaneous as well as organised spatial labour 
mobility in the form of in-migration in to regions where the local labour market develops 
signs of tightness generated by market conditions or interventions by labour 
organisations. Evidence in this regard, is available from Kerala, Gujarat, and Punjab. In 
these situations, in-migrants tend to receive lower than locally going wage rates, and 
suffer conditions which are categorically inferior.
Tenth, in several instances, where labour organisation has tabled demands and 
adopted an “uncooperative” stance, the response has been brutally repressive.
All or part of this may indeed be valid, but in our opinion, it does not succeed in 
denying the potentially restrictive effects of labour organisation in confrontational 
environments (Kerala, West Bengal, etc.) (Kannan, 1988; Kannan, 1994). The situations 
pertaining in these cases are end points of long historical processes, which have had a 
powerful influence on both the regional, and the national growth process.
It is also necessary to point out the widespread prevalence of labour market 
rigidities of a different kind, viz., those involving the repression of workers’ freedom of 
choice with regard to work. In important ways, as will be shown, they are also by­
products of the nature of labour legislative framework and infrastructure in India.
In India, at present, there are likely to be far more workers in the vulnerable 
category, who suffer acute forms of distress and destitution than those who are alleged to 
be cocooned in protected labour aristocracies. It must be understood that they represent 
yet another form of market imperfection, as important, if not more so, than those 
involving power of a countervailing nature: trade unions and collective bargaining. 
Coerced, or effectively bonded labour is patently not equitable, but neither is it efficient 
in the economic context. Labour regulation in India has caused the wrong sort of 
rigidity—one that has hurt both efficiency and equity.
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2.5 JOB SECURITY IN INDIA
It has been commonly and persuasively argued that the employment protection or 
job security regulations, currently prevailing in India, have created severe rigidities in 
the organised segment of the labour market. They are supposed to create critical 
impediments to industrial restructuring and also to discourage employment growth by 
increasing the cost of hiring additional labour. These problems, it has been argued, had 
been evident even before the reform process, currently under way, was initiated. But, as 
Ghose (1996) observes, “the reforms, by promoting greater integration of the Indian 
economy into the world economy, have served to bring them into sharper focus and thus 
to underline the urgency of finding satisfactory solutions. As Indian industry confronts 
growing external competition, the need for restructuring increases correspondingly. 
Moreover, the high cost of hiring labour may either act as a deterrent to foreign 
investment or confine it to high-tech industries.” (p. 46)
Even though these views are widely held, methodical efforts to examine their 
soundness and/or bearing have been few. On the other hand, it is must also be accepted 
that job security is of major concern to workers for perfectly legitimate reasons. In an 
economy where state-provided social security is virtually non-existent and where "good 
jobs" are rare, employment security in the organised segment is of some value. The 
issue, therefore, is not merely one of removing rigidities; it is also one of simultaneously 
ensuring economic and social security of the workers. In other words, it is a question of 
efficiency as well as equity.
In what follows, for which we partly rely on various ILO studies as well as 
independent research, the existing system of employment security is critically examined 
with a view to answering two fundamental questions: To what extent does the existing 
system generate rigidities? What kind of protection does the existing system offer to the 
workers?
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2.6 THE HISTORY OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM OF JOB SECURITY
Ghose (1996) observes that the formal history of employment regulations in 
India began with security for employers (against the risk of abandonment of work by 
workers), and not with any measure supporting workers seeking security of tenure. The 
first piece of labour legislation — 'The Workmen's Breach of Contract Act' of 1859 -- 
was enacted to make any breach of contract by workmen punishable by law as a crime. 
This preceded the concept of contracts (of employment and other kinds) under the Indian 
Contract Act, 1872 by thirteen years, the emergence of the first collective industrial 
action by twelve years, and the first employment security legislation and the first wage 
fixation regulation by more than half a century (Ghose 1996, p. 50).
Trade union activity was allowed in India only after 1926. Before 1926, 
industrial relations in India (i.e. before trade unions acquired immunities against 
prosecution for criminal conspiracy, civil conspiracy and restraint of trade) were 
characterized by the virtual absence of any employment/job security. Between 1926 and 
1947, when trade unions could function, employment regulations only aimed to secure 
uninterrupted production, not employment security. This became especially important 
during the war effort of the late 1930s and early 1940s. The justification lay in the shaky 
commitment of an embryonic industrial labour force which created recurring shortages 
of labour. As Breman (1996) observes in his book Footloose Labour, a big problem was 
that workers would “run away” with no prior notice at all—back to their villages where 
they found life more palatable.
While the Workmen's Breach of Contract Act was repealed in 1926, the 
provision for courts of enquiry to intervene in case of strikes remained a part of the 
Trade Disputes Act, 1929. During the Second World War, armed with the justification of 
ensuring uninterrupted production for wartime needs, the government made a legal 
provision (Rule 81-A of the Defence of India Rules) introducing compulsory 
adjudication of trade disputes (Ghose 2000, p. 51). These laws, along with the paucity of 
Indian owned enterprise and the preponderance of foreign owned factories, mines and 
plantations, created an impression (which was not entirely wrong) of Indian workers 
struggling against colonial masters.
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The overabundance of labour laws after national independence arose from two 
main altruistic desires. First, there was a perception, as noted above, of worker 
exploitation which pointed to the need to alter the balance of power between employers 
and workers. Second, industrial workers were viewed as being in the forefront of a 
general welfare push, which was expected, in the long run, to reinforce dignity of labour 
and diffuse prosperity to large sections of the population. The "employment optimism" 
of the Lewis model dominated economic thinking at this point. “If a majority of workers 
were going to be eventually absorbed in the modem sector, it seemed natural to consider 
creation of model working conditions in this sector as desirable.” (Ghose, 1996). It is 
worth noting that the "employment pessimism" of the Mahalanobis model, which 
provided the basic guidelines of India's planned development, did not receive due 
attention at the time.
As ILO (1996) notes, the state, having thus accepted the role of a social 
engineering institution even before the Constitution was framed, substituted the market 
contracting of labour with mandatory and obligatory requirements on employers for 
standards and conditions governing employment contracts. Laws were made to override 
contractual agreements to the extent that they fell short of legal minima and standards; 
thus any departure from law could generate lawful conflict.
Further, as ILO (1996) further points out, all conflicts arising from claims, grievances 
and demands are, potentially, industrial disputes. Employment security has thus come to 
be premised on regulations and state interventions, rather than on development of 
collective bargaining institutions.
2.7 THE LEGISLATIVE EVOLUTION OF JOB SECURITY REGULATION
Job Security in India is mainly regulated on the basis of the Industrial Disputes 
Act, 1947 and the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The Industrial 
Disputes Act provides for settlement of disputes, in cases of termination, through 
compulsory adjudication if an agreement between employer and employee, to the 
satisfaction of both, is not forthcoming within a specified time frame. Individual 
disputes, not championed by unions, can also be treated as industrial disputes. The 
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act sets rights and obligations of employees 
and employers relating to classification of employees, shift work, hours of work, entry
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and exit, attendance, stoppage of work, leave and holidays, punishments for misconduct, 
suspension or dismissal, separation on retirement, grievances, redressal procedures, etc. 
Any dispute or claim or demand or grievance on terms and conditions of employment 
arising from this Act and its rules and models becomes an industrial dispute under the 
Industrial Disputes Act. Both the Acts apply with full force to establishments employing 
100 or more workers.
Ghose (1996) notes that three main provisions in the Industrial Disputes Act 
define the core of the job security system. First, he notes (p.58) “all employee 
separations from employment involving 'workmen' in 'industry' amount to 
'retrenchment' except in cases o f
* retirement on reaching the age o f superannuation
* expiry and non-renewal o f a time specific contract or its termination under a
stipulation in the contract itself
* termination o f service as punishment for proven misconduct
* voluntary retirement
* termination o f service on the ground o f continued ill-health ”
Second, any separation that does not follow satisfactory observance of the 
standards and procedures for the exceptions is also treated as 'retrenchment'. Third, any 
retrenchment of a workman in industry, for any reason whatsoever (including closure), 
requires prior permission of the 'appropriate government' (usually the government of the 
state in which the unit is located) if the industrial unit employs one hundred or more 
workmen. I f  the permission to retrench is granted, the regulations require thirty days' 
notice and payment of fifteen days' wages for every year of past service. These notice 
and compensation rules also apply to units employing between fifty and one hundred 
workers, but these units do not require prior permission from the 'appropriate 
government’. If dismissal is without prior permission, then notice period and severance 
pay vary state-wise.
A 'workman' in this context means any person (including an apprentice) 
employed in any industry for 240 days or more in a year to do manual, unskilled, skilled, 
technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for a reward, whether the terms of 
employment be expressed or implied, but does not include any person
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(i) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity;
(ii) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding a certain 
specified amount per month; or
(iii) who exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason 
of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.
It is to be noted that there were no restrictions on retrenchment until 1976 if an employer 
followed 'last come first go' rule in drawing up the list of the workmen to be retrenched. 
They gave a month's notice or pay in lieu of notice, paid half a month's average pay for 
every year of continuous service or any part in excess of six months and informed the 
government. For retrenchment following closure, the requirement of sixty days' notice 
was introduced in 1972 but retrenchment remained the sole prerogative of the employer 
till 1976.
In 1976, new provisions were incorporated into the Industrial Disputes Act, 
placing, for the first time, severe restrictions on retrenchments and closures but only in 
industrial establishments employing three hundred or more workmen. The requirement 
of prior permission from the 'appropriate government' for retrenchment or closure in 
industrial establishments employing one hundred or more workmen was introduced 
through an Amendment to the Act in 1982 which also increased the notice period to 
three months.
Ghose (1996, 65) notes that employers challenged the constitutional validity of 
the statutory restrictions on retrenchment and closure on the grounds that “the right to 
carry on business also implies the right not to carry on business.” The courts struck 
down the new provisions and the amendment as unconstitutional. The 1984 
Amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act re-introduced the restrictions by relying on 
an Amendment to the Constitution. They also removed some of the arbitrariness inherent 
in the exercise of discretionary power vested in 'appropriate governments' to grant or 
refuse permission for retrenchment or closure. As it stands now, the 'appropriate 
government' is required to give a reasonable opportunity to the employer to establish the 
genuineness and adequacy of reasons, to consider all relevant factors and the interests of 
the general public and to decide to withhold permission or grant it within sixty days; 
failure to decide within sixty days is deemed as granting of permission.
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Certification of service rules (called 'standing orders') under the Industrial 
Employment Act is another source of job security. This is mandatory in industrial 
establishments employing one hundred or more employees. The scope of this law was 
initially expanded making it applicable to establishments employing fifty or more 
workers in Karnataka, Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal. In Uttar Pradesh and 
Tamil Nadu, this law applies to all factories, and in Madhya Pradesh it was replaced by 
more stringent State legislation. Regulatory changes have since been made, as discussed 
in Chapter 5.
Service rules can neither be certified nor modified without the consent of every 
covered employee. Further, there is a requirement that service rules must closely adhere 
to model standing orders formulated by state governments. So they vary from state to 
state and between states and the Union of India. Standing Orders regulate job security by 
specifying classification of employee categories; they regulate income security through 
provisions on computation of payments for hours worked and leave; and, they regulate 
employment security through restrictions on punitive terminations and prescribed 
procedures for taking disciplinary action in cases of misconduct. The overall effect is 
that the employers are left with very little non-negotiated authority to transfer workers 
from one job to another or from one location to another.
2.8 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JOB SECURITY REGULATIONS
The scope of cognisable conflict ("industrial dispute") was greatly expanded in 
the course of judicial interpretation, which assigned a very wide meaning to the term 
'industry' in the Industrial Disputes Act. Any activity is regarded as 'industry' if it is a 
systematic activity organised by the cooperation of employer and employee(s) for 
production of any goods and services to satisfy human wants. This criterion followed 
from a landmark judgement of the Supreme Court of India in 1978 which held a public 
utility — Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board — to be an 'industry'. All 
organised activities have since been regarded as 'industry' (Ramaswamy, 1994).
The judicially widened ambit of the word 'industry' brought benefits of 
employment security regulations to a much larger number of employees than originally 
intended by the Parliament. Public support for such an interpretation managed to
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obstruct, in 1982, a Parliamentary Amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act that sought 
to correct this anomaly by specifically excluding certain types of establishments from 
the definition of 'industry'. The Amendment was passed by Parliament but was withheld 
by the Executive on the advice of the government. Thus, the category 'industry' 
continues to include service establishments such as educational institutions, hospitals, 
charitable and philanthropic organizations, research laboratories, cooperatives and so on. 
However, as noted earlier, the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act do not apply 
with equal force to all sizes of establishment. Their full force applies to establishments 
with one hundred or more 'workmen' and their restrictive effects are greatly curtailed for 
establishments with less than fifty workmen.
In essence, notes Ramaswamy (1994), the employment security system rested on 
two types of “implicit contracts”. The first type of implicit contract existed between 
employers and the government. Since the government granted protection to employers in 
product markets through the instrumentality of the licensing system, it expected 
employers to protect employment levels and hence wanted them to justify all involuntary 
separations, howsoever defined. With the exception of termination on grounds of proven 
misconduct, the question of separation was not even entertained since anything licensed 
to be produced could be sold and there was a general expansion in production all the 
time. Neither the Trade Disputes Act, 1929 nor the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 made 
any provisions for retrenchment.
The concept of 'retrenchment' was first introduced by a Parliamentary 
amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act in 1953 "to immunize workmen from the 
hazards of involuntary redundancy in continuing business". The discharge of 'workmen' 
following a bonafide closure was brought within the scope of'retrenchment' by another 
amendment in 1957 (Ramaswamy 1994, p. 131).
Further, prices could be increased to absorb increased costs because price 
competition was limited to domestic markets, technology was comparable across 
enterprises in a particular branch of industry and oligopolistic market structures were 
common. These factors provided the basis for a second type of implicit contract -- that 
between employers and employees; costs of employment security could generally be 
passed on to consumers (Ramaswamy 1994, p. 1333).
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It should be noted that both types of implicit contracts involved the acceptance of 
slow growth of industrial output. For when the effects of cost increases are automatically 
passed on to consumers through price increases, demand growth is necessarily 
constrained. The consequent slow growth of output translates into slow growth of 
employment in organised industries. This type of effect, of course, cannot be detected 
through empirical analysis.
2.9 JOB SECURITY, LABOUR FLEXIBILITY AND EMPLOYMENT
It bears repetition that the restrictive provisions of both the Industrial Disputes 
Act and the Industrial Employment Act apply principally to establishments employing 
100 or more workers. As such, these are the establishments which are expected to be 
affected by the labour market rigidities (if any) arising from the employment security 
regulations. These establishments account for only a tiny proportion of total employment 
in the economy. It is legitimate to wonder, therefore, notes Ghose (1996), if the 
employment security regulations can have appreciable effects on the growth of 
aggregate employment. He therefore avers that there are two key questions: Do the 
employment security regulations create operational difficulties for large establishments? 
If yes, then does this have economy-wide consequences, particularly for employment 
growth?
2.9.1 Job Security and Labour Adjustment
Ghose (1996, 71) notes that in principle, the regulations do not impose a ban on 
retrenchment; they only require that prior permission be sought from the 'appropriate' 
government. In practice, however, he observes, political compulsions make it difficult 
for the 'appropriate' government to permit retrenchment. Given the regulations, 
employment adjustment at enterprise level becomes a political issue in which an 
employer is pitted against workers in a submission before the state or central 
government as the arbiter. This lands the "appropriate government" in a classic no-win 
situation. If it finds the employer's demand fair and reasonable, it opens itself to charges 
of colluding with employers and alienates workers and unions besides attracting 
brickbats from opposition parties.
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If it does not find the employer's proposal justified, it incurs the wrath of 
employers and runs the risk of giving wrong signals to potential investors. In every case, 
moreover, the government decision can be challenged (and usually is) in a court of law 
and a protracted 'no-decision' involvement automatically converts an industrial dispute 
into an issue in the political arena. It should be noted that more often than not, the 
“appropriate government” is one (or more) state govemment(s).
The methods of termination which do not require prior permission from the 
government are also very difficult to apply in practice. The date of retirement or retiring 
age may not be free from controversy, particularly if the date of birth of an employee is 
not recorded with his agreement. Further, the unreliability of proof of age is legendary. 
Retirement is frequently resisted by production of'evidence' in the form of school 
leaving certificates, papers from 'Certifying Surgeons', court affidavits, notarised 
declarations and birth certificates.
A letter of appointment providing fixed tenure is often not accepted as the sole 
basis for retrenchment, particularly if the position is found to be of perennial nature and 
may form the basis of a claim for permanency.
For a workman to be charged with 'misconduct', the act of omission must have 
been listed as 'misconduct' in service rules (standing orders). Then, the misconduct must 
be proved at an impartial enquiry complying with the principles of natural justice and 
giving full opportunity to the accused. Moreover, the gravity of the misconduct, past 
record of service and any extenuating circumstances must be taken into account before 
termination can be regarded as the appropriate punishment. Any technical lapse vitiates 
the process.
Continued ill-health has to be conclusively established to be a ground for 
termination. In practice, workmen request for 'light work' and resist termination. In 
some States, local laws do not allow employers to terminate employment on grounds of 
continued ill-health.
In practice, therefore, the employment security regulations basically leave only 
one legal route to adjustment open : voluntary retirement induced at a cost. This is an 
important point, because it forms the basis of calculation of the job security index, as
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calculated in Chapter 5. Thus, either labour adjustments have to be ruled out in which 
case labour costs assume the character of fixed costs, or labour adjustments have to be 
achieved at high costs which has the effect of pushing labour costs much above wage 
costs. In either case, labour hiring is discouraged and adoption of capital-intensive 
techniques becomes attractive.
ILO (1996) also notes that the job security regulations tend to reinforce these 
effects. “The freezing of role-sets into a classification conferring status places on an 
employer the responsibility for skill obsolescence without the authority of effecting a 
non-negotiable transfer, the responsibility of absorbing fluctuations in product demand 
or changes in techniques of value-addition without the authority of adjusting human 
resource costs commensurate with product prices and capacity utilization. Under the 
circumstances, internal human resource adjustments require either new hiring (in the 
absence of substitution or reskilling possibilities) or negotiated transfers which come at a 
price. Either way, internal human resource adjustments become not only costly but also 
time-consuming.” (p. 82)
There are escape routes, however, as noted in the previous chapter, and indeed 
throughout the thesis. One is to devise methods of using labour which avoid developing 
a provable employer-employee nexus. Many such methods are in fact available: 
distinguishing 'contracts of service' from 'contracts for services'; making principal-to- 
principal contracts with middlemen and agencies for labour supply in the guise of job 
contracts; engaging workers for specific time-determined contracts; persuading groups 
of workers to form self-managed cooperatives that submit bills for work done instead of 
drawing wages; incorrect classification of workers as apprentices under the 
Apprenticeship Act or as trainees, learners, improvers, or all of these in succession, 
always specifying that employment is not offered; changing record of name two or three 
times in a year; hiring workers on a casual basis (for less than 240 days in any period of 
365 days); designating workers as consultants or retainers or suppliers who submit 
weekly or monthly bills etc (Ramaswamy, 1994).
Another method of avoiding job security regulations, available to employers, is 
to set up a number of independent small units (employing less than one hundred 
workers) in place of one large unit. This method, however, has one disadvantage: it may 
prevent realization of economies of scale in some situations (Mohan Rao, 1995). From
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the employers' point of view, the decision may nevertheless be rational since the 
advantages of labour flexibility and the saving on labour costs may together outweigh 
the loss resulting from non-realization of economies of scale. For the economy, 
however, there are unambiguous efficiency losses. (Ghose, 1996)
For obvious reasons, the escape routes are available more to the private sector 
than to the public sector. This means that the labour market rigidities arising from 
employment security regulations are more important for the public sector than for the 
private sector. This gives the public sector establishments certain inherent disadvantages 
vis-a-vis the private sector establishments in the market place.
2.9.2 Job Security and Employment Growth
It is probably apparent by this stage that the job security regulations provide 
strong incentives for large employers to minimise labour hiring on a regular basis. The 
high cost of labour adjustment, provoked by the job security regulations, effectively 
increases the cost of hiring and induces search for escape routes as well as labour-saving 
technologies. We will use this fact to calculate a job security index in Chapter 5. For 
now, we hypothesise that the growth of employment, particularly of regular 
employment, in large establishments, and consequently in the organised sector as a 
whole, is discouraged as a result. We test this in Chapter 4.
The effect is stronger in the private sector than in the public sector since the 
public sector tends to regard employment creation as a social and political obligation and 
finds it more difficult to resort to escape routes. But this also puts the public sector at a 
permanent disadvantage vis-a-vis the private sector. It should be pointed out that this 
discussion refers to production-related industries. But, as we shall see below, a large 
majority of the employees benefiting from the job security regulations are in fact in 
organised services, mostly public. The negative effect on employment growth in public 
services works less through rising cost of labour hiring than through declining financial 
resources.
There are other ways in which the job security regulations may have constrained 
employment growth in the organised sector. As noted earlier, Ramaswamy (1994) points 
out that the implicit contracts on which the employment security system rested involved
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acceptance of a slower pace of industrial growth than would otherwise be feasible. In 
this sense, the job security regulations had a negative effect on the long-run employment 
growth in organised industries and hence in the organised sector as a whole. Moreover, 
since the job security regulations induce employers to keep the establishments size 
artificially small, economies of scale may be partially sacrificed. This too slows down 
industrial growth and hence employment growth. And to the extent that the job security 
regulations push up costs (financial and other) of hiring labour, they may discourage 
foreign direct investment or confine it to high-tech industries. This too has a negative 
effect on employment growth.
The organised sector, of course, employs only a small proportion of the labour 
force in the country. Nevertheless, slow growth of employment in the sector has 
economy-wide repercussions. The organised sector offers what can be called "good" 
jobs and failure of the sector to draw out labour from unorganised sectors leads to a 
general deterioration in employment conditions. It is not only that the proportion of 
"good" jobs in total employment declines but employment conditions in unorganised 
sectors also deteriorate as the incremental labour force is perforce absorbed by these 
sectors.
2.9.3 Job Security and Regulatory Reforms
Ghose (1996) points out that even under the pre-reform economic regime, the job 
security regulations led to the emergence of surplus labour in the organised sector. First, 
advances in technology and techniques of production over time implied that, within the 
same industry, newer enterprises and enterprises that modernised could operate with 
different cost schedules; this induced limited price competition. This was wholly 
avoided through cartelisation in some industries but could not be avoided in others 
where some units became non-viable as a result. Second, product and process 
obsolescence in certain industries led to dwindling capacity utilisation. Third, some 
enterprises simply did not stay out of the red despite protection and were faced with the 
need to downsize employment. Fourth, many public enterprises (central and state) 
recruited employees far in excess of their requirements in the belief that one of their 
tasks was to create employment. Once recruited, the surplus labour simply had to be 
carried even if this adversely affected the economic viability of these enterprises.
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ILO (1996) points out that the employment security system also had another 
effect, which is rarely recognised. The fact that the government acted as the arbiter 
prevented employer-employee interactions; both groups had more to gain by nurturing 
political clout than by promoting mutual understanding. Healthy development of 
industrial relations was thus pre-empted. India never could develop a collective 
bargaining system, unlike the West. It is still stuck with a tripartite system, in which the 
state must necessarily be a mediator between the employer and the employee, thus 
leading to needless politicisation of the system.
The economic reforms implemented since 1991 have greatly undermined the 
basis of the implicit contracts on which the employment security provisions have so far 
rested (Ramaswamy, 1994). The abolition of industrial licensing and liberalisation of 
external trade have substantially increased competitive pressures in the economy. 
Consequently, it has become much more difficult for employers to translate cost 
increases into price increases. The costs of job security can no longer be absorbed by 
sacrificing overall industrial growth; they now affect economic viability of enterprises. 
The issue of labour adjustment has thus acquired prominence.
Ramaswamy (1994) also points out that the economic reforms have also altered 
the demand conditions for the organised industries thereby generating a need for output 
adjustments. This development too calls for labour adjustments.
The other factor, which has brought the issue of labour adjustment to the fore, 
relates to fiscal difficulties of the government. Mukhopadhyay (1989) says that the 
stock of sick industries, built up over the years, imposes a heavy burden of subsidies on 
the government budget. The growing openness of the economy also imposes strict limits 
on the government's ability to resort to deficit financing without risking economic 
destabilisation. The need to close down non-viable industries has thus acquired urgency. 
Even more importantly, it is clearly necessary to prevent an increase in the stock of sick 
industries.
Finally, Ghose (1996) argues that in the post-reform context, foreign direct 
investment is expected to play a more important role in the growth process in future than 
it did in the past. There are legitimate worries that the rigid employment security 
regulations may discourage foreign direct investment.
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2.10 JOB SECURITY REGULATIONS: HOW MUCH SECURITY?
How much security do the regulations offer to the workers? In 1990-91, the 
entire organised sector employed less than 27 million people who constituted, on a rough 
reckoning, about 8 per cent of the total employed labour force in the country. Only about 
8 million (7.4 million according to the Ministry of Labour and 8.2 million according to 
the Central Statistical Office) of these worked in industries (manufacturing and 
electricity, gas and water); they constituted just over 29 per cent of the organised sector 
employees and just over 2 per cent of the total employed labour force in the country.
But, as mentioned earlier, the employment security regulations strictly apply to 
establishments employing 100 or more workers. According to the Annual Survey of 
Industries (Central Statistical Office), 5.8 million people worked in industrial 
establishments employing 100 or more workers. If it is assumed that all public sector 
employees in non-industrial activities enjoy the benefits of employment security, the 
total number of people enjoying these benefits works out to 22 million or 6.5 per cent of 
the total employed labour force in the country.
Evidently, protected industrial workers constitute at most 26.2 per cent of all 
protected employees. There is evidence to suggest, moreover, that this proportion has 
actually been declining. The data from the Annual Survey of Industries show that the 
absolute number of industrial workers in establishments employing 100 or more workers 
fell from 6 million in 1980-81 to 5.8 million in 1990-91. During the same period, the 
total number of protected employees increased from 19.8 million to 22.1 million. Thus 
the percentage of protected industrial workers in all protected employees declined from
30.3 in 1980-81 to 26.2 in 1990-91. This trend clearly had nothing to do with the 
economic reforms which were launched only in 1991.
But this trend alone does not tell the full story. Fallon and Lucas (1991) argue 
that there are reasons to believe that the employers' search for escape routes intensified 
after 1984 (when the Industrial Disputes Act becafyv fully effective). As such, the 
proportion of irregular or contract workers is likely to have increased in the second half 
of the eighties. The number of sick enterprises was also steadily growing during the 
decade. These factors affected industrial enterprises rather than service enterprises. And
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this means that the estimates of the share of protected industrial workers in all protected 
employees, reported above, are actually overestimates.
2.11 CONCLUSION
To conclude, most writers agree that job security for industrial workers in the 
organised sector has been a major concern in India for perfectly understandable reasons. 
The colonial history generated a perception that industrial workers were victims of 
exploitation and needed state support. In the early post-colonial period, employment 
optimism was in the air and it seemed right to create ideal type of jobs in modem 
industries. A high degree of employment security also seemed quite consistent with the 
protectionist, import-substitutive industrialisation strategy which India adopted. 
“Employment security, moreover, was viewed as an instrument of guaranteeing income 
security to workers in an economy where no state-sponsored social security system 
existed.” (Ghose 1996,101).
Originally, the job security regulations were meant to protect industrial workers 
in large establishments. Legal interpretation, however, held virtually all large scale 
organised activities to be industries and thus widened the coverage of the regulations 
very substantially. The result is that industrial workers actually constitute a small and 
dwindling proportion of the employees benefiting from the regulations.
There is little doubt that the job security regulations gave rise to a number of 
problems whose harmful effects were absorbed principally by industries and industrial 
workers. As ILO (1996) points out, in the first place, they had a negative effect on 
growth of employment in organised industries and thus hampered the process of 
improvement of employment conditions in the economy as a whole. Second, they led to 
the accumulation of surplus labour in the organised sector. Third, they turned industrial 
disputes into political issues. Finally, they obstructed development of healthy industrial 
relations and collective bargaining systems at enterprise level.
The recent economic reforms have both undermined the basis of the implicit contracts 
on which the employment security system rested and brought into sharp focus the need 
for labour adjustment. Delicensing and trade liberalisation have stimulated price 
competition thus making it difficult to pass on the costs of employment security to
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consumers. Cost adjustment, of which labour adjustment is a part, has thus assumed 
importance. These developments also necessitate industrial restructuring which requires 
labour reallocation across industries. And what is important to realise is that these 
developments are not of once-for-all variety; in an open economy, they will be 
characteristic features. Rethinking the job security system has clearly become necessary.
CHAPTER 3
RIGID LAWS AND FLEXIBLE OUTCOMES:
QUALITATIVE FIELDWORK IN BOMBAY, MAHARASHTRA
In this chapter, we will present insights gained from (i) the Bombay Labour 
Flexibility Surveys, carried out in the late 1980s, and again in mid-1990s by myself (the 
second time) and others; and (ii) qualitative research and fieldwork conducted by myself 
at the firm level in Bombay, Pune and Delhi during 1995-98. We also include excerpts 
from interviews carried out with representatives of both employer and employee 
associations. This chapter forms a precursor to Chapters 4, 5 and 6, which provide the 
results of simple statistical analysis carried out on both primary and secondary data.
We will see that only a minute elite— in general better educated, male and more 
skilled—benefit from the plethora of labour laws, especially job security regulations. 
This result if further verified by the econometric analsis in Section 4.4. The majority of 
the labour forces is getting increasingly casualised, and spends its working life in 
insecure, and often inhumane, conditions. Labour laws do not seem to be helping the 
large majority of the labour force.
Throughout this chapter, we will work with and refer to interviews, personal 
observations and secondary data collected exclusively for the labour flexibility surveys. 
This chapter is divided into the following sections: Section 3.1 provides the background 
and justification for this fieldwork research. Section 3.2 discusses employment and 
unemployment in Maharashtra, and especially its capital city, Bombay—a bustling 
metropolitan and industrial centre. Section 3.3 discusses industrial relations in India, 
Maharshtra and Bombay. Section 3.4 discusses the political economy of wage 
determination. Section 3.5 analyses our findings and observations about state 
intervention in the labour market, particularly at the level of the firm, in a great deal of 
detail. Section 3.6 provides an analysis of the observations contained in Section 3.5. 
Section 3.7 contains the summary and conclusions, and further reiterates the single main 
finding of our research—increasing insecurity among workers. This sets the stage for 
the quantitative work contained on Chapters 4 and 5.
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3.1 BACKGROUND
The belief that labour inflexibility, caused by collective bargaining practices and 
state intervention in the labour market, has restrained growth of industrial employment 
in India has grown stronger among economists like Ahluwalia (1991), Sachs (1994) and 
Basu (1984,1997,1998, 2001). The Government of India started the process of 
deregulation in 1975, which picked up in the eighties, particularly in the mid-eighties. 
Manufacturing output responded to deregulation and grew faster in the eighties than in 
the previous two decades. However, growth of employment decelerated to 0.006 per 
cent per annum in 1983 - 1987/88 from 2.42 per cent per annum in 1972/73 - 1977/78 
and 1.74 per cent per annum in 1977/78 -  1983 (Government of India, Planning 
Commission 1990). Protagonists of flexibility see in this conjunction of stagnation of 
employment and acceleration in output, incontrovertible evidence of rigidities 
introduced by unions and state intervention in the form of labour legislation (World 
Bank, 1989). Many authors have time and again pointed fingers at the efficiency losses 
due labour regulations.
In response, scholars like Lyn Squire (Squire and Suithwart-Narueput, 1997) 
have asked the very pertinent question: Does labour market regulation in developing 
countries result in significant efficiency losses? He emphasises that there is not sufficient 
international empirical evidence to bear this out. In his survey paper Freeman (1992) 
expresses surprise that there was not more evidence on the distortionary costs of labour 
market regulation: "The first surprise was that studies designed to support the distortionist 
view of labour markets in developing countries failed to make a stronger empirical case 
than they did" (p. 139).
Squire and Suithwart-Narueput (1997) say that there are several possible 
explanations for this result. “First, the regulations may not be binding at the market 
equilibrium. Second, even if they are binding, the relevant elasticities of supply and 
demand may be so low that their impact on efficiency is small. And third, even if the
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regulations are binding and the elasticities are sizeable, compliance may be low.3” Squire 
further argues that:
□ “The likelihood o f non-compliance will be greatest when the 
regulations are binding and the relevant elasticities are sizeable. ”
(P-2)
That is, they explain, if the distortionary costs of regulations are not rendered insignificant 
by the first two reasons, then the returns to non-compliance will be high and, other things 
being equal; employers will either evade or avoid the regulations thereby minimising the 
impact on efficiency.
□ “Although more likely to comply with labour market regulations, 
public enterprise compliance may actually reduce efficiency 
losses. ” (p. 2)
Taken together, Squire and Suithwart-Narueput (1997) argue, the two propositions suggest 
that limits exist to the efficiency losses engendered by labour market regulations.
Squire and Suithwart-Narueput (1997), set out the following “facts” from 
international evidence, and then sets out to model the behaviour of labour markets to 
explain these facts:
“Fact 1: The extent o f non-compliance with labour regulations is widespread and 
significant.
Fact 2: The pattern o f non-compliance is consistent with the observation that it increases 
with the costs o f compliance andfalls with the costs o f enforcement.
Fact 3: Firms can and do legally avoid labour regulations. ” (p. 4)
On this point, Freeman (1992) notes that, "If extensive unemployment results, the minimum will often be 
unenforceable because both workers and employers will have incentives to collude to avoid the law and 
save jobs" (p. 128).
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Let us see how the debate summarised above sits with the findings and insights 
from our primary fieldwork in different industrial districts. The lion’s share of this work 
was done in and around Bombay, although some work was also done in Delhi and Pune 
(Maharashtra).
I was fortunate enough to be part of the second labour market flexibility survey 
to be conducted in Bombay, and was also given access to information from the first ever 
Labour Flexibility Survey ever conducted in India. This survey was also done for the 
city of Bombay by the University of Bombay. Let us begin with a very quick analysis of 
the secondary information on various aspects of labour and employment in India, 
collected for the surveys. Such information is not always accessible at one place, and 
therefore the secondary information collected for the surveys forms a very valuable 
resource.
3.2 EMPLOYMENT IN INDIA, MAHARASHTRA AND BOMBAY
The Directorate of Employment collects quarterly data on employment from all 
establishments owned publicly and such private establishments as employ 25 or more 
workers. Though debatable, it is common to treat the employment reported to the 
Directorate's Employment Market Information Programme (EMIP) as formal 
employment. This data, given for Maharashtra in the first table, shows stagnation in total 
formal employment, the net result of an annual growth of 2.0 per cent in public and an 
annual decline of 1.7 per cent in private employment between 1971 and 1991.
The situation was worse in the eighties than in the seventies; private employment 
declined by 3.2 per cent per annum, public employment increased about 1 per cent per 
annum and total formal employment declined at about the same rate. Formal 
employment in private manufacturing declined at 4.7 per cent per annum and the total 
manufacturing, by 3.8 per cent per annum in the eighties. With formal employment 
declining in the eighties one would have expected unemployment on the live register to 
grow faster in the eighties than in the seventies. That it grew slower casts doubts on the 
employment exchange data. They could be defended if it could be shown that
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registration followed formal employment. This may well be true but cannot be tested 
with the data available at present.
It may be argued that in the absence of unemployment insurance, few can afford 
unemployment and institutional rigidities lead not so much to unemployment as to 
informal employment. Informal employment grew faster than formal employment in the 
1960s (Joshi and Joshi, 1976) and the 1970s (Deshpande, 1979). Table 3.1 presents two 
estimates of the size of the informal economy in Bombay. Estimate 1 is obtained by 
deducting the EMIP-reported employment from that reported by the population census.
It shows that the share of informal employment increased from nearly half o f total 
employment in 1961 to about two-thirds of it in 1991.
Estimate II is based on the Economic Census and adopts a cut-off point of "under 
10 workers" and not "under 25 workers" to demarcate the informal from the formal 
sector. According to this estimate the share of employment less than 10 workers 
increased from 27.4 per cent in 1970 to almost 34 per cent in 1980 and further to 46.3 
per cent in 1990. The first estimate yields a growth in informal employment of 3.5 per 
cent and the second 3 per cent per annum in the 1980s. In contrast formal employment 
according to Economic Census declined at 0.7 per cent per annum. Thus the labour 
market became conducive to adoption of flexible labour practices in the eighties.
Table 3.1
Estimates of Informal Sector Employment, Bombay 
Estimate I: Census Employment-EMIP recorded employment.
Year
1961 1971 1981 1991
%  Share in total census employment 49.0 50.0
55.4 65.6
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Estimate II: Economic Census reported share of employment in units employing less 
than 10 workers
Year 1970 1980 1990
% Share o f  employment in units 
employing less than 10 workers
27.4 33.8 46.3
Sources: Census o f India, Maharashtra 1961 through 81, General Economic Tables. 
Census o f India Maharashtra, Primary Census Abstract.
Census o f India 1971, Maharashtra, Establishment Tables 
Government o f India, Economic Census 1980 and 1990 
Data from Employment Market Information Programme (EMIP)
The coverage of the formal sector defined with respect to establishments 
employing 25 or more workers is very restrictive. Besides, non-response to EMIP has 
increased over time. An alternative source, the Annual Survey of Industry (ASI) relates 
to factories4. The ASI has two sectors, the census and the sample. The former includes 
factories that employ 50 or more workers and use power and 100 or more, if  they do not. 
The rest form the sample sector. Factories in the latter sector are numbered serially and 
those bearing even numbers are surveyed in one and the others in the other year of a 
two-year cycle.
The production process and total employment, the former more than the latter, 
declined over the decade 1975/77-1985/87. Total employment had increased by 13 
thousand between 1975/77 and 1979/81 despite a loss of 34 thousand jobs in textile. 
Between 1979/81 and 1986/88, factory employment in Bombay fell by 142 thousand and 
textile employment, by 88 thousand. To put the data in wider perspective, manufacturing
4 Factories, according to Factories Act are manufacturing establishments which employ 
ten or more workers and use electricity and 20 or more if not.
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employment declined annually at 1.9 per cent in Bombay, 3.3 per cent in Maharashtra 
and 1.5 per cent in India in the eighties.
The Cotton Textile Industry led others with a decline of 59 per cent in 
employment in the decade 1975/77-1985/87. It was followed by basic metal industry 
(-39 per cent), non-metallic mineral products (-32 per cent), textile products (-28 per 
cent) and metal products (-22 per cent). The fall was much steeper in these than in all 
manufacturing in the city (19 per cent). Data such as these form the basis of much of the 
criticism of unions and labour legislation, the institutional interventions in the labour 
market in India. Let us take a brief look at these institutional interventions.
3.3 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDIA, MAHARASHTRA AND BOMBAY
3.3.1 Union movement, growth and structure
The union movement in India benefited substantially after independence from 
industrial development and sympathetic governments. Registration with the competent 
authority constituted by the Indian Trade Union Act, 1926, is voluntary. A significant 
number of unions do not register and of those who do quite a few do not comply with 
other provisions of the Act. Recognition of bargaining agent is as unresolved an issue 
today as it was before independence (Datar, 1983). Most unions exaggerate their 
membership and the data published by the Labour Bureau and the State Governments, 
being based on returns submitted by the unions are often suspect. Union members 
number 6 million in a labour force of 300 million in India but related to formal 
employment of 25 million, the union movement commands some respect. All the more 
so because the membership is concentrated in relatively large enterprises in key 
industries (Edgren, 1990).
Unions have, over time, had a much wider power base in Bombay. Union 
membership increased from 881 thousand in 1971 to 2.1 million in 1985 and the degree 
of unionisation increased from 55 per cent to 91 per cent. However, data on membership 
are poor in quality and those on the degree of unionisation are both poor and dated 
(Deshpande, 1992). A sample of 300 men and women workers drawn from 
manufacturing firms surveyed in 1989 showed that only half of all workers were union
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members. Not even a quarter of the workers employed by small firms with less than 50 
workers were members. Only three of every ten persons working in medium firms, 
employing between 50 to 99 workers, reported union membership. In large firms, 
membership varied between 40 per cent and 82 per cent, the highest figure being in 
firms employing 1000 workers or more (Deshpande and Deshpande, 1992).
3.3.2 Political affiliation andfragmentation
Most unions are affiliated to federations, which function as labour wings of 
political parties. The view that political affiliation has fragmented the union movement 
and made it ineffective as a countervailing power to the state and industrial capitalists 
was shared widely till recently (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987). It drew support from two 
facts. First, the constancy, if not the fall in real wages since 1950 seen in the wage series 
put out by the Labour Bureau and secondly, the fall in the share of wages in value added 
by manufacturers observed in the data derived from the Census of Manufacturing 
Industries. With industrial employment growing at constant real wage, India was 
regarded as the best example of Lewis’ model of development at work. India's labour 
policy was applauded for the way it restrained wages (Jackson, 1972).
Some critics did not accept the Labour Bureau's wage series because it was 
limited to workers earning less than a specific monthly wage (Madan, 1977). Real 
emoluments per employee based on the ASI data reported by Tulpule and Datta (1988) 
increased 2.7 per cent a year between 1960-1985. In his overview of the Indian labour 
market, Lucas (1988) reports a rise of 69 per cent over the two decades 1960-1980.
Since there was no evidence to show that real wages in agriculture had increased, Lucas 
concluded that the rise in manufacturing wage was a disequilibrium rise to be attributed 
to unions and labour legislation.
Recent evidence on real wages of agricultural workers shows that they have 
increased since mid-seventies in all states of India-an event unheard of earlier (Ghose, 
1992). Acharya and Papanek (1989) and Hanumantha Rao (1994) also report similar 
findings. It would therefore, be necessary to produce some other evidence if unions were 
to be blamed for the disequilibrium in the labour market. Lucas blamed unions because 
they caused wages to increase faster than productivity. Employers responded by
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substituting capital for labour. Consequently demand for labour in manufacturing grew 
very slowly up to the eighties. A more recent study, covering the period from 1974 to 
1985 suggests that unions were guilty of appropriating to workers almost all the gain in 
labour productivity brought about by increase in capital intensity (Sengupta, 1992). If 
wages were deflated by product price, as they were by Lucas (1988) and Sengupta 
(1992), the data for Bombay tell the same story. So deflated, real emoluments per 
worker increased 5.6 per cent a year during 1975/1977 and 1985/87. Capital per worker 
deflated by machinery prices increased at 5.2 per cent and value added per worker 
deflated by wholesale prices of manufactures increased at 5 per cent a year. Share of 
wages in value added increased from 55 per cent in 1975/1977 to 57 per cent in 
1985/1987. Let us look more closely at what is happening here.
3.4 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAGE DETERMINATION
We got very interesting results when we measured elasticities of employment 
with respect to wage rate. For the period 1975/77-1985/87, the ASI-reported average 
real earnings deflated by product price increased at 5.6 per cent and net value added 
deflated by WPI increases at 2.3 per cent per annum. Assuming that the base year 
employment elasticities of 1.25 and 1.05 respectively with regard to wages and output 
would have prevailed throughout the decade of union behaviour and provisions relating 
to retrenchment and closures were altered, employment would have declined at 4.6 per 
cent per annum, about 2.7 per cent faster than the observed rate of 1.9 per cent. The 
difference, i.e. 2.7 per cent indicates, from the employers’ point of view, the extent of 
rigidity due to unions and legislation.
However, the story changes substantially if the emoluments of employees were 
deflated by the CPI instead of the product price. The CPI-deflated earnings increased at
3.1 per cent per annum, and lagged behind labour productivity, which increased at 5 per 
cent. Consequently the share of wages in value added fell from 58 per cent in 1975/77 
to 51 per cent in 1985/87. With an annual increase of 3.1 per cent in wages and 2.3 per 
cent in output, and with wage and elasticities as before, employment would have 
declined at 1.5 per cent, 0.4 per cent slower than the observed decline of 1.9 per cent per 
annum. In other words, employers were able to retrench more workers than dictated by 
the elasticities.
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Thus, one could draw diametrically opposite conclusions from an increase in real 
wage depending on the deflator. The choice of the deflator depends on whether one 
considers wage as a cost of production or as income of a worker. So, what determines 
wages in Indian industry?
It would be reasonable to expect that, other things remaining the same, wage per 
worker would increase faster in industries in which share of wages, size of factory, profit 
per worker and fixed capital per worker increased faster. If one were to test this 
relationship empirically, as done by Deshpande and Deshpande (1996), one finds that 
changes in wages are positively and significantly associated with changes in two 
variables, wage share and profit per worker.
What changes the share of wages? It can be shown, and not just for India, that 
unions do not have the power to increase this variable. It is more likely to be determined 
by the elasticity of substitution, which could be inferred from the rise in real wage and 
fall in wage share, to be greater than unity. With an overvalued rupee, highly protected 
industry, low interest rates and liberal depreciation allowances that characterised the 
Indian economy until recently, there was enough incentive for employers to substitute 
capital for labour. Hanson and Lieberman (1989) report that highly protected industries 
in 1986 employed five times as much capital per worker and reported unit labour costs 
about 70per cent higher than those with low levels of protection.
The World Bank (1989) reports that net pre-tax profits in India’s manufacturing 
formed 21 percent of the value added in 1982 as compared with under 4per cent in 
Korea in 1981. The unions have tried to share in these high rents. The positive 
relationship between profits and wages existed conventionally but was dependent rather 
loosely on the grace of the employer. An important point that is often missed is that 
capital intensity in Indian industry did not increase necessarily when wages increased, 
but did so when profits increased. High profits arising from the protective and 
restrictive regime led to increase in capital intensity and thus to labour productivity, 
prompting unions to demand their share in the spoils. This is the way that the causality 
runs, not the other way round.
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Authors such as Ramaswamy have argued that the 70s and 80s have been marked 
by the rise and growth of internal unions whose leaders were not affiliated politically 
and as such were not constrained in their wage demands as leaders of affiliated unions 
were. Consequently, they bargained hard, were relatively militant and secured standards 
which the affiliated unions had to “follow or perish”. If this analysis were true, we 
should expect this militancy to be reflected in industrial disputes statistics.
Table 3.2. shows that in 1989, industrial disputes standardised for factory 
employment, were a fifth, workdays lost a third and workers involved only 3per cent of 
the respective magnitudes in 1971. A dispute in 1989 lasted four times as long but 
involved a fifth of the workers it did in 1971. If we assume that the wage lost per day 
equals the daily wage prevailing in the firm, we find that a striking worker in 1971 
earned Rs. 49 in 1971 and Rs. 53 in 1989. The CPI increased about four-fold in that 
period as did production per workday valued at constant prices. This data suggests that 
the unions were much less militant in the late eighties than about two decades earlier and 
further that wages in striking units in 1989 were low in relation not only to the 
productivity, but also to those their predecessors had achieved in nearly twenty years 
before.
Table 3.2
Indicators of Industrial Relations, Bombay, 1971/1989
1971 1981 1989
N um ber o f disputes
397 195 57
N um ber o f disputes per 100,000 Factory Workers 72 44
14
W orkdays lost (thousands) 1,584 16,253 426
W orkers involved (thousands) 413 137 12
Average duration o f  disputes (days) 14.4 77.7 53.7
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Median duration of dispute (days) 4.4 19.3 18.7
Wages lost per workday (Rs.) 49 41 53
Production lost per workday (Rs.) 56 383 949
Source: Commissioner o f Labour, Government o f Maharashtra.
3.5 STATE INTERVENTION IN THE LABOUR MARKET
Having looked at the political economy of wage determination in India, let us 
now look at direct state intervention in different aspects of the labour market in great 
detail, in light of our firm-level observations and interviews. Until recently, the state 
intervened substantially in both product and factor markets in India. The Narasimha 
Rao-led Congress Government withdrew in July 1991, and March 1992 most of the 
restrictions in the product market but retained the legal framework including the much 
damned "ban" on exit intact. Employers, though critical, have not gone beyond 
registering a mild protest. That is because the current, overtly rigid laws, suit them very 
well, given the intricate political economy that has developed in this regard over the past 
five decades and more. Union leaders are apprehensive of the future, as they fear the 
government may give in to the national and international pressure and liberalise the 
labour market as well. But their fears have not been realised yet. Why? Let us take a 
look at the different labour regulations and their actual impacts, particularly in Bombay.
3.5.1 Interventions in Factories in Bombay
Since independence, unions have used their political connections to counteract 
employers. Consequently, their right to hire, dismiss and alter conditions of employment 
to the workers' detriment was subjected to judicial scrutiny. Most of the protective 
legislation applies to factories. The Factories Act, 1948 includes provisions that protect a 
worker's health, life and limb and his working conditions.
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If the Factories Act is regarded the first step in segmenting labour market into 
protected and unprotected labour segments the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) 
Act of 1946 would be the second. It applies to factories employing 50 or more workers 
and regulates conditions of recruitment, discharge and disciplinary action. It requires the 
employers to classify workers into permanent, probationers, badlis or substitutes, 
temporaries, casual and apprentices.
Though defined clearly, the classifications are flexible in practice. The system of 
contract labour dates back to the beginning of industry in India. The Contract Labour 
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 regulates employment of contract labour in certain 
establishments and provides for its abolition in certain circumstances. It applies to every 
establishment and contractor who currently or in the preceding year employed at least 20 
contract workers. A contractor who employs 100 or more workers on contract is required 
to provide elementary facilities such as drinking water, toilets and first aid. The principal 
employer must ensure that these amenities were provided and that no worker was 
underpaid. He is authorised to make good the default by the contractor and recover the 
expense from the latter. Establishments performing exclusively casual or intermittent 
work are exempted from the scope of this Act.
3.5.2 Impact
A. Badli workers
A theoretical discussion of the impact of the legislative interventions detailed 
above has been analysed well by Mathur (1992; 1993; 1994). In the following we cover 
much the same ground but restrict myself to the Bombay and Delhi labour markets. To 
assess the impact of legislative interventions one needs to compare a market affected by 
such interventions with another that is not. Since the laws mentioned above apply to 
most states of India such comparisons would not be of much help unless the rigour with 
which the laws were implemented differed from one market to another. Alternatively, 
one could focus on a specific market and go back in time to a period relatively free of 
state intervention. This alternative is easier to accept because Bombay labour market is 
better researched than others in India are. Broadly, interventionist era could be said to 
have started with independence. Bombay's labour market was dualistic before
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independence and wages paid to committed permanent workers were higher than those 
paid to migratory, unstable, temporary workers (Mazumdar, 1989b). The dualism went 
hand in hand with a system of recruitment through jobbers in textiles. This saved the 
employers fixed costs of supervision, training and salary administration. If necessary, 
employers used jobbers to break strikes and more often to keep unions at bay.
Badli workers are those workers which are literally interchangeable (badli 
meaning inter-change in Hindi and Marathi), and are hired on a per-day, or even per- 
hour basis from labour contractors. Technological change within the textile industry and 
socio-political changes outside led employers to initiate a Badli Control System in 1935 
(Deshpande, 1992). It operates today with the Decasualisation Scheme introduced by the 
Government in 1950. Neither altered the proportion of the Badlis employed by the 
industry. According to the sources cited in Mazumdar (1989b), the share of Badlis 
varied between 18-20 per cent in 1935,1946/48 and 1963. Few know their share before 
the strike of 1982/83, and fewer still, after it. We also found reasons to believe that it 
may have gone up substantially after the strike. Employers were able to reduce 
employment of permanent workers even before the strike. This reduction was gradual 
and took place in accordance with the agreement hailed as a model of rationalisation 
without tears.
The strike helped employers to get rid of permanent workers at one stroke 
without any obligation to compensate them. A fall in employment of permanent workers 
would increase the share of badlis if fewer of the latter than of the permanent were 
refused employment after the strike. The share of badlis would increase faster if a 
permanent worker victimised for participation in the strike by his earlier employer took 
up employment as a badli with another. A reliable source close to the Mill Owners 
Association informed us that the share of the badlis had increased from about 20 per cent 
in the sixties to 29 per cent in 1990.
The critics who blame the union movement for the decline in employment in the 
city ignore the fact that the textile industry accounted for 95 per cent of the jobs lost in 
the city's manufacturing sector between 1975/77 and 1986/88. This could be blamed 
entirely on the national policy relating to the textile sector. To implement the 
Mahalanobis capital-led growth model favoured by Nehru in the early Fifties, the
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government banned new investment in the modem mill sector and even taxed it to 
subsidise handlooms. Owners of powerlooms benefited most from the policy. More 
efficient than handlooms, powerlooms increased spectacularly (Mazumdar, 1989b).
They enjoyed a few doubtful advantages.
Owners of powerlooms organise production in units employing under ten 
workers to avoid application of the Factories Act. According to Mr Suryakant 
Wadhavkar, the union leader active in nearby Bhiwandi which houses Asia's largest 
concentration of powerlooms, 20 per cent of the powerlooms are not registered with any 
agency at all. Excepting the Minimum Wages Act, no legislation applies to powerlooms 
and the Minimum Wages Act is flouted with impunity. Mr Keki Randeria, management 
consultant, read out to us the reply that he had received from the State's Labour 
Department to his query on implementation of the minimum wage law, in Bhiwandi.
The Department admitted that the government was unable to prosecute violators because 
the owners of powerlooms could not be traced. Bhiwandi brings to one's mind scenes 
from early days of the Industrial Revolution with men, women and children working 
long hours and sleeping often in unventilated sheds among the deafening noise of looms 
that work 24 hours a day and every day of the week.
The extent of job-work the owners of powerlooms in Bhiwandi do for the 
Bombay-based mills is not known. The powerloom owners take pride in it while the 
Secretary of the Bombay Millowners Association denies it. In an interview, he did not 
rule out the possibility of some managers of Bombay Mills doing it on the sly. 
Flexibilisation of labour employed in Bombay's textile industry is seen only partly in the 
casualisation within the mills. It is reflected largely in Bhiwandi where an estimated 
200,000 workers sweat as piece rated day-workers earning half or less of the mill 
workers' wage. They are not carried on the muster of any employer, have no security of 
income and employment and no insurance to cover against sickness, injury, old age and 
death.
B. Contract Labour
Contract labour is also hired through contractors, but are a less homogenous 
category than Badlis, since they are individually identified and identifiable. The data on
74
employment of contract labour collected by the ASI is published at the state and national 
level but not at the city level. When we looked at the ASI-reported shares of work days 
worked by contract workers and average wage per day of contract and regular workers in 
Maharashtra and India, we found that the share of workdays worked by contract workers 
doubled both in Maharashtra and India between 1971 and 1985/86. Wage per workday 
of a contract worker declined from 51 per cent of the regular's to 43 per cent in 
Maharashtra and from 51 per cent of the regular's to 47 per cent in India between 1971 
and 1977/78.
The Labour Commissioner's Office, as an alternative source of data, is worse. It 
recorded 4,838 contract workers employed by licensees in all industries except 
construction and 3,852 in construction in 1986. Even if all 4,838 workers were employed 
in manufacturing, they would have formed about one per cent of the manufacturing 
employment in that year. Labour contractors employing fewer than 20 workers are not 
required by the Act to obtain a license. Hence the very low number. Such contractors 
who do not employ 20 or more workers, do not have to have their contract recorded. 
Those who intend tpjworkers are required to specify when they apply to the government 
for a license, the maximum number they would employ on any day. If found guilty of 
employing more than the number they had specified, the contractors could be either 
fined or imprisoned and for repeated violations, both fined and imprisoned. According to 
Mr Ram Desai, President of the Mumbai Kamgar Sabha then organising unorganised 
workers; no labour contractor was imprisoned. A few were fined but most avoided 
prosecution by bribing the labour inspectors.
C. Casual Labour
Casual labour is a more formal category of labour employed than either of the 
previous two categories. Although not subject to any protection or severance pay, it 
does need to be put on a company’s payroll and register. The main objective of 
legislative interventions relating to badli, contract and casual labour was to prevent 
possible exploitation of these categories in a labour surplus economy. We saw that 
despite these interventions, employers employ absolutely and relatively more badlis and 
contract workers now than before. No official source except the most inaccessible 
Occupational Wage Surveys published by the Labour Bureau reports employment of
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temporary and casual labour. Hence, no one knows its extent in Bombay. At most we 
could look at data giving the distribution of employment by status of workers are based 
on the data provided by firms seeking permission of the Commissioner of Labour to 
either retrench workers or close down their business.
This data shows that the share of non-permanents declined from nearly 21 per 
cent in 1971 to barely 5 per cent in 1989. Obviously the legal interventions have 
succeeded and to that extent management's flexibility is restricted. We saw earlier that 
the pool of badlis maintained by the mills exclusive of that maintained under the 
Decasualisation Scheme increased from 20 per cent to 29 per cent of the daily 
employment. This is likely to have happened in the other industries too. A manager of a 
subsidiary of a multinational producing valves for tyres informed us that most large 
firms maintain a pool of casual workers who are rotated in such a way that no worker 
completes 240 days of continuous work, which could earn him permanency. Questioned 
on the size of the pool, he replied that it was about 15 per cent of the employees carried 
on the roster by his company though the share employed on any one day is much 
smaller, about 3-5 per cent.
High permanency reported by small firms is suspect. Employers of fewer than 50 
workers do not fall within the scope of the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act 
and are not required to classify workers by status. They report most workers as 
permanent but they do not enjoy the legal protection that goes with permanency. This 
tendency of small employers is likely to have distorted the distribution in the terminal 
year because small firms formed 87 per cent of the sample in 1989 as compared with 63 
per cent in 1971. Moreover a decline in the share of temporaries and casuals does not 
imply loss of flexibility for management when there are many flexible categories to 
choose from. An employer can substitute one for another depending on the relative 
advantages. Contract labour, for instance, is as cheap to employ as casual but involves 
less paper-work, its supply is more assured and its presence in the factory is a clear and 
loud signal for unionised labour to behave. This has increasingly led employers to 
substitute contract for casual labour.
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3.5.3 Intervention in Wages in Bombay
The Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is the oldest regulation relating to wages. It 
regulates intervals between successive wage payments, overtime payments and 
deductions from the wage paid to a worker. The Minimum Wages Act, 1948 empowers a 
Government to fix a minimum wage for any category of worker employed in an industry 
listed in the schedule appended in the Act or added to it later, but only if the industry 
employed at least 1,000 workers in the state. The minimum wage may be inclusive or 
exclusive of cost of living allowance. It is fixed either on the recommendations of a 
tripartite committee or by an announcement in the government gazette. The Equal 
Remuneration Act, 1976 prohibits wage discrimination against women. The Payment of 
Bonus Act, 1965 was enacted to reduce conflict that took place on bonus every year in 
Indian industry. Any worker who has put in 30 days of work in an establishment 
employing 20 or more workers is entitled to a bonus.
From total profits earned during the accounting year by a firm are deducted 
stipulated prior charges such as depreciation, direct taxation, development funds and 
return on capital to arrive at the available surplus, which is shared 60:40 between labour 
and capital. The sum allocated to labour is shared in proportion, to each worker's total 
wage consisting of basic and Cost of Living Allowance (COLA). The sharing is subject 
to a minimum and a maximum. No worker is paid less than 8.33 per cent and none more 
than 20 per cent of his total wage. The minimum must be paid and collective bargaining 
has bypassed the maximum. Firms pay 20 per cent in accordance with the law and a 
lump sum ex-gratia in addition.
Social security legislation in India includes Employees' State Insurance Act,
1948, the Employees' Provident Fund Act, 1952 and Payment of Gratuity Act of 1972. 
The first Act provides benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity and injury. It 
applies to all factories and all workers whose wages do not exceed Rs. 1,600 per month. 
The scheme is financed by contributions from workers and employers. The latter 
contribute five per cent of the wages payable to employees.
The Provident Fund Act applies to all factories. The fund is financed by 
employer and employee contributions, each contributing 8 per cent of the total wage.
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The Payment of Gratuity Act applies to all factories and to workers earning more than 
Rs. 1600 per month, who have worked for five years or more than one employer.
Gratuity is paid at fifteen days' wages for every year of service, subject to a maximum of 
twenty months' wages.
3.5.4 Impact
The Maharashtra State Government had listed till the end of 1988, 74 industries 
employing 10 million workers as potential candidates for minimum wage fixation. It had 
fixed the minimum in 51 industries employing 9.8 million workers. Special allowances 
were fixed along with minimum wages in 32 of the 51 industries. In the remaining 19, a 
consolidated minimum inclusive of allowances was fixed.
Studies evaluating implementation and impact of the MW Act are hard to come 
by. In 1983, a regular wage and salaried male worker in Bombay averaged Rs. 28 per 
day and a woman Rs.20 per day. A casual male worker earned Rs.14 and a woman Rs.8 
per day (Government of India, 1983). In the same year the average of 28 minima with 
and 16 without special allowances fixed by the state was Rs.20 and Rs. 10 per day 
respectively. Distribution of the regular workers in the NSSO's sample by wages is not 
known. Hence it is difficult to estimate the share of workers not paid the minimum 
wage. But the casual men and women workers forming 4 per cent of the NSSO's sample 
did not get it.
Violations of the MW Act are difficult to detect because of five factors 
(interview with Labour Bureau, 1996). First, an unknown but reportedly large number of 
small employers falsify books of accounts and cheat officials. Secondly, they bribe 
them. Thirdly, there are far too many minimum wages around and workers often do not 
know the minimum applicable to their trade unless there are unions to tell them and fight 
for them. A small sample of 57 motor garage workers when interviewed by the 
Ambedkar Institute of Labour Studies in 1983 reported they did not know if the 
Government had fixed a minimum wage for them (Datar, 1983).
Lastly, there are far too many units to police and too few officials to do it. Hence 
the assertion an office bearer of an association of small industries made much to the
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discomfort of his colleagues in a group discussion with the authors that in his opinion 
four out of every five small employers (employing fewer than ten workers) did not pay 
the minimum wage is likely to be true (Group Discussion-Feb. 13,1997). Minimum 
wage is revised once every five years. When prices rise, every worker gets less than the 
minimum in real terms. Between 1983 and 1989, minimum wages with special 
allowances in 16 of 28 trades in Bombay lagged behind prices.
In the two decades after the Second World War, unions secured for the workers 
more or less full neutralisation of inflation at the lowest level of pay. They were helped 
in their achievement by the Industrial Court and Labour Tribunals created under the 
Industrial Disputes Act. By and large, workers above the minimum pay were paid the 
same amount. The practice led to discontent among the better-paid workers whose real 
wage declined over time. Unions in some large and prosperous firms secured the 
double-linkage system by which the dearness allowance was linked to both prices as 
well as to the worker's basic pay. Despite the noise made about it, the system does not 
appear to be widespread; only 6 of 192 large firms surveyed recently reported 
double-linkage Dearness Allowance (DA) system (Government of India, 1988).
Indexing of wages to prices reduced the opportunity available to employers to 
increase their profits at the cost of workers in times of rising prices. The year-end bonus 
system culminating in the Act of 1965 eliminated it altogether at least for large and 
medium employers. Besides, there are non-wage costs consisting mostly of social 
security contributions. The composition of pay packet of factory workers is not known 
but that of wage per person-day is, though only at the state level. In 1983-84, a 
person-day in Maharashtra cost an employer Rs.51. Wages, dearness allowance and 
profit-bonus formed 86 per cent and non-wage costs 14 per cent. A more detailed 
breakdown related to person-days worked by workers in 1981-82 is given in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3
Composition of Wage Cost Per Person-day, 1981-82, Maharashtra (all firms)
Wage component % of total wage cost
1 Salaries and wages 78.4
2 Bonus 5.9
3 Benefits in kind 2.8
4 Old age benefits 7.6
5 Other social security charges 1.6
6 Other benefits 3.7
Total wage cost per person-day (Rs.) 49.60
Source: Data obtained from the Labour Bureau, 1989.
The shares of these components in large and medium firms based in Bombay would 
differ from those reported above. Profit bonus may form a higher share of the pay packet 
of a worker employed in a large than in small firms. Taking all non-wage benefits 
determined statutorily and assuming that all workers employed in large firms were 
eligible to these benefits, we estimate that the non-wage benefits would form between 25 
to 35 per cent of the total wage cost, slightly less if the second assumption were relaxed 
as it must be to take account of the flexible categories.
3.5.5 Job Security/ Industrial Disputes
The Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 governs industrial relations in all factories. 
The Act provides for conciliation of disputes and if that fails, for adjudication consisting 
of three tiers, Labour courts, Industrial Tribunals and National tribunals. Of late, the 
provisions of the Act dealing with lay-off, retrenchment and closures have been 
criticised by employers as having restricted the flexibility that management needs to 
adjust to changing economic conditions. No employer of 50 or more workers can lay off 
anyone who has worked for over 240 days unless he compensates him at 50 per cent of
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the basic plus COLA payable to him for a period up to 45 days. If the worker could not 
be re-employed within 45 days, the employer can retrench him, with compensation and a 
month's notice. Badlis and casual workers are not entitled to lay-off compensation.
To retrench a worker who has worked at least a year, the employer has to give 
him written notice indicating reasons for it a month in advance of the date of 
retrenchment and pay compensation at 15 days' average pay for every year of service. 
The Act requires an employer to compensate a worker on closure of business at the same 
rate. The Act was amended in 1976,1982 and 1984. The first amendment made lay-off, 
retrenchment and closure illegal if the employer did not obtain permission from the 
Government to do so. He was also required to notify his intentions to lay-off, retrench or 
close 90 days in advance. The two later amendments which became effective in 1984 
compelled the employer to pay full wages if a retrenched worker was reinstated by the 
Labour Court. According to the amendment of 1976, the provisions relating to closure 
and retrenchment applied to units employing 300 or more workers. The limit was 
lowered to units employing 100 or more workers with effect from 1984.
3.5.6 Impact
Introduced to protect current levels of employment, the restrictions on closures 
and retrenchment are blamed, ironically enough, for the slow growth of employment in 
the seventies and much more for the decline in the eighties (Lucas, 1988; Fallon and 
Lucas, 1991). The data on closures recorded with the Labour Commissioner given in 
Table 3.4 mislead one to conclude that the objective of the amendments to the Industrial 
Disputes Act namely, to restrain large firms from closing down, was achieved. The 
share of closures reported by employers of 100 or more workers increased from 6 per 
cent in 1971 to 15 per cent in 1981 and declined sharply after the amendment of 1982, to 
a little over one per cent of the closures in Bombay reported to the Commissioner in 
1989. In contrast, the Chief Inspector of Factories (CIF) reports 1105 or 12 per cent of 
the factories registered in Bombay closed in 1989. Closures reported to the 
Commissioner of Labour formed about 13 per cent of those reported by the CIF. Worse 
still, the share of closed factories in the CIF reported data given in Table 3.5 shows an 
increase from about 8 per cent in 1971 to 9.5 per cent in 1981 and further to 12 per cent 
in 1989.
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Table 3.4
Distribution of Closures by Size of Employment, Bombay, 1971-1989
Size of employment 1971 1981 1989
1-9 21.5 19.5 35.0
10-49 63.7 54.3 55.6
50-99 8.9 11.0 8.0
100-499 4.4 14.4 0.7
500+ 1.5 0.8 0.7
Total reported 135 118 137
Source: Commissioner o f Labour, Government o f Maharashtra. 
Unit o f observation: firm
Table 3.5
Registered and Closed Factories, Bombay, 1972-1989
Y ear N um ber o f  factories 
R egistered Closed
S hare  o f closed factories P ercen tage
1972 5551 433 7.8
1981 7724 813 9.5
1989 9076 1105 12.2
Source: Chief Inspector o f Factories, Government o f Maharashtra.
The data available from the Labour Commissioner are of little use in assessing 
the impact of restrictions on closure. Employers of fewer than 50 workers are not 
required to report but they form 91 per cent of the firms that reported to him in 1989.
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Those of 50-99 workers, though required to inform the Commissioner, are not obliged to 
seek Government's approval to close down. Such firms formed 8 per cent of the closures 
recorded with the Commissioner. That left only two firms truly affected by the 
restriction on closure. The Commissioner’s information states that many large 
employers approach the State Labour Department directly.
The Labour Secretary investigates the specific cases and decides if the firm could 
be permitted to close. Data relating to these firms are not published. Large employers 
can and do approach the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), an 
authority constituted in 1987 under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) 
Act 1985, directly. The board ascertains if the company was sick according to the Act 
and if so whether it could be made viable. If it cannot be revived it is allowed to go into 
liquidation. In 1988, 50 large and medium firms from Bombay were referred to the BIFR 
but results of the BIFR scrutiny are not known. The ban on exit is held responsible for 
locking up huge bank credit in sick units.
The argument that the resources locked up in sick units could be put to more 
productive use if the units were allowed to close sooner has won the day. A fund called 
the National Renewal Fund avowedly to retrain workers was announced by the Finance 
Minister in March 1992. Its objectives are not yet clarified and if used to compensate 
workers for loss of jobs, it is likely to be grossly inadequate (Tulpule, 1992).
Union leaders are apprehensive of the future liberalisation holds for workers and 
unhappy that the existing laws may be relaxed. Although it must be said that these 
restrictions on closure and retrenchment are not such restrictions that have helped them 
bargain from large employers compensation to workers much higher than 15 days' pay 
for every year of service stipulated by the ID Act. Mr G.R. Naidu, advocate who appears 
for employers informed us that many large employers settle with two months' pay.
The Commissioner of Labour also informed us that the share of workers 
compensated for closure was quite low in two of the three years for which the data 
available from the Labour Commissioner were tabulated. Two explanations could be 
offered. First, employers apprehensive of being refused permission to close an entire 
unit, close various departments one at a time. Secondly, they employ in much bigger
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proportion than they disclose to official and non-official agencies flexible labour 
categories that need not be compensated.
Although the procedures employers have to follow to retrench are about as 
cumbersome as the ones they follow to close down, employers find it cheaper to retrench 
than to close. Again the data from the Labour Commissioner referred to in the previous 
paragraph is misleading as it suggests that the restrictions reduced retrenchment. A 
closer inspection of the data based on the records of the CIF shows that large and small 
employers reduced their work force with equal ease though the large employers were not 
legally as free to do it as the small ones. The data also brings out another dimension of 
flexibility, the growth of units and employment in non-factory non-household 
establishments totally outside the scope of protective legislation and unions.
3.5.7 Adjudication by the State
Employers blame the system of compulsory arbitration instituted under the ID 
Act for restricting their freedom to enforce discipline and change deployment of labour. 
By its very nature, the judiciary is guided more by equity than by demand and supply. 
This puts the management at a disadvantage that they try to counteract by appealing to 
higher courts against every decision of the lower court that went against it. Both unions 
and management adopted legalistic attitudes that together with growth in legislation and 
failure of the government to increase the number of judges led to enormous delays. 
Disputes pending decision increased phenomenally and forced both parties to fall back 
on voluntarism. Workers employed in large firms turned away in some measure from 
affiliated unions to independent unions. The trend received a setback with the defeat of 
the textile strike.
Wherever and whenever management wanted to achieve substantial reduction in 
employment, they did so by a greater reliance on “backdoor” collective bargaining 
where the union agreed, and by resorting to even more informal individual bargaining 
where it did not. The long delays in getting justice from the judiciary often forced 
workers to accept management's offer of retirement with a golden handshake or even 
with much lower compensation laid down by law.
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3.6 ANALYSIS OF OBSERVATIONS
To conclude, factory employment in India stagnated in the eighties. India, hailed 
in the sixties as the archetype of Lewis model, no longer conformed to it. Bombay, the 
industrial and financial capital of the country went more wayward than the country in so 
far as employment in the whole modem sector, not just in factories declined absolutely. 
Registered unemployment and informal employment increased, as did that of badlis, 
contract labour and women.
It should be noted that it is difficult to relate the increase in capital:labour ratio in 
Indian industries causally to rise in real wages alone. Relative factor prices are 
influenced as much by the price of capital as by that of labour. Many policies followed 
in India encouraged employers to use far more capital per unit of output and labour.
One such policy is the restrictive nature of labour law. In Bombay, large and medium 
employers were not allowed to expand employment. Consequently they increased output 
by increasing mechanisation. Increase in capital intensity increased labour productivity 
and wages. In addition unions helped workers appropriate part of the rents generated by 
the regulatory regime.
Whether unions raised wages faster than productivity depends on the deflator one 
uses to translate nominal into real magnitudes. So also does the answer to the question 
whether employers were restricted by collective bargaining practices from reducing their 
workforce.
Restrictions on closure and retrenchment are often cited by employers and many 
economists as the most obnoxious elements in the set of protective legislation in the 
country. We observed that contrary to the general belief, the share of closed factories in 
those registered in Bombay increased over time and further that the large employers 
allegedly restrained by law from retrenching their workers, were able to do so as freely 
as the small ones.
The growth in flexible labour categories noted earlier portends ill for the union 
movement and the maintenance of minimum labour standards in private factory 
employment in the immediate future. Three finance ministers have been forced to deflate
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the economy to reduced fiscal deficit. Deregulation of the economy has reduced the rents 
arising from the regulatory regime. Unions representing workers employed in import- 
substituting firms are being forced to accept a cut either in wages or in employment and 
perhaps in both. The latter, if employers adopted new technology based on microchips. 
These changes have weakened the union movement.
The gloom has not been lifted for quite some time after the initial adjustment 
period of two-three years was over. Total employment has increased but it comprises 
mostly of flexible labour types. Ironically, the new technology is increasing the 
fragmentation in the labour market. Being highly automated, it involves men to control 
working situations and to diagnose difficulties and set them right. Firms adopting this 
technology function as core units and employ workers who have had far more of formal 
schooling than the typical production process worker of today. Employers are having to 
find ways and means of increasing employee involvement and of increasing quality of 
working life. Obviously this class of workers is being paid highly.
Outside this core lies the periphery. Workers employed in the firms that make it 
bear the full brunt of the new economy and new technology. Belonging mostly to the 
flexible types, they are being daunted by insecurity of employment and income both 
during and after their working life. The implications of these developments go far 
beyond the labour sector. Neither fragmentation nor the injustice that goes with it is new 
to India. The leadership that fought for her independence and gave her the present 
constitution had dreamt of ending this social inequity. That vision must guide the 
country in facing the new challenges ahead. But before we think of the ways and means 
of facing the crisis, it would be appropriate to consider the facts at the micro level.
3.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: INCREASING INSECURITY
The basic purpose of the labour flexibility surveys and our related largely 
qualitative primary research was to find out how employers cope with industrial 
relations systems and protective legislation both of which are alleged to have reduced 
their flexibility in adjusting their labour costs and work force to changes in product 
demand. This loss of flexibility is a matter of great concern in India because much of the 
stagnation in employment is attributed to it. Attempts have been made to support the
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allegations empirically drawing on the ASI data disaggregated at best to 3-digit level. 
This is useful but not enough because whether employers possess or lack flexibility is 
likely to be revealed in an enterprise survey rather than in the industry aggregates 
reported by the ASI. To meet the challenge to unions and state intervention squarely, our 
research was largely restricted to Bombay where union movement is stronger and labour 
legislation is applied more effectively.
The review of macro level data revealed a substantial increase in shares of 
flexible labour categories in manufacturing employment. This informalisation of what is 
traditionally considered formal employment took place along with the growth, absolute 
and relative, of the traditional informal employment. Rates of unemployment were high 
particularly among the young entrants to the labour force. Registered unemployment, 
deficient in many ways, increased fast. Taken together, the macro level evidence showed 
that the labour market became conducive to adoption of flexible labour practices.
Analysis of micro, firm level data showed that employers varied total 
employment, manual and non-manual taken together found that firms which experienced 
an increase in demand increased employment and it was the medium and the large firm, 
supposedly constrained by unions and protective legislation, that increased it more than 
the small firm did with all the flexibility at its command. As predicted by micro theory, 
firms that increased fixed capital per worker reduced employment and so did other firms 
that which experienced a rise in share of labour cost relative to other costs. Importantly, 
it is the firm, which increased the share of non-permanent labour that increased total 
employment. Changes in manual employment were associated directly not only with 
changes in share of non-permanent but also with those in shares of female and contract 
labour. Hence, increased insecurity for workers.
We have made an attempt to explain what factors influenced levels of and 
changes in employment of flexible labour categories. Firms which increased capital 
intensity reduced employment of flexible labour be it non-permanent, casual, contract, 
female or the all-inclusive non-regular labour. Employers who reported their labour cost 
had increased as a share of variable cost, reported a higher share of non-permanent 
labour particularly, casual labour. In contrast, such employers reported proportionately 
fewer contract and women workers.
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This led us to probe this relationship between flexible labour statuses. 
Non-permanent labour and contract labour were complementary but contract labour and 
female labour were substitutes. Non-regular labour and female labour were also used as 
substitutes in employment.
The supposition that larger firms resorted increasingly to flexibilisation of labour 
was also borne out in respect of non-permanent labour but not in that of casual labour 
and female labour while the labour flexibility survey lacked data to test it in respect of 
contract labour. Some solace could be had from the fact that the hypothesised tendency 
was observed though it was statistically insignificant. Viewed in the context of the 
macro data, one suspects that the data on employment of casual, contract and female 
labour may not have been correctly reported by larger firms to the government. This 
possibility makes the evidence of flexibility gathered by both labour flexibility surveys 
all the more precious.
The surveys also found that unions were less likely in firms that reported a higher 
share of non-permanent labour in particular and a higher share of other flexible labour in 
general but the generalised relationship was not statistically significant. Flexible labour 
being difficult to organise, the lower probability of union presence in firms reporting 
higher shares of flexible labour is quite understandable. Unions discouraged 
employment of non-permanent and non-regular labour. Unionised firms reported lower 
share of female labour but greater increase in it over the previous years. They also 
reported a greater increase in the share of casual labour. This behaviour of unions could 
be rationalised pragmatically. Casual labour could be given permanency later with the 
help of the law. It could also be that unions did not mind employers hiring flexible 
labour so long as they did not hire them in threateningly large numbers. Unions 
contributed to dynamic efficiency of the firms by encouraging technological change and 
widening of product range. Unfortunately, such contributions of unions are rarely 
noticed. Regrettably, the conflictual role of unions appears from the surveys’ data to be 
unduly exaggerated.
The wages of unskilled male workers were higher if determined by collective 
bargaining; if such workers were employed in medium and large firms; if the firms paid
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higher than the minimum rate of bonus; and if the firms belonged to chemical industry. 
Unions raised the wages of both unskilled and skilled males above those paid to them by 
non-unionised employers. A firm reporting a higher share of female employment paid its 
unskilled males less than a firm that reported a lower share. Unions narrowed the 
skill-based wage differentials. The latter were narrower in large than in small firms but 
wider in textile product industry and firms reporting higher share of female. Labour cost 
was a higher share of variable costs of a firm which reported a lower increase in prices.
It was the higher, the lower the share of non-permanent labour and surprisingly, the 
higher the higher the share of contract labour. Perhaps the causation runs the other way 
around; firms with higher labour costs resort to proportionately greater use of contract 
labour.
It must be stated that the data set presented in the surveys as available for India 
bears no comparison with the quantitatively and qualitatively much richer set presented 
by Standing his labour flexibility surveys, which formed the guide for our surveys (e.g. 
1989 and 1990 for Malaysia). However, the conclusions that emerge from the limited 
number of studies are not much different. Even if we assumed that bigger firms reported 
the whole truth and nothing but the truth, the lower recourse to flexibilisation than 
reported by employers in Malaysia, may be attributed to the less urgent need for it in an 
inward-looking, highly protected Indian environment that prevailed at the survey.
Having established from the detailed examination of the conclusions of the two Labour 
Flexibility Surveys, and of the insights gained from our own interviews, we have 
established what seems to be a trend for increasing casualisation, informalisation and 
insecurity. This leads us to strongly suspect that as hypothesised by Basu, Fields and 
Debgupta (2000) and also suggested above, job security regulations tend to not benefit 
the large majority of the labour force, and have a negative effect on employment. Let us 
test this hypothesis next in Chapter 4.
*  *
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CHAPTER 4
IMPACT OF JOB SECURITY REGULATIONS:
USING HOUSEHOLD AND FIRM-LEVEL DATA FOR INDIA
We concluded in the previous chapter that labour regulations have a selective 
impact. While giving protection to a tiny minority of the labour force, they actually lead 
to large scale informalisation for the majority of the work force, thus pushing them into 
insecure employment, which is badly paid and low skilled. As a result, these regulations 
are, to a large extent, responsible for trapping a large majority of the labour force— 
informal labour—into an often inter-generational cycle of poverty. Let us now test this 
impact on employment, and its various categories.
In order to assess the impact of labour market reforms on the workers, it is 
necessary to determine the impact of labour market regulations on labour market 
outcomes. This chapter does so, and is organised into the following sections: Section
4.1 presents the theoretical debate about the impact of labour market regulations.
Section 4.2 summarises the empirical evidence contained in academic papers about the 
impact of labour market regulations. Section 4.3 briefly re-states the background 
information about job security in India. Section 4.4 presents the data, methodology and 
results of a simple probit analysis using National Sample Survey (NSS) data, designed to 
answer the question: who benefits from job security regulations in India? Section 4.5 
presents the data, methodology and results of an econometric exercise on firm-level data 
in India, which is designed to look at long term labour demand functions of firms, and 
analyses which categories of labour are facing decreasing demand, and which are facing 
more negative impact on demand than others. It finds a decrease in the demand for both 
regular, and casual labour—i.e. a negative impact of regulations on all employment. 
Section 4.6 contains the conclusions to this chapter.
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4.1 THE IMPACT OF LABOUR MARKET REGULATIONS: THEORETICAL 
ARGUMENTS
In an important review article, Freeman (1992) caricatures the debate over 
labour regulations as a fight between the World Bank Distortion View versus the ILO 
Institutional View. He describes the opposing positions as follows:
“On one side are economists who see unregulated labour markets as 
neoclassical bourses in which government regulation o f wages, mandated 
contributions to social funds, job security, and collective bargaining create 
"distortions" in an otherwise ideal world....On the opposite side are 
institutionally oriented economists who believe that the social aspects o f 
labour markets create such large divergences from the competitive ideal as to 
make the model a poor measuring rod for policy. These analysts stress the 
potential benefits o f intervention, hold that regulated markets adjust better 
than unregulated markets to shocks, and endorse tripartite consultations and 
collective bargaining as the best way to determine labour outcomes. When 
efficiency conflicts with the social protection o f labour, they place greater 
weight on the latter (p. 118)
On the other hand, the World Bank’s Distortion View (so called as opposed to 
the ILO’s “institutional view”) argues that labour market policies tend to raise labour 
costs and reduce labour demand in the formal sector, while increasing labour supply and 
depressing labour income in the informal and rural sectors (where most of the poor are 
engaged.) In addition to the efficiency losses resulting from such misallocations of 
labour, labour policy also gives rise to deadweight losses associated with interest group 
rent-seeking (e.g., as a result of attempts by "insiders" to gain even more protective job 
security legislation), a diminished capacity to adjust to shocks due to a regulation 
induced loss of labour market flexibility, and a lowering of overall investment rates as a 
result of labour policy's redistribution of economic rents from capital to labour.
Taken together the theoretical arguments of the Distortion View imply that 
labour regulations hurt both wage and employment growth, and, while some workers 
may benefit from regulations, labour as a group will not. The poor especially are likely
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to be hurt from a lowering of labour demand since labour time is their primary, or even 
sole, asset.
Freeman (1992), however, argues that the Distortion View employs a 
"selective use of economic theory," and its welfare conclusions might be less robust than 
they first appear. He writes,
“those who believe that social security payroll taxes adversely affect savings and 
investment reject Ricardian equivalence; those who use nonwage costs to 
measure interventionist distortions reject the fungibility o f modes o f 
compensation; those who argue that employment protection laws have efficiency 
costs ignore Coase's theorem that property rights do not affect efficiency”, (p. 
120)
The ILO’s Institutional View also is subject to criticism by him, more for its 
lack of theory than for its selective use. A moral imperative for labour protection often 
is substituted for a more objective defence. Theory can play a greater role in assessing 
the Institutional perspective but too often it has not. Cost benefit analysis can be 
applied to the evaluation of programs such as unemployment insurance. Game theory 
offers insight into alternative bargaining arrangements and can identify the relative 
merits of differing institutional modes of wage-setting. "The game theory finding that 
modest differences in the rules of games (that is, institutions) can substantially affect 
outcomes implies that one cannot dismiss institutional claims as atheoretic, although the 
claims may be wrong. All of which means that we must look at evidence to decide who 
is closer to the truth." (Freeman 1992,122)
4.2 THE IMPACT OF LABOUR MARKET REGULATIONS: EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE
The evidence on the impact of labour market regulations is no more conclusive 
than is theory. Based on analyses from the 1980s, Freeman's survey finds little evidence 
of the labour market rigidities that the Distortion View assumes result from labour 
regulations. In a wide range of developing countries, real wages despite the prevalence 
of minimum wage orders were not sticky and as macroeconomic situations worsened, 
real wages declined, often precipitously. Relative wages, especially differentials
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between the public and private sectors, but also by skill and education levels, similarly 
displayed considerable flexibility. Direct evidence on the consequences of specific 
regulations proved equivocal. Relaxation of job security legislation in Spain seems to 
have spurred employment growth, but similar legislation in Malaysia had little affect on 
employment, and findings on India and Zimbabwe appear contradictory. Correlations 
between either the organisation (industrial versus company) or strength of unions and 
macro-adjustments or enterprise performance also proved inconclusive.
“Fallon and Lucas (1991) estimated wage and employment adjustment equations before 
and after passage of job security laws in India and Zimbabwe and found little evidence 
that the laws affected wages or speeds of adjustment but considerable evidence that they 
reduced total employment in relation to output--an odd finding, since job security 
provisions that do not affect wages or the speed of adjustment carry no extra cost that 
would deter employment." (Freeman 1992,129)
Empirical work undertaken in the 1990s supports Freeman's earlier findings. A 
special issue of the Journal o f Labour Economics (July 1997) is devoted to studies of 
labour market flexibility in developing countries. Several of the papers consider 
whether dismantling various labour regulations increases labour demand. Once again 
the results are mixed. Bell (1997) finds a statistically significant disemployment effect 
resulting from Colombia's minimum wages ("...the 10 percent rise in the real value of the 
minimum wage from 1981 to 1987 reduced employment of low skilled workers between 
2per cent and 12per cent." (p. s i04)
Conversely, in Mexico the real value of the minimum wage fell almost in half 
with little apparent effect on employment. Bell attributes these differences to the 
relative position of the minimum wage in the wage distributions of the two countries 
(relatively high in Colombia and low in Mexico) and to a much higher degree of non 
compliance in Mexico.
Rama (1995) examines the impact of minimum wages in Indonesia and gets 
results that fall closer to those on Mexico than on Colombia. He finds that a doubling of 
the Indonesian minimum wage led to a 10 percent increase in average wages and a 2
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percent decrease in wage employment. These magnitudes suggest a moderate effect, 
not a large labour market distortion, resulting from Indonesia's minimum wage.
Papers by Gruber (1997) and by Maclsaac and Rama (1997) in the Journal o f 
Labour Economics volume consider the incidence of regulations. Gruber studies the 
privatisation of Chile's social security program which, beginning in 1981, shifted most 
of the financing of the program from payroll taxes to general revenues, causing the 
payroll tax to fall from 30 to 5 percent. If the incidence of these payroll taxes bears 
heavily on employers, this reduction should lower labour costs and produce, ceteris 
paribus, a commensurate increase in labour demand. Gruber finds that it did not. 
Workers bore the burden of the tax and when rates were lowered effectively all the 
benefit accrued to workers in the form of higher wages. Gruber concludes, "changes in 
employer taxes had essentially no effect on employment." (p. s73)
Maclsaac and Rama (1997) reach a similar conclusion. Their focus is on the 
incidence of nonwage benefits mandated by Ecuador's cumbersome labour legislation, 
where bonus payments (the "teens"), cost-of-living adjustments, transport allowances 
and social security contributions are all required and, in principle, could push-up take 
home pay by 75 percent for a minimum-wage worker. Instead, the fungibility of 
compensation results in labour costs increasing, on average, by only an estimated 8 
percent as workers absorb most of the mandated benefits in the form of lower base 
wages. Like Gruber, and unlike the conclusions of Cox-Edwards (see below), the results 
obtained by Maclsaac and Rama suggest that many labour regulations neither have the 
presumed large and negative effect on employment nor have they proven capable of 
significantly improving the well-being of those workers covered by these statutes.
In a survey of labor market legislation in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC), Cox-Edwards (1993) writes,
“Textbooks usually mention minimum wages as the predominant labor market 
distortion to be removed in market-oriented reforms. But this is not the most 
pressing issue in Latin America today. With few exceptions, minimum wages 
have declined throughout the region in the past few years and have largely 
become non-binding.... The most serious labor market distortions in Latin
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America can be classified in three categories: employment protection laws that 
impose limits on temporary hiring and impose substantial costs on dismissals; 
high payroll taxes; and antagonistic labor-management relations that encourage 
confrontation and costly settlement procedures.” (p. ii)
Examples of such regulations include two year limits on non-renewable 
temporary contracts in Ecuador, Nicaragua and Peru; payroll taxes of 46 percent in 
Argentina and 20 per cent in Colombia; and the existence of union shops in a large 
number of LAC countries. Cox-Edwards also reports the existence of mandatory non­
wage compensation such as annual vacation time (30 days in Peru), maternity leave (24 
weeks in Brazil) and employer funded child care (for firms of 20 or more employees in 
Venezuela.) “The key question concerning these benefits is who pays for them: 
employers in the form of lower profits; workers in the form of higher benefits and lower 
wages; or workers outside the formal labor market who might benefit from higher labor 
demand if total labor costs were lower.” (p. iii)
Independent evidence from surveys of business executives in many countries 
confirms the weak support for the Distortion View's worst case scenario of labour 
regulations escalating labour costs and inhibiting the growth of employment and 
investment. Maclsaac and Rama (1997) report that in a survey of 1000 large firms in 
Ecuador, labour regulations were mentioned infrequently as a concern of business 
managers. The same result was obtained for Cameroon by Gauthier (1995), for Senegal 
by Terrell and Svjenar (1989), and for the Ukraine by Kaufinann (1997).
The World Economic Forum's Africa Competitiveness Report 1998 employs 
similar surveys. It finds that in a sample of twenty, mostly sub-Saharan economies, over 
two-thirds of the countries do not rank regulations on hiring and firing, or on working 
hours, as a significant constraint on business activity. For most of the countries labour 
regulations were ranked as less onerous to business than were other regulations. The 
exceptions, where labour regulations were perceived of as a significant problem, were in 
Southern Africa and included Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.
The World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 1999 poses 
similar questions to a broad group of developed and developing economies. “India's
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business leaders, like their South African counterparts, repeatedly cite job security 
legislation as a significant impediment to their activities "(emphasis mine). In Latin 
America, Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela receive low scores on labour market 
flexibility while Brazil, Chile and Mexico rank more favourably (World Economic 
Forum (1999), Tables 7.04 and 7.05).
Available empirical studies suggest that labour regulations have caused weaker 
distortions and fewer debilitating effects on the labour market than predicted by the 
Distortion View. Freeman suggests that there are several reasons why this may be the 
case. First, labour policy is at least partially endogenous to economic circumstances. 
Concerning the use of minimum wages, Freeman (1992) writes, "The minimum floor 
proved to be sawdust not hardwood, as distortionists feared." (p. 128) When 
governments realise the difficulty firms have meeting the levels of prevailing minimum 
wages, they permit inflation to erode guidelines pegged at nominal rates. Second, labour 
markets world-wide show considerable flexibility to market conditions regardless of 
their particular institutional or regulatory features. The fungibility of wages and benefits 
is a prime example. Third, compliance and enforcement are key determinants of the 
impact of labour regulations. Often, employers and employees both have an incentive to 
evade the law employers to lower labour costs and employees to save their jobs. Given 
the administrative burden of enforcement, non-compliance is expected. Describing the 
situation in the CFA zone, Rama (1998) writes,
"...very few plants are visited to check that they do comply with labour standards. 
In the unlikely event o f one such visit, some employers add, inspectors can be 
easily bribed to avoid paying a fine. Not surprisingly, employers do not feel 
unduly constrained by current labour regulations." (p.9)
Labour regulations can be designed which seriously misallocate resources, 
reduce investment and slow employment growth. But this does not mean they always 
will do so. Empirical studies report on individual cases, but not necessarily the worst 
cases. However, India, one suspects, is one of those “worst” cases. More careful 
scrutiny of the country experience below reveals a situation in which labour regulations 
exact a heavy price, especially on those "outsiders" who work beyond the reach of the 
labour code.
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4.3 JOB SECURITY IN INDIA
Let us briefly re-state what we have already stated in previous chapters. In the 
case of India, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, requires firms that employ 50 or more 
workers to pay a compensation, which is specified in the Act, to any worker who is 
retrenched. In addition, an amendment to the Act, which became effective in 1984, 
requires firms, which employ more than 100 workers actually to seek prior permission 
from the government before retrenching workers. And, as Datta Chaudhuri (1994) has 
noted, the government seldom gives permission and, in general, places a lot of a priori 
restrictions on the terms for hiring and firing workers (see, also Mathur, 1992; Edgren, 
1990; Papola, 1994).
Basu, Fields and Debgupta (2000) note that “what is interesting about such 
laws is how lay opinion on them is at divergence from the opinion of economists” . The 
popular wisdom on this issue is that these anti-retrenchment laws help labour, but hurt 
the development process, as they force firms to maintain huge workforces that reduce 
their ability to make profit. One problem with the conventional wisdom is that it fails to 
capture the fact that anti-retrenchment laws raise the effective cost of employing labour 
and, as a result, firms may hire fewer workers. Additionally, it is conceivable that, given 
the presence of such laws, some firms may not enter into production in the first place. 
Hence, Basu, Fields and Debgupta (2000) conclude:
“the economists' view o f this is often the opposite o f the lay opinion: By 
burdening firms with the risk that they may not be able to fire their workers or 
that they will have to pay very large compensations in order to do so, the anti­
retrenchment laws cause a decline in the demand for labour and thereby cause a 
lowering o f wages and so ultimately hurt workers” (p. 4).
Fallon and Lucas (1991), in an empirical study on the anti-retrenchment laws 
in Zimbabwe and India, show that as the laws were strengthened (making it more 
difficult to layoff a worker), the long-run demand for employees fell by 25.2 percent and 
17.5 percent, respectively. They could not determine any significant reduction in wages 
as a result of the laws. In the case of India the point has been made time and again that
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rigid labour market legislation may have hurt India's overall growth and efficiency 
(Fallon and Lucas; Ahluwalia 1991; Government of India, 1995). The claim that is 
forwarded by Basu, Fields and Debgupta (2000) is related—inasmuch as labour earnings 
are a subset of growth and efficiency. They have argued that the legislation may have 
hurt the very constituency that it was meant to protect— labour. Hence, Kannan's (1994) 
observation that wages in the eighties have not kept pace with labour productivity and 
Ghose's (1994) finding that employment per unit of gross value added in manufacturing 
fell monotonically throughout the eighties (see, also, Mahendra Dev, 1995) sit very well 
with the theoretical findings of their paper and the fact that India's labour market 
legislation was made more rigid in the eighties.
In the next section, we use National Sample Survey (NSS) data to analyse who 
benefits from job security regulations in India.
4.4 WHO BENEFITS FROM JOB SECURITY REGULATIONS?: PROBIT 
ANALYSIS USING HOUSEHOLD DATA
4.4.1 Theory
Job security (JS) provisions are, in general, regulatory measures enacted as 
social protection to mitigate the risk of unemployment among workers by forcing firms 
to provide subsidies during downturns. The main mechanism is large severance 
payments preventing workers from being laid-off during downturns. In India it also 
implies lengthy and expensive procedures that inhibit layoffs by driving up firing costs.
It is sometimes argued that the macroeconomic adjustment is further shifted towards the 
informal sector. Hence many perceive JS provisions as inequitable for unprotected 
workers.
Those who support regulations in the job market claim that they are 
commendable to the extent that their objective is the protection of workers against 
unsafe work practices and unjustified dismissals. They also state that regulations protect 
the weakest members of society, that they help to redistribute income and that they 
stabilise earnings for those people subject to greater risks.
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Job Security is one form of non-wage compensation. Besides inducing greater 
immobility, JS increases labour costs to the firm. The increase in labour costs depends 
on how workers value JS and, specifically, on whether JS is a substitute for, or a 
complementary to, wage compensation.
Who benefits from regulations? Could we predict which individuals are the 
most likely to profit from deregulation? These questions have no simple answer but 
deserve serious consideration before any action is taken to alter the current regulatory 
standing. We attempt such an exercise using five rounds of NSS data.
4.4.2 Description o f Dataset
For the purpose of this thesis, we use data collected in various surveys of 
National Sample Survey (NSS), India. NSS is the only source that provides comparable 
time series information on the levels and patterns of employment, unemployment, 
consumption and the distribution of population by per capita consumption levels. These 
surveys also provide information on demography, consumer expenditure, land 
utilization, and so on.
For over 50 years, the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) has been 
conducting socio-economic surveys on a nation-wide basis in the form of annual 
(sometimes half-yearly) rounds. Primarily the national sample surveys (NSS) are 
designed to provide reliable results for planning and policy purposes at national and state 
levels. The State Governments started participating in the programme of NSS from the 
8th round (July 1954-June 1955) onwards employing their own field resources. The 
main idea of states participating in the NSS programme was to provide a mechanism by 
which the sample size will get increased as a result of which it should be possible to 
provide more disaggregated results at regional or lower level by pooling the central and 
state samples for meeting the requirements of effective decentralised plan formulation 
and policy analysis. In order to ensure that pooling of results of central and state samples 
is undertaken on a scientific basis, right from the beginning the states adopted the same 
sampling design, schedules, concepts and definitions, instructions for the field and 
supervisory staff, and manual scrutiny programme.
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Generally the central sample comprises about 10,000 villages and 5,000 urban 
blocks. The sample canvassed in each state is at least of the same size as the central 
sample canvassed by the NSSO. In some cases the state sample is twice (or more in few 
cases) the size of the central sample. For example, for the 55th round (1999-2000) 
relating to household consumer expenditure, employment and unemployment, and 
informal non-agricultural enterprises, the size of the state sample (both for rural and 
urban areas) was twice that of central sample in case of Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu & 
Kashmir, and Manipur, while it was one-and-half times in Goa (both for rural and urban 
areas) and Mahrashtra (only for urban areas). In case of Delhi the state sample, both for 
urban and rural areas, was three times that of the central sample. The union territory of 
Chandigarh conducted the survey only in the urban areas with twice the size of the urban 
central sample.
Comparability in Data Gathering across States: The respective State 
Governments have charged the state Directorates of Economics and Statistics (DES) 
with the responsibility of canvassing state sample of NSS. In order to ensure uniformity 
of concepts, definitions, and methodology of data collection in the central and state 
samples, the Field Operations Division (FOD) of NSSO organises an all-India training 
conference of supervisory staff involved in the collection of both central and state 
samples before launching the field work for each round. The regional staff of the FOD of 
NSSO and the DESs coordinate with each other in training the field staff deployed for 
canvassing the central and state samples.
Comparability in Data Processing across States: Unlike the field operations, 
the arrangements for co-ordination between the Data Processing Division (DPD) of 
NSSO and the state DESs in matters relating to data processing of NSS are rather weak. 
The DPD of the NSSO selects both the central and state sample of the NSS and provides 
to the state DESs the lists of villages and urban blocks for canvassing the state sample. 
Although the NSSO and state DESs adopt the same tabulation programme, on a very 
few occasions an annual training workshop on data processing has been organised by 
DPD to discuss with the state DESs issues relating to adoption of uniform data entry 
formats, computer scrutiny and procedures and methods of validation of data. This is 
mainly on account of differences in the hardware and available data processing facilities 
in the state DESs.
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Pooling o f Results: Primarily the responsibility for pooling of central and state 
sample results of NSS rests with the state DESs in view of the State Governments’ 
interest in obtaining results at regional and lower levels to meet their requirements of 
decentralised planning.
Methodology o f Pooling: A technical group set up by the Department of 
Statistics, Government of India in 1981 under the chairmanship of Mr. S.C. Choudhri, 
the then Chief Executive Officer of NSSO recommended in 1983 that the estimates 
based on central and state samples may be combined as a weighted average with the 
number of primary sampling units as weights at the stratum level. Most of the state 
DESs were not able to adopt the recommended procedure mainly on account of the 
reason that it called for a large amount of additional data processing resources. Keeping 
in view the above difficulty of the state DESs, Minhas and Sardana (1990) devised a 
simple procedure of pooling the central and state sample data to provide more precise 
results as compared to both the central sample and the state sample. In brief, the method 
involves pooling of central sample and state sample data and treating it as one sample by 
simply amending the multiplier files of the central sample and state sample to take into 
account the increase in the sample size.
This procedure is statistically sound because the central and the state surveys 
are undertaken adopting the same sampling design, the same concepts and definitions, 
same schedules and procedures of data collection, and manual scrutiny of filled in 
schedules. The method, of course, presumes that the data processing by the NSSO and 
the state DESs will be undertaken in a co-ordinated manner using the same procedures 
and software for data entry, data validation, imputing of missing values, working out and 
stabilising the multiplier files and desirably the same software for generating the desired 
tabulations. In order to promote the activity of pooling of central and state samples of 
NSS, the NSSO provides the validated unit-wise data and the stabilised multiplier files 
of the central sample to the interested state DESs.
Since most of the state DESs use computer for data processing of NSS, copies 
of the computer based software developed and used by the DPD of the NSSO for
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tabulating central sample data are given by the NSSO to the state DESs for tabulating 
results based on state sample as also pooled central and state sample data.
As a matter of general practice, NSSO does not publish estimates of standard 
errors (SE) of estimates presented in the reports on national sample surveys. However, to 
help users to get an idea about the reliability of estimates, the published reports, in 
general, present estimates by two or more sub-samples. Occasionally individual research 
workers have published estimates of SE of selected estimates at national level, state 
level, and NSSO regional level.
Advantages o f NSS Data: The National Sample Survey (NSS) is an important 
source of information on labour. Unlike the Population Census which covers the entire 
population, the NSS data is based on sample surveys. As stated earlier, the National 
Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) carries out large scale surveys on the whole of 
India with sections on employment and unemployment every five years. The systematic 
and comparable surveys on employment by gender, age-group and other classifications 
are available from 1974 onwards. Therefore the data relating to estimates of labour are 
available for six periods, namely 1973-74,1977-78,1983, 1987-88,1993-94 and 1999- 
2000 with five year intervals.
The large-scale NSSO quinquennial surveys covering the entire country mainly 
aim to measure the extent of employment and unemployment in quantitative terms. The 
population in National Sample Survey is comprised of three components, that is (a) 
workers (or employed) (b) seeking/available for work (or unemployment) and (c) not in 
labour force (or non-worker). Unlike the Population Census, which used only one 
approach or concept of ‘work’ (or employment), the NSS has adopted three different 
approaches of work or employment based on the activities pursued by the individuals 
during a specified reference period. The three approaches are based on the reference 
period used in assigning the working status:
(i) Usual Status Approach -  The Usual Status (US) is assigned by taking a reference 
period of 365 days preceding the date of survey. This particular approach is further 
divided into two categories.
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(a) Principal Usual Status -  A person who is engaged relatively for a longer time 
during the reference period of 365 days in any one or more work activities is 
considered as principal status worker.
(b) Subsidiary Usual Status -  A person who pursued some gainful activity in a 
subsidiary capacity is considered to be a subsidiary status worker.
(ii) Current Weekly Status -  The working status under current weekly status is with a 
reference to 7 days preceding the data of survey
(iii) Current Daily Status -  The working status under the daily status is assigned based 
on activity with reference to each day of the 7 days preceding the date of survey.
Economists have generally used differences between (i), (ii) and (iii) to 
calculate the true extent of casualisation of labour in India, and to calculate the 
difference between the number of people with regular contracts and those with different 
kinds of informal, or no, contracts.
Besides the age and gender distribution of working persons or employed, the 
NSS also provides data on unemployed persons by age including the age-group 5-14 
years, marital status of respondents, and education and skill level, sector of employment, 
and activity group.
Activity Group: This category helps us to understand whether a worker is 
protected or unprotected, given whether he/she is a regular worker or not. The National 
Sample Survey provides the data on the economic activities in which the working person 
is engaged. The economic activities are classified into five economic activity groups by 
total and then separately in agriculture and non-agriculture sector for rural and urban 
areas. As stated already, the participation of persons working in each of the activities 
and their division within agriculture and non-agriculture is given for four status namely, 
Principal Usual Status, Usual Principal and Subsidiary Status, Currently Weekly Status 
and Current Daily Status. The activity categories of employed persons included under 
principal usual status and usual principal and subsidiary status are as follows:
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Usual Activity (Principal Status) and its activity categories
• Worked in Household enterprise (self employed)
• Worked as helper in Household enterprise (unpaid family worker)
• Worked as regular salaried/wage employee
• Worked as casual wage labour in public works
• Worked as casual wage labour in other types of work
• Sought or seeking/available for work (Unemployed)
• Not in Labour Force
• Total Population
The activity categories for persons employed based on the Current Weekly Status and 
Current Daily Status are slightly different.
Current Weekly/Current Daily Activity and its categories
• Worked in Household enterprise (self employed)
• Worked as helper in Household enterprise (unpaid family worker)
• Worked as regular salaried/wage employee
• Worked as casual wage labour in public works
• Worked as casual wage labour in other types of work
• Worked in household enterprise but did not work due to sickness
• Worked in household enterprise but did not work due to other reasons
• Regular salaried/wage employed but did not work due to sickness
• Regular salaried/wage employed but did not work due to other reasons
• Sought or seeking/available for work (Unemployed)
• Did not seek but was available for work
• Not in Labour Force
• Total Population
There have not been any significant changes in the concept of work (gainful 
activity) adopted over the five rounds i.e. 32nd round (1977-78), 38th round (1983), 
43rd round (187-88), 50th round (1993-94) and 55th round (1999-2000) in National
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Sample Survey and Rural Labour Enquiry. Therefore, temporal changes could be studied 
with little difficulty.
4.4.3 Methodology
Because of the labour market's segmentation, the probability of benefiting from
regulations varies across individuals. For this reason, it appears interesting to run a
descriptive analysis of the beneficiaries of regulations. At this stage, as we must
acknowledge the technical support and inputs provided by Mr. C.S. Das of the Central
Statistical Organisation (CSO) in Calcutta. Without him, it would have been impossible
to obtain, clean and analyse the data, and obtain the results discussed below. We report
results arrived at using household-level data for wage-eamers from various rounds of the
National Sample Survey (NSS) for the 1977-99 period. We divide the sample between
males and females. The model we estimate is a simple probit equation where the
O'C r\ o ii
dependent variable is a dummy over whetheijthe worker can claim state-mandated 
protection and/or compensation in case of dismissal. These are all those workers who 
are in regular employment according to answers provided to questions about kind of 
employment (see previous section). We follow the methodological framework provided 
in Mondino and Montoya (2000), although the nature of our analysis and results is 
different, as our data set provides different kinds of information than theirs.
The correlates included are:
■ Educational level: Higher educational level implies higher productivity 
and should increase the probability of being in the formal sector. Lower 
educational level workers could be pushed to the informal sector because 
their low productivity may not be enough to counter the costs of 
minimum wage and other laws.
■ Experience: Experience increases general human capital and, hence, 
productivity. Therefore, more experienced workers would face less 
insecurity than those who have recently joined the labour force, or those 
who work intermittently.
■ Tenure on the job: Longer tenure must reflect a better match and greater 
job specific human capital. If a firm could choose the type of jobs to
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offer job security it would provide it to workers that have accumulated a 
high level of firm-specific human capital. Workers would in return pay 
back in the form of higher productivity.
■ Branch of Activity: A purely empirical set of correlates to account for 
sector specific differences in the enforcement capabilities of control 
agencies, the degree of monopsony power, unionisation and instability of 
activities.
■ The size of the company.
■ Regulatory status of another family member: It is quite possible that 
workers become increasingly prone to accept job offers with regulatory 
coverage when the household has diversified risks, in particular, when the 
spouse or another family member enjoys regulatory coverage. This can 
be seen from whether the worker is principal or subsidiary status.
■ Marital status: this variable is introduced in the female regression 
bearing in mind the gender biased features of the legislation. We should 
anticipate a negative sign.
■ Children under six years of age.
4.4.4 Results
Table 4.1 reports the results for females and males of the derivates of a probit 
model where the dependent variable is the possibility of claiming state-mandated 
protection and/or compensation if the worker is laid off.
Table 4.1
Probit Estimation: Jobs with Protection/Compensation Rights
Men Women
dF/dx Z X -B ar dF/dx Z X -B ar
P rim ary 0.048464 2.2256 0.406744 -0.000832 -0.0728 0.576368
H igh-School 0.26163 9.5172 0.367916 0.100837 7.9619 0.264813
College 0.219802 10.8018 0.17544 0.078846 4.5186 0.086598
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Experience 0.020907 1 1.9382 20.323624 0.016564 22.541382 13.6148
T enure 0.001632 3.6516 6.964254 0.00255 7.2114 8.071872
C onstruc tion -0.476066 -21.6094 0.169435 -0.304056 -19.4979 0.069937
M an u fac tu rin g 0.225576 2.236 0.00364 0.126152 3.5776 0.013936
R etail 0.070616 4.3264 0.145496 -0.045344 -4.4928 0.167128
T ra n sp o r t 0.140801 4.4084 0.028531 -0.07004 -6.0667 0.126896
F inancial Services 0.132498 6.9972 0.103734 0.015912 1.1424 0.091494
P riva te  and  Social 
Services*
0.174932 11.3625 0.550652 -0.005757 -0.5858 0.220584
Size < 50 0.2362 0.177255 13.6754 0.204525 0.126351 16.7559
Size <100 0.30957 22.3482 0.181662 0.232968 28.9374 0.176868
F l ia R e g  * 0.46332 41.2568 0.340704 0.34112 43.5344 0.277888
P a r t  Time* -0.210288 -17.212 0.367328 -0.207168 -18.0024 0.12064
H ousehold H ead 0.008446 0.5047 0.184061 0.146466 15.244 0.692469
Child <6 0.00012 0.002 0.21378 -0.00551 -0.51 0.198696
M arried 0.1245 2.3467 0.3417 -0.0509 -3.6158 0.477427
Observations
;■$
371620 296053
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. z  is the test of the underlying coefficient being 0.
Interpretation o f Results: The results are interesting, and support the Distortion 
View argument. It is easy to see that educated male workers are the most privileged lot, 
and benefit most from these regulations. It appears that regulations are increasingly 
prevalent the higher the human capital of the individual. It shows that the level of 
regulations, i.e. jobs with protection of tenure and working conditions, are at present 
growing with educational level, especially for males. Males also show, however, that 
for those with a college education the probability decreases a bit. Those with a university
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level education select themselves out of wage-earning jobs and into self-employment to 
avoid the impact of high taxation.
Let us look at the correlates one by one. First off, it is obvious that male 
workers fare consistently better than female workers. The most convincing results are 
obtained for educational level. The higher the education level, the greater the 
probability of having a protected job. Similarly, the greater the experience level and 
tenure, the higher the probability of having a protected job. Both of these imply greater 
insecurity for those entering the labour market (mainly youth), and those working 
intermittently (seasonal labour). Coming to the branch of activity, the least number of 
protected jobs are found in the construction sector, which uses the maximum number of 
unskilled manual labour. The more technical the branch of activity, the greater the 
probability of a worker having some protection. Also, the more specialised the activity, 
i.e. the more specialised the human capital required for it, the more probability of 
protection offered exists.
Coming to the size of the company, the smaller the company, the lower the 
probability of a worker having any protection with his or her job. The larger the 
company, the more the probability of such protection being afforded. Regarding 
regulatory status of another family member, it results are more convincing for male 
workers than for female workers. This sits well with the empirical fact that fathers with 
regular jobs find it easier to get access to regular jobs for their sons. This does not hold 
true for wives and daughters. Moreover, if the husband has a regular job, wives can 
often work as casual workers. This can be seen from whether the worker is principal or 
subsidiary status.
Coming to marital status, married men are far more likely to have protected 
jobs than married women. This could be accounted for by the fact that women often 
move in and out of supplying labour outside the household. As such, given our findings 
for experience and tenure, they are less likely to have job protection. For, children under 
six years of age, the possibility of any protection is very remote. This sits well with the 
legal fact of child labour being illegal. As such, all such labour is either “invisible”, or 
classes as “house work”.
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Hence, summarising the results, the probit analysis confirms that regulations 
tend to segment the market and provide protection to those male workers with greater 
human capital, working for large firms. Workers with greater human capital belong to 
the upper and middle socio-economic and educational categories. In other words, the 
regulatory structure is regressive and, whatever protection it might provide, it does not 
appear to benefit those people who are objectively worse off. It provides protection to 
people who have greater power in the labour market anyway, by virtue of their education 
and skill backgrounds. The most vulnerable sections—trapped in low skill, insecure 
jobs—are left largely unprotected. At the same time, the results show the natural 
response one would anticipate from rational private decision making. Sectors more 
vulnerable to supervision and control (namely larger firms) are more compliant with 
regulations. Smaller firms tend to get away with offering a lot less security of tenure, 
wage of working conditions. In this respect, they echo the view held by Squire and 
Suthiwart-Narueput (1997), as quoted in the previous chapter.
4.5 THE IMPACT OF JOB SECURITY REGULATIONS ON LABOUR 
DEMAND: ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS USING FIRM-LEVEL DATA
In this section we use the database of 4,230 firms contained in the Prowess 
database of the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) to show that 
tightening job security regulations over time have a negative impact on employment, 
thus supporting the distortion view held by the World Bank, and showing that job 
security regulations have a negative equity impact.
4.5.1 Theoretical Background
One can argue that most of the regulatory impact of employment protection 
would operate through the demand for labour. Theoretical arguments suggest that 
regulations in the form of taxes will have a negative impact on employment and/or 
wages. Contributions to social security are typically thought to affect negatively the 
demand for labour as well since the effects through labour supply are probably modest. 
Theory, however, provides relatively less guidance over the effects of severance 
payments and other protective measures, on employment. While they are likely to 
change the ease with which payroll is managed, it is not clear that they reduce the
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aggregate demand for labour. That is why one needs to test this proposition empirically, 
as we do below. It appears crucial to have an empirical estimate of how firms respond, 
in their labour demand decisions, to the presence of regulations.
Hamermesh (1986), summarising the literature, provides empirical estimates of 
the employment/labour cost elasticities for various industrial countries. He found the 
parameter to be low in the sample (0.1 to 0.5) suggesting that policies that increase the 
fixed cost of employment may reduce the employment-hours ratio only slightly. 
However, these elasticities could be biased downward as they may reflect the effect of 
prevailing JS since these regulations would have induced a substitution away from 
labour.
Less controversial than the effect of JS on the adjustment process is its effect 
on the employment level. An increase in JS increases the cost of hiring due to the change 
in the expected future severance payment and the cost of foregone output due to 
potential mismatches. In the context of shocks to output, labour-demanding firms must 
strike a balance between hiring more workers or waiting a few periods to forego the high 
potential future severance payment.
This section follows the work done by Fallon and Lucas (1991), and presents 
the results of the estimation of a homogeneous labour equation with a previously 
unexploited balanced panel of 4,230 Indian manufacturing firms put together by the 
Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) in a manufacturing survey database 
called Prowess. Our empirical analysis considers the adjustment of regular and casual 
employment over the 1980/1999 period.
4.5.2 Data
Prowess, put together as a commercial product by CMIE, is the most reliable 
and powerful corporate database in India. It contains a highly normalised database built 
on a sound understanding of disclosures in India on over 8094 companies. However, we 
use only 4,293 of those companies for the analysis below in order to have comparability 
of the 1980 to 1999 time period of analysis. This database provides detailed information 
about all aspects of costs and revenues for each firm, including labour costs, break-up of
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those costs, and the categories of labour employed. In addition, it provides information 
on financial statements, ratio analysis, funds flows, product profiles, returns and risks on 
the stock markets, and so on.
The database is complemented with powerful analytical software tools to enable 
extensive querying and research. With Prowess, information access and research is 
unproblematic. Prowess exploits the detailed disclosures, which are mandatory in the 
annual accounts of companies in India. Besides it provides information from scores of 
other reliable sources, such as the stock exchanges, employer associations, trade unions, 
and so on. The coverage includes the detailed profit & loss account and balance sheet 
statements and ratios and funds flows based on these, half yearly results, products and 
plants, labour employed, and its categories (for example regular and casual, blue and 
white collar, and so on), raw materials, history of capital changes, bonus and dividends, 
stock prices and related information, expansion plans etc.
Comparability Issues: Different companies present accounting information 
differently. Inter year comparison, growth rates, inter-company comparisons and 
industry aggregates are all compromised by the uncritical use of raw data from annual 
accounts. CMIE's methodological framework for database normalisation addresses this 
problem. Databases are also subjected to rigorous formal validation and quality control.
Coverage: There are hundreds of thousands of industrial firms in India. But the 
eight thousand odd companies in Prowess account for more than seventy per cent of the 
organised industrial economy of India. In the case of most of the capital intensive 
industries, Prowess covers nearly the entire industrial sector. This large coverage is the 
result of the inclusion of all kinds of companies independent of its ownership, listing or 
size characteristics.
Prowess permits the intelligent selection, comparison, aggregation, etc. of 
industry groups. This intelligence built into the system makes Prowess the most 
scientific and transparent means to study an industry. Industry analysis in Prowess 
enables the generation of industry-wide income and expenditure statements, balance- 
sheets, ratio analysis, bench marking of industry averages and inter and intra industry 
comparisons.
I l l
Prowess comes packaged with about 140 industry groupings. More importantly, 
it permits the creation of user-defined industry groups or any set of groups. One of the 
rich features of the dataset is the availability of employment data for both regular and 
casual workers. One must note that this database provides us with the numbers of casual 
workers in the organised sector only, and does not cover the unorganised sector. This 
means that we are able to assess the impact of job security regulations on workers in the 
organised sector—not all of whom are regular, as we know. Since one of the effects of 
stiffening regulations is likely to be a more intense use of unprotected casuals, we are 
likely to uncover features here that papers with more aggregate data sources cannot. Of 
particular interest is the adjustment in the intensive margin that can follow an increase in 
the perceived cost of labour. For instance, increases in the demand for goods 
accompanied by higher severance costs are likely to lead to a reasonably constant level 
of employment but a more intense use of more unprotected labour.
4.5.3 The Model
•i
We adapt the model developed by Mondino and Montoya (2000) " to study _ 
the relationship between employment (number of jobs) and hours worked, and the way 
this relationship changes with enforced labour regulations. Their empirical approach 
models labour demand through a fairly general setting. We adapt their model to 
characterise employment choices as the dynamic interaction of formal and informal 
employment adjusting to fluctuations in output, factor prices and regulations. They, on 
the other hand, analyse the smooth substitution between number of jobs available, and 
number of hours worked. We find it more realistic to go with the formal-informal option 
for India, as, given high over-time rates, it is much more economic for employers to 
adjust between regular and casual workers, than making regular (especially unionised) 
workers work longer hours. While the system that will be estimated is unconstrained, 
the specifications for the demand system correspond to a substantial number of 
production structures.
The system is summarised by the following two equations that we have 
adapted from Mondino and Montoya’s (2000) model:
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LnRt = (Xi + a 2LnRt. k + ocsLnRegs + o^LnQ. k + pLnwt+ yLnPt+ ejt (1)
LnCt = a j +  0C2LnCt -k + a 3LnRegs+ a4LnRt. k + pLnwt+yLnPt+e2t (2)
Where R is regular employment, C casual employment, P is industrial production. Regs 
measures the “cost equivalence of regulations, which presumably affect not just the level 
of demand but also the dynamics” (Mondino and Montoya 2000, 24). Finally w captures 
the product wage.
Measuring the Effect o f Labour Regulation: Mondino and Montoya (2000) 
calculate LnRegs using payroll taxes pensions, family allowances, health care and other 
benefits. They also includes expected severance payments. However, we use a different 
way of calculating LnRegs, as the nature of our data is different. We use benefits, which 
are not available to casual workers, as well as expected severance payments, but more 
importantly, we use the difference in wages between regular and casual employees doing 
the same job, as a measure of the cost of regulations. This implies that our analysis 
applies only to those jobs for which both regular and casual workers are employed. This 
excludes most white collar jobs, and hence the lion’s share of our observations apply to 
blue collar jobs only.
Mondino and Montoya’s (2000) model assumes that employers seek to 
maximise the expected value of current and future profit and that the costs of adjusting 
labour input are a quadratic function of the size of the adjustment made. The 
specification is quite flexible, as we mentioned above. It is consistent with a number of 
production structures with smooth substitution between new hires of regular and casual 
workers, including varying degrees of returns to scale or, what is even more likely, the 
presence of imperfect competition in goods markets. In other words, the Mondino- 
Montoya model does not restrict the source of curvature of the profit function. They 
write:
“Given this generality, care must be taken to make explicit the maintained 
hypotheses i f  the coefficients are to be identified as technology parameters. It is 
important to consider the theoretical model on which the specification is based 
so as to understand the true significance o f the parameters. I f  the production
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process is assumed to have the features o f a Cobb-Douglas production function, 
labour costs and production parameters are interpreted as labour and return to 
scale parameters, respectively. If, on the other hand, it is assumed that a CES 
production function explains the model better, the corresponding coefficients 
represent the capital-labour substitution elasticity and the scale parameter, 
respectively. In any case, in the estimations presented here, no restrictions on 
production function or underlying cost structure will be imposed. ” (p. 26)
4.5.4 Methodology: Panel Data Analysis
The term "panel data" covers a variety of data collection designs, but 
historically has referred to the repeated observation of a set of fixed entities (people, 
firms, nation states) at fixed intervals (typically, but not necessarily, annually). Classic 
panel analysis requires each unit to be observed at each time point, but more recent 
approaches permit unbalanced designs and tolerate both missing data and irregular 
intervals.
Unbalanced and Balanced Panels: An unbalanced panel data set, is a data set 
with missing observations over time (holes in the data set - so different group size over 
time) or different groups (e.g. of people or industries) participating over time or 
behaving differently across sections. Regarding the latter, such different groups have 
different specific qualities, which gives individual effects or impact when they are 
applied within estimations. We can adjust with Dummy Variables (‘Fixed effects’ or 
‘Slope effects’). Regarding the former -  one will have to adjust your data set by 
guessing missing data or by dropping other observations until you have a consistent data 
set. A balanced data set is a data set where this is not the case i.e. no missing variables 
or different groups participating over time or behaving differently across sections.
Estimation Methods: When analysing cross sections over time it is common to 
use Dummy variables. They are used to adjust for the individual effect (Fixed Effect), 
which sections (individuals, groups, etc.), or periods (e.g. seasons, historical epochs) 
have on the general relationship between the independent and the dependent variables. 
For a system likey = a  + px + w, ifwe do not adjust for the individual effects we may
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bias the results of both a and p. Within the fixed effect framework, we assume that the 
differences across units can be captured in the difference of the constant term a , 
assuming p is the same across all groups, (i.e. it is only a which is group specific). The 
purpose is to remove the bias in the estimates of p (as a becomes more difficult to 
interpret. Combined effect of a and p can be estimated via use of both ‘fixed effects’ 
and slope effects.
Drawbacks: Mondino and Montoya (2000) point out that panel data estimations, 
such as those pursued here, present some drawbacks. To begin with, the relatively short 
period of time spanned restricts the variability of regulations. In particular, as mentioned 
before, there were relatively few regulatory changes in the period under consideration, 
and those that took place happened towards the beginning of the sample. In any event, as 
we will see, the effects of regulations come out strongly and are highly significant. A 
second limitation they point to could have arisen, since the period was one of 
extraordinary change in a number of dimensions. These included a large number of firm 
births, and some amount of industrial sickness too. Fortunately these were adequately 
captured by the sampling technique used to create the CMIE panel, and therefore avoid 
the negative bias that otherwise might have resulted, unlike Mondino and Montoya 
(2000). Also, the period covered was a period of much firm re-structuring, so that it 
raises concerns over the value of long run elasticities. On the other hand, they point out, 
the high variance in some of the independent variables allows a more efficient 
estimation of the parameters.
The system represented by (1) and (2) presents a number of econometric 
problems that must be addressed. We shall continue to follow the guidance provided by 
Mondino and Montoya (2000). First, the model, being based on a panel, will be 
estimated with fixed effects to control for firm idiosyncratic factors. We will also 
introduce a quarter dummy to correct for any seasonality in the data, which was not 
previously adjusted. For this section, as for the previous one, we acknowledge the 
assistance provided by Mr. C.S. Das in carrying out the panel data analysis.
The model specification introduces an unrestricted dynamic adjustment. This is 
motivated via a cost of adjustment technology that depends in part on the hurdles 
imposed by regulations. The specification they chose was to introduce up to three lags to
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capture all seasonal as well as inertial factors. To allow for a richer interaction between 
the two forms of labour,we also introduce lagged terms of casuals in the regulars 
equation and vice versa (regular_l, regular_2, regular_3, casual_l, casual_2 and 
casual_3).
As stated above, the dataset includes a sample of 4,230 private manufacturing 
firms. The panel provides much useful information on the type of firms included. For 
instance, unlike Mondino and Montoya (2000), we actually know whether the 
employment relations are formal or not. The panel presents some problems too. Not all 
firms systematically answer all questions. Similarly, many firms drop out of the sample 
and the replacement criteria are not clear. The panel is stable, as it does not include 
newly created firms, (thus using only half of the total number of firms in the latest 
Prowess series. We report results from estimating a restricted balanced panel and an 
unbalanced one. The balanced panel drops all those firms that do not answer the 
relevant questions or that have dropped out of the sample, leaving 2,544 firms in the data 
set with all the complete answers for the whole period. The unbalanced panel, on the 
other hand, clears out those firms that do not answer the relevant questions in all 
quarters. This leaves 3,102 firms in the unbalanced panel.
4.5.5 Results
Table 4.2 presents the results of estimating through OLS. Our first 
specification treats output as exogenous. Estimates for regulars and casuals are reported 
for the unbalanced and the balanced panel, respectively. We estimated introducing 
individual firm fixed-effects correcting for serial correlation. The reported z score is 
heteroskedasticity consistent.
Table 4.2
CMIE Prowess Survey--OLS Results
U nbalanced Panel B alanced Panel
R egulars C asuals R egulars C asuals
1 2 3 4
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N orm al W age -0.21 -0.41 -0.11 -0.38
(32.62)** (18.41)** (14.40)** (29.63)**
O u tp u t 0.083 0.25 0.16 0.31
(15.18)** (28.27)** (12.21)** (21.11)**
O u tp u t 1 (lagged one) 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.16
(25.12)** (9.52)** (11.84)** (10.71)**
R egu lar 1 (lagged 1) -0.041 0.31 0.17 0.27
(12.83)** (31.56)** (21.32)** (16.95)**
R egu lar 2 (lagged 2) -0.06 -0.26 -0.08 0.05
(12.79)** (11.24)** (21.82)** (12.37)**
R egu lar 3 (lagged 3) 0.002 0.12 0.08 0.09
(12.24)** (15.21)** (31.29)** (14.23)*
C asual 1 (lagged 1) -0.005 0.024 -0.007 0.06
(18.63)** (10.95)* (8.23)** (25.98)**
C asual 2 (lagged 2) -0.001 0.03 -0.0007 0.011
(33.32)* (7.89)** (8.57)** (3.12)**
C asual 3 (lagged 3) -0.0004 0.026 -0.0005 0.039
(5.46)* (11.34)** (8.62)** (13.21)**
Second Q u a r te r 0.002 0.033 0.004 0.04
(21.45)** (12.93)** (11.72)** (31.21)**
T h ird  Q u a r te r 0.008 0.036 0.0006 0.092
(11.32)** (21.21)** (16.57)** (12.21)**
F o u rth  Q u a r te r 0.0028 0.05 0.0011 0.055
(9.38)** (14.26)** (12.94)** (15.95)**
R egulations -0.019 -0.39 -0.012 -0.48
(1.98)* (2.82)** (4.62)** (1.82)**
C on stan t 0.58 2.94 0.88 1.36
(3.87)** (15.91)** (14.32)** (22.12)**
A R -Squared 0.78 0.81 0.77 0.78
A b s o lu t e  v a lu e  o f  z - s t a t i s t i c s  in p a r e n t h e s e s ;  s ig n if ic a n t  a t  5 %  le v e l;  * s ig n if ic a n t  a t  1%  le v e l*
The results show that all variables are statistically significant. A 1 per cent 
increase in real wages decreases the level of regular employment 0.21 per cent while 
casuals go down 0.41 per cent— almost double—a result much more striking than the
117
one obtained by Mondino and Montoya (2000) from their panel. (These numbers 
become even more striking once state-level analysis is done in the next chapter.)
This result is in accordance with a common pattern in the literature, which is 
that casual workers appear more responsive to changes in costs or scale factors. When 
arises the need for adjustment, it is this category of workers that faces the most changes. 
This is most likely the effect of costs of adjustment. Theory indicates that with costly 
changes in manpower, a firm is much more likely to rely on adjustments in casual 
workers than on the number of regular jobs offered.
Casual workers therefore face much more insecurity of tenure, and also find it 
difficult to attain higher wages. This situation is unlike that in the industrialised 
countries of the West, where it is easier to adjust workers with regular contracts, 
especially in countries like the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America 
(USA).
Both regular workers and casual workers appear sensitive to fluctuations in 
output. As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the surprising features of India's job market 
has been the apparent low responsiveness of employment to output. In fact if output 
grows 1%, casuals increase almost 0.25% while regular workers increase only by 0.08%. 
If this could further be broken down into white and blue collar workers, then we would 
most likely find that blue collar workers vary more with changes in output than do white 
collar workers.
This would be so, say Mondino and Montoya (2000), because white collars 
work can only be increased through overtime hours (which are costlier), while blue 
collar regular workers can just be replaced by and placed with more casuals. The same 
would apply to unionis^yersus non-unionised workers. Firms take this into account 
when making hiring decisions. Unfortunately we do not have enough white collar 
workers in the sample to verify that. Moreover, we have no information from the dataset 
on the extent of unionisation in our sample.
A feature of the results is that output and wage elasticities are higher in the 
unbalanced panel than in the balanced one. Fortunately, the selection rule to stay in the
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panel is clear. Firms that die or “sicken” are included, and not those that simply do not 
answer in some periods. Thus, there is some basis to conclude that regulations do have 
an impact in pushing firms into bankruptcy or sickness.
When we consider the effect of regulations, which is the central objective of 
our analysis, the results are the most striking. Both regular and casual employment is 
sensitive to changes in regulation costs. However, the impactjthe employment of casual 
workers is much more drastic as a result of increasing costs of regulation on casual 
workers than on regular workers. For a 1 per cent rise in the cost of regulations, regular 
employment falls by 0.019 %, while casual employment falls by 0.39%. In both the 
unbalanced and balanced panels, fairly similar trends in the results obtained. So, to sum 
up, the cost of regulations always appears to affect significantly the demand for workers, 
but casual workers are affected much more than regular workers.
Let us add this finding to the finding of Section 4.4, which was that male, 
educated workers, working for large firms, are usually the ones with regular or protected 
jobs. That means that not only are the most vulnerable workers not likely to have any 
job protection, but also as the cost of regulation increases, they are more likely to lose 
their (even) casual jobs in the organised sector.
Given the wages in the organised sector, for even casual work, are significantly 
higher than wages in the unorganised sector and agriculture, and given that demand for 
casual work in the organised sector falls significantly every time the cost of regulations 
goes up, it is very clear from the two pieces of empirical analysis in this chapter that job 
security and protection regulations cause a worsening in the standards of living of the 
poorer, low skilled and more vulnerable workers.
Mondino and Montoya (2000) point out that “when using micro-data the 
simultaneous problems of output determination and employment are typically avoided. 
The reason is simple: under perfect competition, demand is given and hence firms only 
choose how many workers to hire.” Unfortunately, in the case of India, as in Argentina, 
the assumption of competitive markets may be a bit unrealistic, at least for the first few 
years of the sample, when the economy was quite closed and a few firms ruled the 
domestic market. Under imperfect competition the decision to hire workers and sell
119
goods is closely intertwined and disturbances that affect one will probably affect the 
other.
For this reason Mondino and Montoya (2000) instrument for movements in the 
final goods demand. We however do not have the econometric arsenal required to carry 
out an instrumenting exercise rigorously. We do not, therefore, attempt to carry out an 
instrumental variable (IV) analysis, and note that omission here. However, the simple 
OLS analysis does provide us with powerful results.
4.6 CONCLUSIONS
India's experience in the 1980s and 1990s raises serious questions about the 
adjustment of the labour market. While output was growing strongly, employment was 
lagging behind—often called the phenomenon of “jobless growth”, which many have 
tried to explain. Many observers blame this behaviour on an increasingly binding lack of 
market flexibility. One source of such stiffness could well be the important number of JS 
regulations governing labour market relations. As the economy demanded greater 
flexibility to adjust to a more competitive business environment, labour regulations were 
becoming ever more binding. The issue, however, is that there were no estimates of how 
important these increasingly tighter regulations were.
We have shown that India's JS regulations do not quite do what they are 
intended to do. They reverse discriminate, providing protection to those workers with 
greater human capital, from more privileged backgrounds. Regulations appear 
regressive, limiting the opportunities of those worse off and protecting the jobs of those 
endowed with higher human capital.
These findings strongly support the case put forward by the World Bank and 
other proponents of the Distortion View. Regulations, and in particular employment 
protection, represent a cost for business. Firms rationally respond to them by lowering 
their demand for labour. Indeed, in the short run, but mostly in the long run, there is a 
strong negative effect of regulations on the level of labour demand. This downward shift 
of labour demand is at least partially (and we would argue mostly) responsible for the
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drop in employment that is found to be associated with regulatory coverage. Any 
downward shift of a demand curve increases the potential for employment reduction.
Let us now study this at greater detail by going below the national level to the 
state level in India in Chapter 5, and see whether we get similar results for that.
*  *
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CHAPTER 5
JOB SECURITY RANKING OF INDIAN STATES:
THE JOB SECURITY INDEX AND EFFECTS OF JOB SECURITY
REGULATION
In the previous chapter, we established that job security regulations in India only 
help a small labour aristocracy, while disadvantaging the large majority of the labour 
force through decreasing labour demand and lack of coverage. In this chapter, we study 
this phenomenon in greater detail. We first rank the states of the Indian Union by the 
strictness of their job security regulations, and then analyse the differential state-wise 
impact of job security regulations across these states. The chapter is organised in the 
following manner: In Section 5.1. we give a brief background about the division of 
powers between the central and state governments—both in the constitution, and in 
practice. In Section 5.2. we give details of our data, and describe the differences in job 
security regulations across states. In Section 5.3. we describe the construction of a job 
security index, based on the information provided in the previous section, and rank the 
states according to the Job Security Index, and discuss its implications. In Sections 5.4 
and 5.5. we assess the differential impact of these differences in strictness of job security 
regulations. Section 5.6 provides the summary and conclusions.
5.1 THE CENTRE-STATE RELATIONSHIP IN THE INDIAN UNION
" Indian States are the drivers o f Economic Reforms, stated Mr. Chandrababu 
Naidu, Chief Minister o f Andhra Pradesh, at the India Economic Summit, 
organised by the Confederation o f Indian Industry (CII), and the World 
Economic Forum, here today. He was speaking about the reform process in the 
state o f Andhra Pradesh and the ensuing success o f the state in achieving
progressive growth rates On the labour and Public sector reforms initiated
in the state, Mr. Naidu said that the government was encouraging VRS 
(Voluntary Retirement Scheme), o f the 25 Public Sector Units (PSUs), in the
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State, four had already been privatised, ten were in advanced stage o f  being , 
privatised, eight sick units had been closed and three were being restructure^ He 
had advised the PSUs that they must compete with the private sector, to remain 
in profitable business. Labour reforms, said Mr. Naidu, had been introduced 
vigorously in the state. ”
The Hindu 
October 21, 2001
India is a union of states with a strong centre. Over time, in the first three 
decades after independence, power had been increasingly concentrated in the central 
government, particularly in the Prime Minister's Office, in opposition to the spirit of the 
constitution. But over the last two decades or more, power has finally begun to devolve 
to state governments, and economic and other policy is increasingly being formulated 
and implemented at the state level. In fact, the centre has grown progressively weaker 
relative to states, due to a combination of political and economic factors that are 
discussed below.
By the early 1980s an array of regional, ethnic and caste groups had become 
increasingly assertive, demanding a redistribution of political power and economic 
resources. Some areas where the issues have a complex historical background - Kashmir 
and the North East - remain intractable. But elsewhere India’s changing political 
landscape in the 1990s has given regional parties more of a stake in central government, 
while economic liberalisation has benefited emerging regional elites. In practice, even in 
the absence of major constitutional reform, the balance of centre-state relations has 
shifted from centralisation to a greater acceptance of regional autonomy. In this context, 
it becomes increasingly vital that an economic analysis of any aspect of Indian 
development, especially something like the political economy of regulatory reform, must 
be done at the state-level, and not just at the All-India level, as has been the practice for 
the majority of independent India’s five decades of development.
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5.LI Background: Indian States and The Centre
In a narrow sense, centre-state relations concern the allocation of powers 
between the Union government in New Delhi and the twenty-five states plus six Union 
Territories and the National Capital Territory of Delhi (which have more limited 
powers). More broadly it encompasses many aspects of Indian political life: the interplay 
of national power and local politics; competing ideologies of nationalism and 
ethnic/minority rights; central political and economic decision-making versus local 
empowerment; problems of regional imbalances and redistribution; adjudicating disputes 
between states over access to resources; law and order and police powers; and 
educational and cultural policy. It is less a static institutional arrangement than a 
complex dynamic between and within the different levels of India’s political system.
Although the term federation appears nowhere, India's constitution-makers 
defined the nation as a union o f states and provided the states with their own national 
chamber, the Rajya Sabha (upper house of Parliament). Legislative powers are divided 
between the Union Parliament, which retains the cardinal functions of finance, 
communications, defence and foreign affairs, and the state legislatures which are given 
exclusive powers over subjects which include land and agriculture, education, police and 
public order, welfare, health and local government. On a further range of subjects either 
the centre or the states may legislate, although in the case of conflict the centre is pre­
eminent.
Labour falls into the third, or concurrent list. It is important to note that labour 
laws are altered and implemented according to the particular state, within the ambit of 
the larger Central Act—in this case the IDA 1947. However, states are free to accept or 
not accept the central law. Further, they are free to amend the central law—the only 
restriction being that the amendment cannot go against the spirit of the law. Further, all 
implementation and enforcement of such laws is purely at the state level—and controlled 
by the state-level legislature, executive and judiciary.
The division of financial resources between the centre and the states is overseen 
by a constitutional body, the Finance Commission and, in the case of development 
funds, by the Planning Commission. Broadly, the centre collects 60 per cent of all
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revenue, while the states spend about 60 per cent of total expenditure. State finances are 
supervised by the central government through the Comptroller and Auditor General.
5.1.2 Central Power And State Politics
For the first twenty years or so after independence in 1947, the Congress Party 
under Nehru and, briefly, Shastri, was dominant at the centre and in the states. Union- 
state relations were essentially an intra-party affair of the Congress, based on elite 
consensus and accommodation. Following the extensive redrawing of state boundaries 
on linguistic lines in the 1950s the states increasingly emerged as the focus for the 
expression of regional language and culture. As democratisation proceeded they formed 
the arena for popular demands for economic development and against the imposition of 
a national culture. Elections in 1967 saw the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagham (DMK) in 
Tamil Nadu come to power on an "anti-northern" platform while in Punjab the Sikh 
Akali Dal party managed to form a coalition government.
But once Nehru's daughter Indira Gandhi had consolidated her position, she 
increasingly concentrated power in her own hands and in a number of central 
institutions, including the Prime Minister's Office, at the expense of state governments 
and local Congress politicians. During her two tenures as Prime Minister (1966-77 and 
1980-84) President's Rule was invoked 41 times in order to dismiss state governments 
(compared to ten times under Nehru and Shastri).
This high-handedness contributed to the rise of regional parties. The early 1980s 
saw a period of increasing political turmoil. In Punjab, Sikh extremists turned an 
autonomy movement into an armed secessionist struggle which took years to suppress, 
with heavy loss of life. In Jammu and Kashmir the dismissal of the local government 
contributed to Kashmiri disaffection. In Andhra Pradesh a new regional party swept to 
power in 1984 on a platform of local pride. In 1985 a regional Assamese party gained 
power after years of bloody strife in the state. At the sub-state level ethnic and cultural 
movements also emerged, for example among the Nepali-speaking population of 
northern West Bengal and among tribal peoples in Assam and elsewhere.
The decay, under Indira Gandhi and later her son, Rajiv Gandhi, of the Congress 
party organisation - once an efficient transmission belt between local politics and
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national power - saw the emergence of a plethora of other parties. As essentially local 
phenomena they are sometimes bracketed with regional parties, although their basis is 
usually caste allegiance rather than linguistic or ethnic identity. Often they represent 
farming castes, numerically large but traditionally low in the social scale, who felt that 
their interests were neglected by the elite-dominated Congress and other national parties. 
Dalits (former untouchables) are also beginning to organise politically in some areas.
A significant effect of Congress's decline as a national electoral force (it has not 
won a majority since 1984) is that regional and caste parties are now in a position to 
bargain for a place in national government. In 1996 most gathered around the Janata Dal 
(itself effectively a regional party) to form a national government, supported from the 
outside by Congress. In 1998 many gravitated to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) when 
it became clear that Janata Dal had little prospect of returning to power. The need to 
attract such support has made the BJP, strongly associated with a nationalist agenda, 
more willing to countenance regional demands. It also creates a complex balancing act 
for the majority party in such a coalition, since over-generous concessions to one group 
will inevitably trigger protests or demands from others.
Much of the BJP's first 13 months in office was spent fending off excessive 
demands from its main Tamil partner, leading to the rift which brought down its 
government. In October 1999 the BJP led a new coalition (minus its Tamil nemesis), the 
National Democratic Alliance, to power on a manifesto which set aside contentious 
nationalist issues and made further commitments to regional interests. Currently, the 
BJP government is ransom to leaders from many states, most notably Chandrababu 
Naidu of Andhra Pradesh, who use each political crisis to “negotiate” more and more 
concessions for their own states.
In general the 1990s has seen a greater acceptance that decentralisation does not 
threaten Indian unity. Not only the central government, but states themselves (several as 
big as major European powers) are undertaking a modest degree of devolution with their 
boundaries. For example, the devolution of powers to panchayat (village) level 
institutions is being taken more seriously. There has been greater willingness to grant 
demands for regional entities within states (autonomous councils in, e.g., Ladakh, 
Daujeeling) or to consider further sub-division of states as a means of defusing regional
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sentiment. Proponents of decentralisation argue that national politics now better reflects 
the diversity of Indian society.
At the same time, the rise of the BJP suggests there are powerful countervailing 
forces which regard issues of national identity and national unity as pre-eminently 
important. Some observers suggest that hard-line nationalists may see limited 
decentralisation as no more than an interim tactical ploy until they are able to 
consolidate power.
5.1.3 The Impact O f Economic Liberalisation
Although the Constitution assigns major responsibilities to the states and grants 
them access to resources through taxation and borrowing, as well as through resource 
sharing with the centre, in practice their freedom of action has been circumscribed. The 
Centre retained overwhelming control over invisible resources in the economy through 
its control over fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange resources. Moreover, centralised 
planning allowed it to gain greater control by intervening on the grounds of national 
interest, and of maintaining common standards of services across the states, and through 
determining administered prices of many products produced by public sector enterprises,
By June 1991, when Narasimha Rao's Congress Party took office, the highly 
regulated, largely closed Indian economy was on the verge of what the Ministry of 
Finance called "a calamitous economic precipice". In return for IMF assistance the 
government embarked on a programme of reforms and liberalisation, seeking to 
encourage foreign direct investment, technology transfers and a growth in foreign trade. 
The Indian economy retreated from the precipice. Although the pace of reforms has 
since been uneven all subsequent governments have reaffirmed their commitment to the 
principles.
Economic reforms assigned greater powers to state governments and provoked 
greater competition for control over them. Crucially, industries previously reserved for 
the public sector or private Indian companies, particularly in key areas of infrastructure, 
were opened up to foreign investors. The 1995 decision to allow state governments to 
retain foreign exchange income was a landmark. State governments were now free to
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identify the industries in which they wanted investment and to negotiate independently, 
although final clearance still has to be obtained from the Foreign Investment Approval 
Board or the Reserve Bank of India, depending on the size of the investment. Controls 
were progressively lifted from a number of industries, although aviation, defence 
industries, atomic energy, and railways remain off-limits to foreign investors.
State governments have also been allowed to exercise increased autonomy to 
negotiate reform programmes with International Finance Institutions. For example, 
Andhra Pradesh has secured support from the World Bank, which is also negotiating 
extensive support for Uttar Pradesh. The Asian Development Bank is seeking to support 
reform in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh. The British Government’s Department for 
International Development (DfID) is also working to support state level reforms in 
Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa.
At the same time as these relaxations - readily grasped by several states, which 
became active in seeking foreign investment in infrastructure - the centre also tightened 
up on lending conditions. State finances had deteriorated significantly in the 1980s as 
states overspent on subsidies at a time of declining revenues; their capital expenditure 
also stagnated and declined. Their debt burden increased as they resorted to deficit 
financing. In the 1990s the deterioration in state finances accelerated. The situation has 
been exacerbated by the implementation of generous pay awards following the Fifth Pay 
Commission on civil service pay (which the states were not obliged to follow for state 
employees, but generally have). The states' deficit is now equivalent to around 4.5 per 
cent of GDP.
The Union government has since tightened up the conditions for lending to state 
governments, giving them added incentives to attract investment and reduce subsidies. 
Nine states have signed Memoranda of Understanding with the centre to obtain 
additional resources in return for policy reforms. These states have effectively sacrificed 
a measure of autonomy on policy because of their fiscal profligacy. Moreover, some 700 
of India's 1,000 public sector enterprises- accounting for nearly 70 per cent of jobs in the 
organised sector - are owned by the states. There are obvious advantages to central 
government in encouraging the states to bear the brunt of resistance to the closure or
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privatisation of industries notorious for their poor financial performance and pervasive 
inefficiency but with strongly entrenched workforces.
Greater financial autonomy has generally been welcomed by emerging regional 
elites. Businesses with a high degree of regional concentration prefer to deal direct with 
foreign multinational corporations rather than through the many additional layers of 
central bureaucracy. Regional politicians appreciate that foreign investment in their state 
creates fresh employment and helps free up resources for social welfare purposes. 
Encouraging though this modest devolution is much remains to be done to remove the 
distortions in centre-state financial relations.
5.1.4 Regional Imbalances And Uneven Development
Even before the 1991 reforms states varied widely in their economic 
performance, reflecting their particular geographical, historical and political 
circumstances. Since 1991 interstate disparities of income have increased. Per capita 
income in the richest states - Punjab, Haryana, Maharashtra, Gujarat - is nearly three 
times as great as in the poorest - Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh. This 
has affected the latter’s ability to apply and benefit from the reforms.
Economic reforms have had complex effects on the pattern of regional 
development. Some states, such as Maharashtra, have retained their competitive 
advantage of (relatively) efficient infrastructure and power supplies. Private investment 
and public expenditure alike tend to gravitate to such states. Others, such as the small 
North-Eastern states - isolated, politically unstable and socially backward, have seen few 
if any benefits from liberalisation. They remain almost wholly dependent on subventions 
from the centre. But Orissa, one of the poorest, has been one of the more successful in 
attracting foreign direct investment, particularly to the power sector and for extraction of 
its massive mineral resources. Punjab, the wealthiest state but only recently emerging 
from prolonged political unrest, has attracted very little. For different reasons neither has 
Kerala, despite having India's highest level of literacy and other social indicators 
approaching those of Western European countries. Patterns of economic development 
depend on a mix of political stability, bureaucratic competence, efficient infrastructure, 
particular sectoral advantages and a flexible labour market with the appropriate skills.
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In terms of foreign investment the southern and western states have been the 
most successful - Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Karnataka in particular, attracting US$ 
6-10billion each (investment approvals) over the 1991-98 period. The second tier is 
made up of Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh (between $3.6 and 
$4.6 billion each). Madhya Pradesh and Kerala came next, with $2.4billion and $1.4 
billion respectively. Investment in Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Bihar was 
tiny, while eleven States received no foreign investment at all.
5.2 LABOUR REGULATION AND INDIAN STATES
Labour market regulations are usually introduced with stated objective of increasing 
workers’ welfare. To put it in more “economic” terms, it is believed that labour 
regulations promote equity, even at the cost of some efficiency, and that such a trade-off 
is justified. We have shown thus far in this thesis that these regulations, in the way they 
pan out in India, have high efficiency as well as equity costs, and that labour law reform 
is urgently needed to promote both efficiency and equity.
Job security provisions, in particular, are designed to reduce a worker’s odds of 
losing his job and livelihood. Do these benefits come at a cost? Yes. Do these benefits 
reduce employment? Yes. Do these job security provisions protect some workers at the 
expense of others? Yes. Let us see this at a greater state-level detail now.
As we have noted before, work on inter-state comparisons of job security and its 
impact have been carried out in Latin America and East Asia, but never in India. We 
follow excellent work done on Latin America by James Heckman, Carmen Pages, James 
Montenegro and others at the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) for this thesis. 
They make use of the fact that Latin American states have a wide range of labour market 
policies that provide natural experiments with which to evaluate the impact of these 
polices. We feel that the same potential is provided by the different states of the Indian 
Union, with one crucial difference—while the Latin American states are sovereign 
nations with their own foreign and trade policies, these and some other policies are 
exogenously determined for Indian states.
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We establish in this chapter that job security policies have a substantial impact on the 
level and the distribution of employment in Indian states. Our evidence suggests that 
like Heckman and Pages (2001), regulations promoting job security reduce covered 
workers’ exit rates out of employment. However, it also indicates that demand curves 
are downward sloping, that regulation reduces aggregate employment and that the 
greatest adverse impact of regulation is on vulnerable groups marginal to the mainstream 
workforce.
Insiders and entrenched workers gain from regulation in the short run, and in a 
partial equilibrium or individual sense. But on a general equilibrium, 'big picture’ level, 
both insiders and outsiders suffer as employment falls for both categories, as the former 
stock of jobs becomes smaller and smaller, and as the latter also both in absolute as well 
as relative terms. Therefore, as a consequence, job security regulations reduce 
employment and promote inequality across workers. In order to see how we arrive at 
these results, let us look at these regulations state by state.
5.2.1 Job Security Regulation across Indian States
We follow MorjjLiegro and Pages (1999) for this part of the analysis, i.e. the 
construction of a job security index. However, there is one important difference. While
they construct a job security index by modelling the variation in job security regulations
/
in Chile over time, we confin s ourselves to one point in time (1998-99), and study the 
variation in job security regulations across states. Like Montenegro and Pages, we 
define job security (JS) legislation to include all those provisions that increase the cost of 
dismissing a worker. We quantify the costs of abiding by the legislation, in terms of 
wages, in order to address the questions: (1) How high are the implied costs of JS 
provisions in Indian states? (2) Which states have costlier termination provisions and 
which are more deregulated?
In India, like in Latin America, labour laws and statutes favour full-time indefinite 
employment over part-time, fixed-term or temporary contracts. These types of contracts 
differ not only in the length of the employment relationship but also in the conditions for 
termination. While indefinite contracts carry severance pay obligations, temporary
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contracts can be terminated at no cost provided that the duration of the contract has 
expired. Many states do not regulate the range of admissible contracts. Instead, such 
decisions are left to the parties involved in what is effectively collective bargaining, even 
though the official system of industrial relations in India is a tripartite one.
There are important differences as well in the conditions for termination of contracts. 
In the more regulated states, the termination of a contract is severely restricted. Thus, 
labour laws mandate a minimum advance notice period prior to termination, determine 
which causes are considered “just” or “unjust” causes for dismissal, and establish 
compensation to be awarded to workers for each possible cause of termination. In some 
states, firms must also request permission to dismiss more than a certain fraction of their 
labour force.
Finally, some states allow the reinstatement of a worker to his post if the dismissal is 
found to be “unjustified” by the labour courts and tribunals, although this provision has 
been eliminated in a few states.
Thus, termination laws require firms to incur four types of costs: advance 
notification, compensation for dismissal, seniority premiums for dismissed workers and 
foregone wages during any trial in which the worker contests dismissal. It is the range 
of differences in these costs which has been used to calculate the Index of Job Security 
(JS) below. This data was gathered painstakingly through communications between 
myself and state labour departments. Please note that we could not obtain any data for 
Jammu and Kashmir. Please note also, that the following rules apply only to “visible” 
workers; i.e. those on regular contracts or those formally employed as temporary or 
casual workers. As such, they already miss out on the vast numbers who work as totally 
informal workers. There is no cost to dismissing those workers.
Andhra Pradesh
Advance Notification: 15 days
Compensation for Dismissal: Fifteen days salary for each year worked if regular worker, 
otherwise at the discretion of employer
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: No seniority premium
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay if worker reinstated, nothing otherwise
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Arunachal Pradesh
Advance Notification: 120 days
Compensation for Dismissal: Three months salary for each year worked
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: Lump sum payment of Rs. 8,000 if worked
beyond ten years
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay if worker reinstated, half pay if not 
Bihar
Advance Notification: 180 days
Compensation for Dismissal: Three months salary for each year worked up to eight 
years, four months salary for every year beyond that
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: Rs. 5000 for each year worked beyond ten 
years
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay if worker reinstated plus legal costs, half 
pay if not
Delhi
Advance Notification: 30 days
Compensation for Dismissal: One month salary for each year worked if regular worker;
otherwise lump sum payment of Rs. 30,000
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: No seniority premium
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay if worker reinstated, nothing otherwise
Goa
Advance Notification: 90 days
Compensation for Dismissal: One month salary for each year worked
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: Lump sum payment of Rs. 7,500 if worked
beyond fifteen years
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay if worker reinstated, lump sum gratuitous 
payment if not
Gujarat
Advance Notification: 15 days
133
Compensation for Dismissal: Fifteen days salary for each year worked if regular worker, 
otherwise employer has no obligation
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: No seniority premium
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay if worker reinstated, nothing otherwise.
Haryana
Advance Notification: 45 days
Compensation for Dismissal: One month salary for each year worked, only if on 
permanent contract; otherwise 20 days salary
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: Lump sum payment of Rs. 5,000 if worked 
beyond ten years
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay if worker reinstated, nothing otherwise
Himachal Pradesh
Advance Notification: 60 days
Compensation for Dismissal: One month salary for each year worked, only if on 
permanent contract; otherwise 20 days salary
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: Lump sum payment of Rs. 5000 if worked 
beyond ten years
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay if worker reinstated, lump sum gratuitous 
payment if not
Karnataka
Advance Notification: 15 days
Compensation for Dismissal: Fifteen days salary for each year worked since worker was 
made regular; no compensation for years worked a temporary or casual worker; 
employer under no obligation to compensate temporary workers.
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: No seniority premium 
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay if worker reinstated, nothing otherwise. 
Employer has the right to demand legal costs if employee’s claim judged malicious or 
frivolous.
Kerala
Advance Notification: 240 days
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Compensation for Dismissal: Six months salary for each year worked, calculated at the 
latest wage rate or salary level
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: Rs. 10,000 for each year worked over three 
years.
Foregone Wages during Contestation: Full pay for worker during contestation plus legal 
costs if reinstated. Increments added and inflation indexed.
Madhya Pradesh
Advance Notification: 180 days
Compensation for Dismissal: Three months salary for each year worked
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: Rs. 5000 for each year worked beyond ten
years
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay plus half of legal costs if worker 
reinstated plus legal costs, half pay if not; inflation indexed
Maharashtra
Advance Notification: 30 days
Compensation for Dismissal: One month salary for each year worked if regular worker,
otherwise any amount at the discretion of the employer
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: No seniority premium
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay if worker reinstated, nothing otherwise
Manipur
Advance Notification: 180 days
Compensation for Dismissal: Four months salary for each year worked
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: Rs. 5000 for each year worked beyond ten
years
Foregone Wages during Contestation: Full pay if worker reinstated plus legal costs, 
three quarters pay otherwise, inflation indexed
Meghalaya
Advance Notification: 120 days
Compensation for Dismissal: Three months salary for each year worked
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Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: Lump sum payment of Rs. 10,000 if 
worked beyond ten years
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay if worker reinstated, half pay if not 
Nagaland
Advance Notification: 120 days
Compensation for Dismissal: Three months salary for each year worked
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: Lump sum payment of Rs. 7,500 if worked
beyond ten years
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay if worker reinstated, half pay if not 
Orissa
Advance Notification: 150 days
Compensation for Dismissal: Three months salary for each year worked 
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: Rs. 5000 for each year worked beyond 
fifteen years
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay plus half of legal costs if worker 
reinstated, half pay if not
Pondicherry
Advance Notification: 90 days
Compensation for Dismissal: Two months salary for each year worked
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: Lump sum payment of Rs. 7,500 if worked
beyond fifteen years
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay if worker reinstated, lump sum gratuitous 
payment if not
Punjab
Advance Notification: 60 days
Compensation for Dismissal: One month salary for each year worked, only if on 
permanent contract; otherwise 20 days salary
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: Calculated according to formula below 
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay if worker reinstated, lump sum gratuitous 
payment if not
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Rajasthan
Advance Notification: 90 days
Compensation for Dismissal: Two months salary for each year worked
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: Lump sum payment of Rs. 7,500 if worked
beyond ten years
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay if worker reinstated, lump sum gratuitous 
payment if not
Sikkim
Advance Notification: 120 days
Compensation for Dismissal: Two months salary for each year worked
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: Lump sum payment of Rs. 7,500 if worked
beyond ten years
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay if worker reinstated, half pay if not 
Tamil Nadu
Advance Notification: 45 days
Compensation for Dismissal: One month salary for each year worked if regular contract, 
otherwise 15 days salary
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: Lump sum payment of Rs. 5000 if worked 
beyond twelve years
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay if worker reinstated, nothing otherwise 
West Bengal
Advance Notification: 120 days
Compensation for Dismissal: Three months salary for each year worked
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: Lump sum payment of Rs. 7,500 if worked
beyond ten years
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay if worker reinstated, half pay if not 
Uttar Pradesh
Advance Notification: 180 days
Compensation for Dismissal: Three months salary for each year worked
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Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: Rs. 5000 for each year worked beyond 
fifteen years
Foregone Wages during Contestation: full pay plus half of legal costs if worker 
reinstated, half pay if not; inflation indexed
Tripura
Advance Notification: 180 days
Compensation for Dismissal: Four months salary for each year worked up to ten years; 
six months salary for each year worked beyond ten years
Seniority Premiums for Dismissed Workers: Rs. 5000 for each year worked beyond ten 
years
Foregone Wages during Contestation: Full pay plus legal costs if worker reinstated; 
three fourths pay if worker dismissed. Increments added, inflation indexed.
5.3 CONSTRUCTION OF A JOB SECURITY (JS) INDEX
In an attempt to quantify all of the provisions detailed in the previous section. We 
construct an index of JS encompassing all Indian states (except Jammu and Kashmir, for 
which no data could be obtained).
There have been previous attempts to construct such types of measures. Bertola 
(1990), Grubbs and Wells (1993) and the OECD (1999a, 1999b) constructed ordinal 
measures of JS for industrial countries whereas Marquez (1998) constructed ordinal 
measures of job security for a sample of industrial and LAC countries. Also, Lazear 
(1990) quantified firing costs as the amount (in multiples of monthly wages) owed to a 
worker if he is dismissed after ten years of service.
These measures, however, are unlikely to accurately reflect the magnitude of 
dismissal costs. Their main shortcomings are: (i) ordinal measures can only state that 
one country (or state) is more regulated than another, but cannot measure how much 
more regulated it is; and (ii) JS tends to increase according to tenure, which implies that 
measures conditional on a certain level of tenure only measure a given point in the 
severance-tenure continuum.
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We follow Montenegro and Pages (1999) to construct an alternative cardinal 
measure of JS that computes the expected future cost, at the time a worker is hired, of 
dismissing him in the future due to unfavourable economic conditions. It calculates this 
cost as a percentage of the worker’s annual pay. So, for instance, we could conclude 
that in a certain state, the worker would need to be paid 25 per cent of his or her annual 
pay as cost of dismissal, which would work out to three months pay. The index is 
constructed, by Montenegro and Pages (1999), to include only firing costs that affect 
firm’s decisions at the margin and therefore it does not include the full cost of regulation 
on labour demand. It includes the cost of providing statutory advance notice and 
severance pay conditional on each possible level of tenure that a worker can attain in the 
future.
This measure of JS thus reflects the marginal costs of dismissing full-time regular, or 
“permanent”, workers, and in some cases, visible (on the books) temporary/casual 
workers.
5.3.1 Methodology for Construction o f Job Security Index
One can see from the information in the previous section that across the twenty 
four states, we go from a situation of very easy dismissal in Karnataka to a very high 
cost dismissal system in Kerala. In estimating the cost of dismissing a worker, two 
factors become especially relevant. The first one is the severance pay profile. Across 
the twenty four states, the existence of different maximum caps substantially changes the 
cost of dismissing workers, especially high tenure workers versus low tenure workers. 
The second is the amount of time taken in adjudication of labour disputes. Some states 
continue to pay full pay, or a proportion thereof, whereas others pay only if 
reinstatement occurs. This also causes major differences in the level of difficulty in 
dismissing workers. For example, the minimum notice period required in Kerala is 240 
days, as opposed to 15 days in Karnataka. This makes the notice period regulation in 
Kerala sixteen times more rigid than in Karnataka. This gives us a scale of 1 to 16 
across the twenty four states, and we give each state a notice period “score” according to 
where they lie on this spectrum between 1 and 16. A similar exercise is carried out with 
each of the four expected costs for which information is given in the previous section.
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The constructed index measures the expected discounted cost, at the time a 
worker is hired, of dismissing a worker in the future. The assumption is that firms 
evaluate future costs based on current labour law. The index includes only statutory 
provisions, and thus, it does not include provisions negotiated among employers and 
employees, for specific firms, or included in company policy manuals, since these are 
not comparable across states. In addition, it does not include dismissal costs that are 
ruled by a high court judge if a firm is taken to court. It does however include dismissal 
costs accruing through rulings of labour tribunals and labour courts. High values of the 
index denote states with high job security, whereas lower values characterise states in 
which dismissal costs are lower.
By construction, as stated by Montenegro and Pages (1999), this index gives 
equal weight to notice periods and to severance pay since both are added up in the 
calculation of the dismissal costs. This index however gives a higher weight to dismissal 
costs that may arise soon after a worker is hired-since they are less discounted at the 
time of hiring-while it discounts firing costs that may arise further in the future.
In computing the index, we, like Montenegro and Pages (1999), assume a 
common discount rate and a common turnover rate: in this case of 8 per cent and 12 per 
cent, respectively. The choice of the discount rate is based on the average return of an 
internationally diversified portfolio as calculated by Montenegro and Pages (1999). 
Finally, the choice of turnover rate is based on the fact that real turnover rates are 
unobservable in states with job security provisions since the turnover rate is itself 
affected by job security. We therefore, like the authors of the index, choose to input all 
states with the observed turnover rates in Karnataka, the state in the sample with the 
lowest job security. The minimum tenure at a firm is considered to be six months, and 
the maximum is assumed to be twenty years.
It should be noted that our objective is to come up with an index which is a 
number. That is not easy for two reasons. First, the cost of dismissing a worker is not a 
single number, but a profile, based on his status. One needs to come up with a number 
to reflect it—a number that represents that profile, and also is sensitive to the changes in 
upper limits, since we are concerned with changes at the margins. Another difficulty 
arises from the fact that the amount firms have to pay differs from the time taken in
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adjudication, and the result of the adjudication. Again, one cannot factor in that cost 
easily, except give a higher weight to states where labour tribunals are notorious for 
delays and high levels of bureaucracy.
The constructed index therefore, as defined by Monenegro and Pages(1999) 
captures expected cost, as that figure captures the whole profile of dismissal, as well as 
the expected time taken in adjudication under India’s compulsorily tripartitie industrial 
dispute resolution mechanism.
We compute the job security index based on the state-wise legal information on 
the mandated costs of dismissal summarised above. This information was directly 
obtained from the various State Ministries of Labour over several months in 1998-99.
To obtain a single measure per state, we compute a separate index for blue and white- 
collar workers and perform a simple average between the two, where such information is 
available.
In the specific case of job security regulation, the strategy is to develop a 
measure of firing costs that summarises the entire profile of tenure and severance pay, 
using a common set of dismissal probabilities. The indicator of firing costs (the job 
security index) is presented in Table 5.1, and the numbers are interpreted as follows: the 
cost of job security is three monthly wages in Haryana, for example, since the cost of 
dismissal is calculated at approximately 25 per cent of the annual wage. In that case, the 
expected cost of labour in the state is whatever wage is paid plus an up-front investment 
of three monthly wages on average. The key elements included in this measure are 
advance notice requirements and compensation for dismissal with and without cause.
Note that Montenegro and Pages(1999), the architects of this measure, 
themselves question the validity of their job security measure given that severance 
payments are transfers from employers to workers and as such are, in part, a form of 
compensation. They recognise that the impact of job security could be completely 
cancelled with a properly designed labour contract provided that there are no restrictions 
on transactions between workers and firms. Lazear (1990), who pointed in this direction 
with his 1990 paper, stated that the impact of job security could only be undone if 
dismissal costs were paid in all separation cases and if payments took the form of lump­
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sum or deferred payments. Lazear shows that under those conditions, severance 
payments have a well-defined counterpart in current salaries, and the contract can fully 
internalise the severance.
However, most states have established severance payments that (a) are a multiple 
of the last salary, or the salary at the time of dismissal; (b) depend on the existence of 
just cause; and (c) do not apply in the case of voluntary quits. Therefore, the capacity to 
internalise the cost of severance is generally low. By their analysis then, for our case, 
Karnataka has moved closer to the Lazear conditions and some other states are 
considering reforms along those lines. This would mean establishing severance in all 
separations or severance based on individual accounts. Heckman and Pages (2001) note 
that “if the job security measure could distinguish cases in which severance is partially 
or fully internalised from cases in which severance cannot be internalised, then the truly 
distortionary component of mandated severance could be isolated, and the Lazear effect 
could be tested empirically”.
In particular, they point out, because the index is constructed exclusively using 
provisions existing in labour codes, it generates a bias in favour of states where effective 
job security provisions originate directly from private contracts and the legal case law as 
applied by tribunals and other adjudicators. For our case, in some states with fairly rigid 
labour legislation, de-facto labour flexibility has been brought about through informal 
collective agreements, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Thus an excessively "legalistic" 
approach may miss some of the actual characteristics of labour markets in the various 
states.
Another element affecting the construction of the index is the discount rate. We 
follow the architects of the index in using a single discount rate for all states. However, 
the relevant discount rate for calculating the expected discounted cost of dismissing a 
worker is significantly higher in some states compared with others. This caveat must 
also be borne in mind.
The results of our exercise in constructing job security indices are presented in 
Table 5.1. As before, Mr. C.S. Das needs to be thanked. We have to say that given the 
caveats above, we have greater faith in the ordinal, rather than the cardinal rankings, 
produced below.
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Table 5.1: Job Security Index across 24 Indian States: Cardinal Measure and
Ordinal Ranking (no reliable data for Jammu and Kashmir)
State Job Security Index 
(monthly Wages)
% Annual wage Ranking
Karnataka 2.13 17.703 1
Gujarat 2.15 17.90 2
Andhra Pradesh 2.25 18.75 3
Maharashtra 2.29 19.05 4
Delhi 2.58 21.51 5
Tamil Nadu 2.66 22.14 6
Haryana 3.03 25.27 7
Punjab 3.05 25.42 8
Himachal Pradesh 3.24 26.97 9
Goa 3.35 27.92 10
Pondicherry 3.52 29.32 11
Rajasthan 3.54 29.53 12
Sikkim 3.72 26.01 13
West Bengal 3.72 31.01 14
Nagaland 3.73 31.09 15
Arunachal Pradesh 3.76 31.31 16
Meghalaya 4.02 33.53 17
Orissa 4.16 34.65 18
Uttar Pradesh 4.21 35.02 19
Madhya Pradesh 4.52 37.66 20
Bihar 4.73 39.42 21
Manipur 4.80 40.03 22
Tripura 4.96 41.33 23
Kerala 5.67 47.19 24
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5.4 TESTING EFFECTS OF JOB SECURITY REGULATIONS
5.4.1 Theory
As mentioned before, we use as a guide the excellent theoretical and empirical 
paper by Heckman and Pag6s (2001). They, in turn, build on the work done by others 
before them ever since this kind of analysis became popular in the 1990s, when it was 
first done for some European countries. As we have noted before, analysing the impact 
of job security provisions requires a complicated structure that covers dynamic decisions 
taken by firms. Bertola (1990) develops a dynamic partial-equilibrium model to assess 
how a firm's hiring and firing decisions are affected by dismissal costs. In the face of a 
given shock, the optimal employment policy of a firm involves one of three state 
dependent responses: dismissing workers; hiring workers; and doing nothing (in which 
case employment in that firm does not change). How are these decisions affected by 
dismissal costs? In the face of a negative shock and declining marginal value of labour, a 
firm may want to dismiss some workers. If it has to pay a mandatory dismissal cost, 
however, this cost discourages the firm from adjusting its labour force, resulting in fewer 
dismissals than in the absence of such costs. Conversely, in the face of a positive shock 
firms may want to hire additional workers, but they will take into account that some 
workers may have to be fired in the future if demand turns down. Heckman and Pages 
(2001) infer that this prospective cost acts as a hiring cost, effectively reducing creation 
of new jobs in good states. The net result, they conclude, is lower employment rates in 
expansions, higher employment rates in recessions, and lower turnover rates as firms 
hire and fire fewer workers than they would in the absence of these costs.
Bertola's model predicts a decline in employment variability associated with 
firing costs, but the implications of his model for average employment are ambiguous. In 
particular, whether average employment rates increase or decline as a result of firing 
costs depends on whether the decline in hiring rates more than compensates for the 
reduction in firings. Some authors (Bertola 1990; Bentolila and Bertola 1990) have 
carried out simulations that suggest that average employment in a given firm is actually 
likely to increase when firing costs increase.
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These results, however, are quite sensitive to different assumptions about the 
persistence of shocks, the elasticity of the labour demand, the magnitude of the discount 
rate, and the functional form of the production function. Thus, job security has a larger 
negative effect on employment in the presence of less persistent shocks and lower 
discount rates, because both factors reduce hiring relative to firing (Bentolila and Saint 
Paul 1994). A higher elasticity of the demand for goods similarly implies a larger 
negative effect of job security on employment rates (Risager and Sorensen, 1997).
When investment decisions are also considered, firing costs lower profits and discourage 
investment, increasing the likelihood that firing costs reduce the demand for labour 
(Risager and Sorensen (1997).
The results mentioned above analyse employment rates in individual firms 
without considering the impact of firing costs on the extensive margin, that is, how firing 
costs affect the creation and destruction of firms. Heckman and Pages (2001) also 
discuss the work done by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), who develop a general 
equilibrium model that accounts for entry and exit of firms, based on the U.S. economy. 
In their model, Bertola's (1990) partial equilibrium framework is rooted in a general 
equilibrium framework in which jobs and firms are created and destroyed in every 
period in response to firm-specific shocks. They find that increasing firing costs in the 
U.S. would lead to an increase in the average employment of existing firms as a 
consequence of the reduction in firings. However, they also find that such a policy 
would result in lower firm entry and lower job creation in newly created firms. For the 
parameter values they consider, these two last effects offset the increase in employment 
in existing firms, resulting in a reduction of overall employment rates.
Job security may also affect employment by changing the structure of wages.
The insider-outsider literature emphasises that job security provisions increase the 
insider power of incumbent workers (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). This effect results in 
higher wages for insiders and lower overall employment rates. Caballero and Hammour 
(1994) consider a model in which job security provisions increase the ability of labour to 
appropriate capital by increasing capital specificity. That is, a larger part of invested 
capital becomes relationship specific and is lost if capital separates from labour. While 
in the short run, higher firing costs allow labour to extract higher rents from capital, in
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the long run firms invest in technologies that are less labor intensive, reducing 
employment demand.
More recent literature also emphasises the possible impact of job security 
regulations on the composition of employment. Kugler (2000) proposes a model in 
which job security regulations provide incentives for high-tumover firms to operate in 
the informal sector. This decision entails producing at a small, less efficient scale in 
order to remain inconspicuous to tax and labour authorities. In this framework, high job 
security is likely to increase informality rates. Montenegro and Pages (1999) develop a 
model, used above, in which tenure-related job security biases employment against 
young workers and in favour of older ones. As severance pay increases with tenure, and 
tenure tends to increase with age, it becomes more costly to dismiss older workers than 
younger ones. If wages do not adjust appropriately, negative shocks result in a 
disproportionate share of layoffs among young workers. Job security based on tenure 
thus results in lower employment rates for the young, relative to older workers, because 
it reduces hiring and actually increases firings for young workers. This work has been 
used by Heckman and Pages (2001) in their paper.
Higher job security provisions thus reduce turnover rates and bias the 
composition of employment against young workers and against employment in the 
formal sector. The implications for average employment in the economy at large, 
surmise Heckman and Pages (2001), however, are somewhat less conclusive since they 
depend on specific configurations of parameters for the economy. To complicate matters 
further, they say that the Coase theorem indicates that the impact of job security could be 
completely "undone" with a properly designed labour contract provided that there are no 
restrictions on transactions between workers and firms (Lazear 1990), as discussed in the 
previous section above.
In a world without transaction costs, wages adjust to offset the possible negative 
impact highlighted above. Given the ambiguity of theoretical models, the magnitude and 
direction of the impact of job security on employment have to be resolved empirically, 
as they do, and as we follow below. Before we get on to that, some definitions of 
variables we will be using.
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5.4.2 Definition o f Variables
We obtained employment and unemployment data from NSS household surveys, 
which have been discussed before. Some of the state data are approximated, as NSS 
zones do not always correspond to state boundaries. We use the same terms as Heckman 
and Pages (2001), but the definitions for the Indian case tend to be somewhat different in 
some cases. The contribution of Mr. C.S. Das was invaluable in both the preparation 
and analysis of the data.
Total employment: All employed workers aged fifteen to fifty five who declared 
having a job in the week of reference. It is measured as a percentage of the total 
population aged fifteen to fifty-five. All measures of aggregate employment include 
formal and informal workers, as well as unpaid workers.
Employment rate of prime-aged males: Percentage of men aged twenty-five to fifty 
who were employed during the week of reference.
Employment rate of prime-aged females: Percentage of women aged twenty-five to 
fifty who were employed during the week of reference.
Youth employment: Percentage of people aged fifteen to twenty-four who were 
employed during the week of reference.
Self-employment: Share of non agricultural workers who are self-employed or who are 
owners of firms.
Total unemployment: Number of people aged fifteen to fifty-five who did not work in 
the week of reference but who are actively looking for a job, expressed as a percentage 
of the total active population in that age group.
Unemployment rate of prime-aged males: Number of men aged twenty-five to fifty 
who did not work in the week of reference but who are actively looking for a job, 
expressed as a percentage of the male active population in that age group.
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Unemployment rate of prime-aged females: Number of women aged twenty-five to 
fifty who did not work in the week of reference but who are actively looking for a job, 
expressed as a percentage of the female active population in that age group.
Youth unemployment: Number of people aged fifteen to twenty-four who did not work 
in the week of reference but who are actively looking for a job, expressed as a 
percentage of the active population in that age group.
Long-term unemployment: Number of people aged fifteen to fifty-five who have been 
without a job and actively looking for employment for more than six months, expressed 
as a percentage of the total active population in that age group.
Female participation: Percentage of total female workers aged fifteen to fifty-five who 
are either employed or actively seeking employment.
SDP: State-level gross domestic product measured in 1995 US dollars.
Population aged 15-24: Proportion of total population that falls in this age group.
5.4.3 Methodology and Summary Statistics
We exploit the substantial cross-state variability in job security provisions to 
estimate effects of job security. We construct a data set that spans all Indian states. We 
try and make this correspond to the data used by Heckman and Pages (2001). In order to 
do so we use the OECD definitions of labour market variables, adjusted to Indian 
definitions (see above), to construct the same indicators out of NSS Household Surveys. 
Table 5.2 provides summary statistics for the overall sample, the low JS rank sample 
(consisting of four states) and the high JS rank, or HS, sample, consisting of 3 states. To 
characterise job security, we use the index of job security constructed above.
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Table 5.2
Summary Statistics
Average Statistics for the overall sample
Variable Observations States Mean Std. Dev.
Total Employment 120 24 66.5184 8.9336
Prime-Age Male Employment 120 24 90.8024 5.3664
Prime-Age Female Employment 120 24 66.5808 13.9256
Youth (15-24) Employment 120 24 47.1432 14.0816
Self-employment 120 24 13.6968 6.7288
Total Unemployment 120 24 8.5488 4.5864
Prime-Age Male Unemployment 120 24 8.5488 4.5864
Prime-Age Female Unemployment 120 24 6.032 3.3176
Youth (15-24) Unemployment 120 24 7.7272 5.0024
Unemployed> 6months/Total U. 120 24 15.8912 9.256
Job Security 120 24 5.0625 1.4144
SDP growth 120 24 2.808 3.12
Proportion pop 15 to 24 120 24 0.156 0.0208
Female Participation 120 24 62.1816 12.2408
Union density 120 24 34.7672 19.9472
Average Statistics for High JS Rank States
(High JS rank implies low job security)
Variable Observations # States Mean Std. Dev.
Total Employment 15 3 74.828 4.39088
Prime-Age Male Employment 15 3 95.4158 3.28328
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Prime-Age Female Employment 15 3 49.0786 11.127
Youth (15-24) Employment 15 3 66.2085 11.5211
Self-employment 15 3 32.742 8.59976
Total Unemployment 15 3 7.70016 3.42784
Prime-Age Male Unemployment 15 3 4.03624 2.68112
Prime-Age Female Unemployment 15 3 4.85264 3.25936
Youth (15-24) Unemployment 15 3 11.3162 4.8568
Unemployed> 6months/Total U. 15 3 15.1299 7.55248
Job Security 15 3 2.1766 1629.68
SDP growth 15 3 3.44448 3.99048
Proportion pop 15 to 24 15 3 0.20488 0.01664
Female Participation 15 3 46.0252 10.947
Union density 15 3 18.72 11.8248
Average Statistics for Low JS Rank States
£ L o u 3 JS
Variable Observations # States Mean Std. Dev.
Total Employment 20 4 66.4865 8.49064
Prime-Age Male Employment 20 4 89.7251 4.95958
Prime-Age Female Employment 20 4 57.2213 14.9391
Youth (15-24) Employment 20 4 53.3683 15.5628
Self-employment 20 4 27.0815 11.9412
Total Unemployment 20 4 8.05806 4.1749
Prime-Age Male Unemployment 20 4 8.05806 4.1749
Prime-Age Female Unemployment 20 4 5.01994 3.10854
Youth (15-24) Unemployment 20 4 6.2875 4.41634
Unemployed> 6months/Total U. 20 4 13.5005 7.75626
150
Job Security 20 4 5.0625 1.75044
SDP growth 20 4 2.9174 3.3198
Proportion pop 15 to 24 20 4 0.16096 0.03018
Female Participation 20 4 55.9738 13.42
Union density 20 4 26.6791 17.8967
N ote: The sm all difference in value between the average figures for the country and the high job  
security (low  rank) states is because these figures are not w eighted by population, and the latter are the 
states w ith the h ighest populations in India.
5.5 IMPACT OF JOB SECURITY REGULATIONS
By following Heckman and Pages’ (2001) advice and constructing our own data set 
from NSS household-level surveys, we are guaranteed that all the labour market 
variables are comparable and reliable. One drawback of our data is that we only have a 
few time series observations per state, and not from consecutive years. This is due to the 
quinquennial nature of NSS data rounds. Given the nature of the data, we decided not to 
average observations from a given period-as is done in most of the OECD studies on job 
security-and insteadfollowed Heckman and Pages (2001) in controlling for the state of 
the business cycle in a given year using SDP growth.
We use a reduced form approach to investigate whether states and periods with more 
strict job security regulations are associated with lower employment or higher 
unemployment rates. Thus we estimate an average net effect of JS as it operates through 
intermediate variables which we do not include in the regression.
JS costs govern the marginal costs of labour when firms are firing, but they also 
affect overall labour demand through their effect on expected (across states) labour cost. 
It is this effect that we attempt to identify. Since most of the variation is cross-sectional, 
Heckman and Pages (2001) use different types of variables to control for state-specific 
factors that may be correlated with job security. We do the same.
First, we use demographic controls such as the share of the population between 15 
and 24 and female participation rates, as defined in the previous section. Since both 
factors affect overall employment rates, not including them in the specification may lead 
to substantial biases in the estimates. We protect against common state-specific
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unobservables that remain constant over time and that may affect both left hand side and 
right hand side variables by including state-specific fixed effects in a set of regression 
specifications reported below.
Second, we use SDP (measured in 1995 U.S. dollars) (Heckman and Pages, 2001, of 
course, use GDP) to control for differences in development levels across states. We also 
include a dummy variable for High JS states to control for regional differences not 
controlled by SDP levels. Most of the variability in our sample comes from differences 
across states. So we limit ourselves to calculating OLS estimates only.
We differ from Heckman and Pages here as their data also has variability from some 
time series variance within the state samples. Given this variation, they conclude that 
fixed effects (FE) estimates are likely to be very imprecise because they only use the 
time-series variation. Instead, they say that random effects (RE) or pooled OLS 
estimates, that use both the cross-section and the time-series variation included in the 
sample, are likely to produce estimates with smaller standard errors. Yet, the latter 
estimates, they assert, will be biased if variables included as controls are correlated with 
state specific error terms.
To protect against the bias that results from using one estimator, they estimate their 
basic specification by pooled OLS, RE and FE, comparing whether these different 
methodologies yield similar point-estimates. We unfortunately have neither the breadth 
and depth of data, nor the econometric wherewithal, to carry out that exercise.
Therefore, we note here our omission of RE and FE analyses, and rely only on OLS 
estimates.
5.5.1 Results
The results are presented in Table 5.3.
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Table 5.3: OLS Estimation. Full Sample
Total
'
Emp.
1
Male fem ale Youth Self- Total
Emp. Emp. Emp. Empl. Unemployment 
2 3 4 5 6
Male Female Youth Proportion
Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment > 6 months 
,  ,  ■ .   ^ ,0
High JS dummy 12.28*** 3.42*** -9.82 35.59 21.33*** -1.98** -3.14*** -5.68*** -9.26*** -54.21***
(1.21) (.1.02) (2.72) (2.29) (2.25) (1.45) (.85) (1.18) (3.57) (3.23)
Job security index -2.07*** -1.01*** -1.92 -3.76*** 1.23** 0.70*** .93*** .65*** 1.07* 1.06
(.36) (.28) (.74) (4.27) (63) (.46) (.29) (.43) (6 1 ) (.91)
SDP growth -0.115 -0.121 -0.137 0.012 0.62** 0.13 -0.02 0.098 0.071 -0.243
(.121) (.137) (.277) (.413) (.185) (.126) (.079) (.112) (182) (0.531)
Female participation 0.512*** - - 0.412*** 0.332*** -.121*** - - -0.201 -0.871 *••
(0.052) (.14) (.076) (.032) (.0841) (0.112)
Pop 15to24 9.26 - - - 182.31** -43.94 - - -72.01 -106.37
(36.08) (61.22) (28.51) (51.92) (21.33)
Constant 61.37*** 109.85*** 52.21*** 43.21*** -10.35 23.44 2.84*** 7.11 45.28** 124.64***
(7.01) (2.21) (5.03) (10.12) (14.61) (8.11) (1.93) (2.47) (11.21) (21.52)
R-square 0.77 0.28 0.31 0.58 0.51 0.19 0.37 0.25 0.33 0.91
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The results, presented above in Table 5.3, are very powerful, and may be analysed as 
follows:
1. The OLS point-estimate for the JS coefficient in the total employment 
specifications shows that job security regulations have a significant negative 
impact on total employment. It is significant at a 1 per cent level of significance.
2. The OLS point-estimate for the JS coefficient in the total unemployment shows 
that job security regulations have a significant positive effect on total 
unemployment. It is significant at a 1 per cent level of significance. We should 
recall here that employment and unemployment are not mirror images of each 
other in NSS data—hence the separate analyses.
3. The OLS point estimate for the JS coefficient in the youth employment shows 
that job security regulations have a significant negative effect on youth 
employment, i.e. they make job market access for the youth very tough. The 
significance level is 1 per cent.
4. The OLS point estimate of the JS coefficient in the youth unemployment shows 
that job security regulations have a significant positive effect on youth 
unemployment. The significance level here is only 10 per cent though, implying 
perhaps that the youth find other means of employment not visible to NSS data 
collection. These would most likely be low paid, highly informal, manual 
labour.
5. The OLS point estimate for the JS coefficient in the male prime age employment 
shows that job security regulations have a significant negative effect on male 
prime age employment. This result is highly significant at a 1 per cent level of 
significance.
6. The OLS point estimate for the JS coefficient in the male prime age 
unemployment shows that job security regulations have a significant positive 
effect on male prime age unemployment. This result holds at a 1 per cnt level of 
significance.
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7. The OLS point estimate for the JS coefficient in the female prime age 
employment has a negative sign. However, it is not significant at the 10, 5 or 1 
per cent levels. This reflects the age-old problem of capturing female 
employment, especially in developing countries.
8. The OLS point estimate for the JS coefficient in the the female prime age 
unemployment, however, does show that the effect of job security regulations on 
female prime age unemployment is both positive and significant. This result, in 
fact, holds at a 1 per cent level of significance.
9. The OLS point estimate for the JS coefficient in self employment shows a 
significant and positive effect of job security regulations on self-employment. 
Given that self-employment refers mostly to badli workers, contract workers, 
home workers and other insecure categories, this result seems to make sense. It 
holds at a 5 per cent level of significance.
10. The OLS point estimate for the JS coefficient in the proportion of those 
unemployed for more than six months shows a positive sign, but is not 
significant at 10, 5 or 1 per sent levels of significance.
The main implication of these results lies in the high magnitude of job security 
elasticity. That means that an increase in expected dismissal costs equivalent to one 
month of pay is associated with a decline in employment rates of 2.07 percentage points 
(Table 5.3). Also, we can calculate from Table 5.1 that the average dismissal cost for a 
worker is 3.57 months of pay. That means, on average, the estimated loss in 
employment, as a percent of the total working population, due to job security provisions 
is about approximately 7.39 percentage points. That is a huge magnitude of loss of total 
employment as a result of job security regulations. This confirms, and further reinforces 
our conclusions from the previous chapter.
Also, the OLS estimates confirm the result we obtained in Chapter 4 for this state­
wide analysis as well. They show quite effectively that job security does not affect all 
categories of workers to the same extent. Thus, the impact on the employment of
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females (generally more casual) is significantly larger than that of males. Also, the 
impact on the employment of males between 25-50 is significantly lower than the impact 
on total employment. Again, the impact on new entrants to the labour market is 
significantly higher than that for total employment. Prime age males are definitely more 
advantaged than both female workers and new entrants into the labour market.
As stated above, our results for self-employed labour are not as unambiguous. Here 
we must remember the highly limited definition of self-employment used by NSS 
household surveys, such that only the tip of the informal labour iceberg is captured by it.
It is clear that more empirical work is required to reach a definitive conclusion on the 
relationship between job security and self-employment. In particular, the higher end of 
self-employed workers (doctors, lawyers, accountants, consultants, independent 
businessmen)—i.e. those self-employed by choice—must be separated from those 
involuntarily “self-employed”, i.e. those at the lower end, unable to find secure and 
protected employment. This is an exercise that must definitely be done very soon, 
especially as new and very scientific measures for estimating informal labour force are 
currently being developed in India.
5.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Freeman (2000) writes “the institutional organisation of the labour market has 
identifiable large effects on distribution, but modest hard-to-uncover effects on 
efficiency.” (p. 12) This view is shared by many economists (see Abraham and 
Houseman, 1994; and Blank and Freeman, 1994). However, the methodologies 
developed by Montenegro and Pages(1999), and Heckman and Pages (2001) has helped 
us to a large extent to get past some of those difficulties. The results outlined in this 
chapter suggest that job security regulations have a substantial impact on employment 
rates in Indian states, and thus substantially affect both the efficiency and equity aspects 
of the labour market.
Where Fallon and Lucas and others left themselves open to criticism and 
refutation was in looking at employment as a single, homogenous variable, culled from 
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) data. That measure is however very imprecise indeed.
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However, employment is very far from just what gets recorded in ASI data. NSS data 
gives us a much better estimate of real employment and unemployment, and also the 
various categories of employment and unemployment. Especially in a highly segmented 
(some say fragmented, e.g. Breman 1996) labour market like India’s, it is vital to look at 
the impact of job security regulations on various categories of employment. Those who 
assert that job security does not have any impact on employment rates (ILO papers over 
the years mainly, and left-leaning scholars like Kannan, 1994 and Ghose, 1996), do so 
again based on one category of employment only.
In addition, while there is substantial evidence that unions reduce earnings 
inequality (beyond our scope here, but see the work of St. Paul, various years), there is  ^9
i
no evidence that job security provisions reduce income inequality (again, St. Paul, 
years, with evidence from the Spanish labour market). Indeed, given that job security 
reduces the employment probabilities (and possibly wages) of younger and less 
experienced and/or skilled workers, who bear the brunt of regulation, it is likely that 
regulation widens earnings inequality across age and wage/skill groups. Thus, there is no 
trade off between employment and inequality associated with job security provisions. 
Such provisions worsen both—i.e. both equity and efficiency. The choice of labour 
market institutions matters—as Solow (1990) warned us over a decade ago.
What policy lessons can be drawn from these results? Our evidence suggests 
that job security provisions are an extremely inefficient and inequality-increasing 
mechanism for providing either income security or earnings equity to workers. They are 
inefficient because they reduce the demand for labour; they are inequality-increasing 
because some workers benefit while many more are hurt. Their impact on inequality is 
comprehensive: job security increases inequality because it reduces the employment 
prospects of young, female, uneducated and unskilled workers—the most vulnerable 
group. It also increases inequality because it segments the labour market between 
workers with secure jobs and workers with very few prospects of ever having a “good” 
job, with any amount of minimum wage and conditions. Finally, job security 
provisions increase inequality if, as predicted by some theoretical studies and most of the 
available empirical evidence, they increase the size of the informal sector. We have seen 
evidence of this from both the qualitative and quantitative work presented so far.
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In this light, it seems reasonable to advocate the substitution of job security 
provisions by other mechanisms that provide income security at lower efficiency and 
inequality costs. However, reducing dismissal costs is a difficult policy to implement in 
most states. The persistence of these policies has been explained in the literature by a 
demand for income security for groups with political power (see Caballero and 
Hammour, 1994).
The political economy mechanism behind it is explained like this: they argue that 
a demand for income security arises because job security flows out of unemployment 
and into employment. Although job security reduces the probability of exiting 
employment, conditional on having lost a job, the probability of finding a regular 
employment is reduced. This produces a sense of insecurity among protected workers, 
who exert pressure to maintain high levels of job security provisions—maintaining the 
“wall around the citadel” as Holmstrom (1984) puts it (124). A balance of power that 
favours insider workers helps to sustain job security provisions (Lindbeck and Snower, 
1988). Thus, those workers most likely to benefit from such provisions are also more 
likely to be represented in the political process.
All of this, of course, depends intimately on the political economies of different 
states. The extent to which various states carry out regulatory reforms depends on 
various variables. It can be a question puzzling to most intelligent minds—why does a 
mature democracy like India find it so difficult to reform job security regulations which 
favour only a tiny minority, while greatly disadvantaging the huge majority. In Chapter 
6, we will attempt to answer this question by testing the influence of various political 
economy variables on the reform-orientation of a representative sample of Indian states.
*  *
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CHAPTER 6
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LABOUR POLICY CHOICE IN TEN INDIAN
STATES
India embarked on the process of economic policy reforms in mid-1991 in 
response to a fiscal and balance of payments crisis. While the central government has 
undertaken a series of sweeping reform measures in the areas of fiscal policy; trade and 
exchange rate policy; industrial policy; foreign investment policy and so on, many of 
India’s state governments have yet to implement a wide array of reform measures in 
order to attain high rates of State Domestic Product (SDP) growth. The reform process 
so far has mainly concentrated at the central level. India has yet to free up its state 
governments sufficiently so that they can add much greater dynamism to the reforms.1 
Labour reforms have been the slowest of all. As late as the Budget o f2002 a few weeks 
ago, in February 2002, the Central Government was still trying to get its own Cabinet 
Ministers to talk about this issue.
The labour market reforms at the state level in India have also been rather slow 
moving. There are several reasons for it. Firstly, limited decentralisation of decision­
making has meant that states in India lack the authority to formulate and implement 
policies that are under the control of the central government. Second, unlike the central 
government, the state governments do not have sufficient institutional back up. Third, 
due to the short-terms of office that state governments have been holding, these 
governments are governed by short-term political considerations. Chief Ministers have 
changed frequently thereby leading to policy discontinuity (since 1967, Chief Ministers 
on average have been in office only 2.65 years). For instance the state of Uttar Pradesh 
has seen 17 governments in 54 years. Fourth, populist policies have always been 
preferred over harsh reform measures, that is, subsidies on rice; urban transport; water; 
electricity and so on are pursued with in order to advance the political interests of the 
party in power.
1 India’s constitution was designed to give primary economic policy making responsibility to the central government. 
Key fiscal, infrastructure, and regulatory decisions on economic management are therefore taken by the central 
government. For instance, in most infrastructure areas, the central government remains in control, or at least with veto 
over state actions.
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The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 discusses inter-state 
variation in reform-orientation, especially labour policy reform, although as we shall 
discuss, labour policy reform is closely correlated with all other types of policy reform 
as well. Section 6.2 discusses some state case studies about policy reform in greater 
detail. Section 6.3 asks what explains this variation in reform orientation. Section 6.4 
discusses the politics of economic reform. Section 6.5 discusses the research model, 
data and methodology of the empirical study which tries to explain the variability in 
reform orientation. Section 6.6 contains the results of the study, while Section 6.7 
contains our conclusions and thoughts about future research.
6.1 INTER-STATE VARIATION IN REFORM-ORIENTATION
A few of the Indian States have been more reform-oriented, such as Andhra 
Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu, but states, such as Haryana, 
Kerala, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan and West Bengal have a lot to catch­
up with. Of course, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are even further behind. We analyse the 
state-level situation in ten major states of the twenty four states of India analysed in 
Chapters 4 and 5, based on the progress of state-level labour policy reform. Accordingly, 
we have divided these states into three categories of reformers, based on the job security 
rankings in Chapter 5. These are the reform-oriented states, intermediate reformers and 
the lagging reformers. We then examine the performance of these ten states in terms of 
SDP growth, foreign direct investment, industrial investment proposals, and software 
exports among other variables. In order to do so, we refer to a large number of papers 
by Sachs and Bajpai (various years), who have studied this in some detail. We notice 
that their classification of reform orientation of states by all reform measures 
corresponds to our ranking of states by job security ranking. That is not surprising, 
given the endogeneity between protective regulation in product and labour markets, as 
modelled by Blanchard (2000), Rama and Tabellini (1994), OECD (1999) and many 
others. That analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis. Suffice it to say that such an 
endogeneity exists theoretically, and can be verified empirically, and therefore it is not 
surprising that laggards in labour policy reform are also laggards in overall policy 
reform.
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Of course, within the reform-oriented states, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu 
have implemented labour market (and other policy) reforms on a wider scale relative to 
other states in that category. We must emphasise here that this classification is purely 
indicative, and loaded with a huge baggage of unresolved issues. Primarily, the idea of 
this very tentative set of grouping is to indicate which of the Indian states are likely to 
attain and sustain higher rates of growth in the years ahead. These states are classified 
into three categories as follows:
Reform-oriented states - Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra
Intermediate Reformers -  Haryana, Orissa, and West Bengal.
Lagging Reformers -  Bihar, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh.
Real annual average growth rates of per capita gross state domestic product 
shown in Table 6.1 bear testimony to the fact that our group of reform-oriented states are 
also the fastest growing states in India in the post-reform period. Interestingly enough, 
Sachs and Bajpai (various years) note that amongst the Southern states, Karnataka per 
capita incomes began to surge and exceed the national average since 1991-92. On the 
other hand, amongst the lagging reformers, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh, 
and to a certain extent Orissa, have lagged far behind the all-India average, as also in the 
growth of SDP per capita of other states.
Table 6.1
Selected Indicators of State Level Progress
S tate/U T G row th  R ate 
GSDPPer- 
capita 
1981-91
G row th  R ate 
GSDPPer- 
capita 
1992-97
F D I 
(Rs. M n.) 
Aggregate 
1991-97 
Approved
Software
Exports
A n d h ra  P rad esh 2.9% 3.8% 25112.73 931.30
K a rn a ta k a 3.5% 3.4% 54938.89 7278.40
M a h a ra sh tra 4.1% 7.4% 126763.87 7085.60
H ary an a 4.3% 2.6% 17884.02 629.90
O rissa 1.3% 1.5% 37907.90 -
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W est Bengal 2.3% 4.9% 52495.48 546.90
B ihar 2.9% -0.7% 1307.46 -
K erala 2.5% 4.9% 5209.17 38.70
M adhya P radesh 2.9% 4.1% 52683.29 2.50
U tta r  P radesh 2.9% 1.8% 24445.19 -
Source: National Accounts Statistics of India
Secretariat for Industrial Assistance (SIA) Newsletter, February 1997, Ministry o f  Industry, GOI WWW Page: 
http://www.maharashtra.gov.in/english/invest/softw.htm, current as o f  4 April 1999, constructed by Sachs and Bajpai 
(various years)
With the initiation of economic reforms in 1991 the role of private investment 
has acquired a great deal of significance. In fact, this is a key category for discussing the 
impact of regulations. If regulations discourage investment, then this will wide
implications for output and employment. States are now in competition with one 
another to attract private investment, both domestic and foreign. Within states, the flow 
of investments tends to be skewed in favour of a few regions. State-level data on FDI 
approvals (aggregate FDI approvals between 1991-97) and domestic investment 
proposals and disbursal of funds for investment (aggregate between August 1991 and 
December 1996) shown in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 respectively suggest once again that the 
relatively fast moving reformers have tended to attract higher investments, both from 
foreign and domestic investors.
Table 6.2
State-wise Breakup of Foreign Collaboration and Foreign Direct Investment
Proposals Approved
(During August 1991 to January 1997)
S tate N um ber of Investm ent Investm ent
A pproved
%  o f T otal 
A pproval
T otal Tech Fin
A n d h ra  P rad esh 439 144 295 25112.73 2.47%
K a rn a ta k a 689 255 434 54938.89 5.41%
M a h a ra sh tra 1355 523 832 126763.87 12.49%
2 On a nation-wide basis, the cumulative approvals for FDI for the period 1991-98 were $52.95 billion. Actual FDI 
inflows during the same period were $15.18 billion. It is not possible to get state-wise details o f  the actual inflows o f 
FDI since this data is not centrally maintained.
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Haryana 414 146 268 17884.02 1.76%
Orissa 77 28 49 37907.90 3.73%
West Bengal 271 92 179 52495.48 5.17%
Bihar 69 42 27 1307.46 0.13%
Kerala 104 38 66 5209.17 0.51%
Madhya Pradesh 192 82 110 52683.29 5.19%
Uttar Pradesh 395 176 219 24445.19 2.41%
Others 4686 2343 2343 509597.52 50.21%
Total 10359 4545 5814 1014940.16 100.29%
Source : Secretariat for Industrial Assistance (SIA) Newsletter, February 1997, Minister of Industry, GOI, constructed by Sachs and Bajpai (various 
years)
According to the data made available by the Secretariat of Industrial Approvals in the 
Ministry of Industry, as quoted in Sachs and Bajpai (various papers), the southern states 
accounted for more than 34 percent of the proposals that have been approved in 1998. In 
the period January-December 1998, a total of 428 approvals were given for investments 
in the states of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Andhra and Kerala. Western India, accounting 
for around 21 per cent of the total approvals throughout the country follows the Southern 
region. This investment is in the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra and Goa. On the other 
hand, the states in the North and the East are far behind, except for investments in Delhi.
Gujarat, a small state in terms of its population, received over a fifth o f private 
investment proposals, whereas Bihar with a tenth of India’s population barely managed a 
share of 5 per cent of such proposals. Maharashtra and Gujarat account for 37 per cent of 
total investment proposals, while Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan and Uttar 
Pradesh, taken together, were able to attract only 26 per cent of investment proposals. 
Over the period August 1991 to December 1996 the bulk of investment proposals were 
concentrated in states with a relatively high level of human development to the detriment 
of states that have a low level of human development (Sachs and Bajpai, 1998). The 
cumulative share of financial assistance disbursed by national financial institutions3 
during 1991-96 indicates a big gulf between the less developed and more developed 
states. Maharashtra alone received almost as much financial assistance as Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal put together. Bihar and
3 All India Financial Institutions include IDBI, IFCI, ICICI, UTI, LIC, GIC, IRBI and SIDBI
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Orissa have shares of financial assistance that are adversely disproportionate to their 
respective population shares.
Table 6.3
Investment Proposals and Disbursal of Financial Assistance for Investment
S tates P ercen tage S hare  O f 
Investm ent P roposals 
Between A ugust 1991 
A nd D ecem ber 1996
C um ulative S h are  O f 
F inancial A ssistance 
D isbursed By All 
Ind ian  
F inancial In stitu tions 
(1991-96)
C um ulative  
F inancia l A ssistance 
By
S ta te  F inancial 
C o rp o ra tio n s  
(1991-96)
A n d h ra  P radesh 7.7 6.7 1488.1
K a rn a ta k a 5.3 5.8 2688.6
M a h a ra sh tra 17.3 22.2 1861.5
H ary an a 3.6 2.3 866.0
O rissa 1.9 1.7 697.8
W est Bengal 3.2 4.0 460.3
B ih ar 1.0 1.5 411.5
K era la 1.1 1.5 735.8
M adhya P radesh 7.6 4.9 589.2
U tta r  P radesh 9.6 7.4 1894.3
All India 100 100 17952
Source :Annual Report, 1996-97, Ministry of Industry, Govt, of India Cited in Kurian (1998). Constructed by Sachs and Bajpai 
(various years)
With regard to FDI, Sachs and Bajpai (1998) note that Tamil Nadu has attracted 
several automobile manufacturers to the state, such as, Ford, Mitsubishi, and Hyundai. 
An auto-ancillary park, near Chennai is coming up that will help enhance the availability 
of world-class auto components to multinational manufacturers in Tamil Nadu and 
neighbouring states. Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh have witnessed investments by 
software giants, such as Microsoft Corporation4, Oracle, Novell, and Sun Microsystems 
as India is increasingly emerging as a major software development centre, with more and 
more overseas companies setting up operations in India. These companies are operating
4 The first development centre o f  Microsoft outside o f  the U.S. is being established in Andhra Pradesh.
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in the Indian market either through 100 percent equity holding, joint ventures with 
Indian companies; or marketing or technical collaborations. In addition to IT companies, 
Andhra Pradesh has also been successful in attracting ABB, Rolls Royce, General 
Electric, Lurgi, and US First Boston. Similarly, Gujarat has the presence of ATandT, GE 
Plastics, Unilever, Sumitomo, and Siemens. Finally, Maharashtra has Coca-Cola, Enron, 
Mercedes Benz, Siemens, Proctor and Gambler, Unilever, and Unisys.
In the area of software exports, Karnataka and Maharashtra are in the lead as 
shown in Table 6.1. While Bangalore in Karnataka and Bombay in Maharashtra were 
traditionally the choice locations of software companies, but the last few years have seen 
the emergence of Chennai in Tamil Nadu, Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh, Pune in 
Maharashtra, and Gurgaon in Haryana as prominent software centres where both Indian 
companies and multinationals have located their operations. In addition, several foreign 
companies have located their back office operations in Bangalore, Chennai, and Pune. 
Abundant supply of labour, low wages, cheap satellite communications and the internet 
have been instrumental in the decision of foreign firms to establish their back office 
operations in India. These range from billing to payroll handling, from credit appraisal to 
airline reservations, and from inventory management to answering customer complaints. 
Data transcription and transmission for hospitals in the US and telemarketing for US and 
European firms is also being undertaken by Indian companies based in Chennai and 
other Indian metropolitan cities.
The state-wise distribution of 100 percent export-oriented units (EOUs) is also 
seen to be concentrated in the reforming states. As Table 6.4 shows, out of a total of 
1995 EOUs as many as 1258 or 63 percent were located in the three reform-oriented 
states.
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Table 6.4
State-wise Distribution of 100% Export Oriented Units (EOUs)
(August 1991-November 1998)
State/UT No. Percent1 Investment
(Rs. Mn)
Percent1 Employment
(Numbers)
Percent1
Andhra Pradesh 391 11.16 93160 14.53 63955 10.76
Karnataka 358 10.22 34440 5.37 66403 11.18
Maharashtra 509 14.53 64880 10.12 78463 13.21
Haryana 204 5.82 19580 3.05 30795 5.18
Orissa 40 1.14 81370 12.69 18907 3.18
West Bengal 96 2.74 28330 4.42 15749 2.65
Bihar 6 0.17 220 0.03 351 0.06
Kerala 66 1.88 8910 1.39 9217 1.55
Madhya Pradesh 129 3.68 49730 7.76 39483 6.65
Uttar Pradesh 196 5.6 19870 3.1 27902 4.7
Total 3281 608950 558992
Source: Secretariat for Industrial Assistance (SIA) Newsletter, December 1998, M inister o f  Industry, GOI, 
constructed by Sachs and Bajpai (various years)
Notes: 1: Percentage shown is proportionate to all o f India
Some of the social indicators for which state-wise data is available also indicate that our 
group of reform leading states are relatively better placed than the other states. O f course, 
Kerala is an exception with highest life expectancy at birth, and the lowest birth rate, 
death rate, infant mortality rate and the total fertility rate among all the Indian states 
(Table 6.5).
Table 6.5
State-wise Performance of Health Indicators
State/UT Death Rate Total Fertility 
Rate
Infant Mortality 
Rate
Birth Rate
1991 1997 1991 1994 1991 1997 1991 1997
Andhra Pradesh 9.7 8.3 3.0 2.7 73 63 26.0 22.5
Karnataka 9.0 7.6 3.1 2.8 77 53 26.9 22.7
Maharashtra 8.2 7.3 3.0 2.9 60 47 26.2 23.1
Haryana 8.2 8.0 4.0 3.7 68 68 33.1 28.3
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O rissa 12.8 10.9 3.3 3.3 124 96 28.8 26.5
W est Bengal 8.3 7.7 3.2 3.0 71 55 27.0 22.7
B ihar 9.8 10.0 4.4 4.6 69 71 30.7 31.7
K erala 6.0 6.2 1.8 1.7 16 12 18.3 17.9
M adhya P radesh 13.8 11.0 4.6 4.2 117 94 35.8 31.9
U tta r  P radesh 11.3 10.3 5.1 5.1 97 85 35.7 33.5
Sources: SRS Fertility an M ortality Indicators 1991, Office o f  the Registrar General, India Vital Statistics Division  
Ministry o f  Home Affairs, New Delhi; SRS Bulletin Oct 98 at http://www.censusindia.net
On the other hand, states, such as Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh 
have high infant mortality rates, and life expectancy that is below the national average. 
Literacy indicators too depict a similar trend among the states with Kerala once again 
ahead of them all as shown in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6 
State-Wise Social Indicators
State/U T L iteracy  R ate T eacher/P up il 
R atio  1994-95
(Primary
Schools)
P ercen tage 
C h ild ren  6- 
14
A ttending
School
(1992-93)
D rop-O u t
R ates
Classes I-V 
P rim ary  
S tage 
(P ercen t)
(1993-94)
Females
(1991)
Males
(1991)
A n d h ra  P radesh 32.7 55.1 50 63.3 42.2
K arn a tak a 44.3 67.3 48 70.5 40.8
M a h a ra sh tra 52.3 76.6 38 81.5 27.6
H ary an a 40.5 69.1 46 81.3 3.9
O rissa 34.7 63.1 35 79.6 52.5
W est Bengal 46.6 67.8 57 67.7 40.4
B ihar 38.5 52.5 55 51.3 63.4
K erala 86.2 93.6 30 94.8 -4.2
M adhya P radesh 28.9 58.4 44 62.3 28.4
U tta r  P radesh 25.3 55.7 59 61.3 19.9
Sources:Census of India (1991), International Institute for Population Sciences (1995)
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Table 6.7 shows the year by which the total fertility rate in the different states is likely to 
come down to 2.1 percent, that is, the replacement level. Assuming there is no change in 
the trend decline in total fertility rate observed during 1981-93, the projected year by 
which replacement level TFR (2.1) will be reached in different states is shown in this 
table. While Kerala and Tamil Nadu have already reached replacement level TFR, only 
seven states are expected to attain that status by 2025. These are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, 
Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, and West Bengal. The TFR is 
expected to be much above the replacement level well beyond 2025 in Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh.
Table 6.7
Demographic Indicators of Major Indian States: Status and Projection
S tate/U T P opulation  As 
P er 1991 Census
A nnual C om pound 
R ate O f G row th  O f 
Population
(In Millions) 
(1981-91)
Y ear By W hich T o ta l 
F ertility  R ate  Com es 
Down To 2.1 -  The 
R eplacem ent Level
A n d h ra  P radesh 66.5 2.17 2002
K a rn a ta k a 45 1.92 2009
M a h a ra sh tra 78.9 2.29 2008
H ary an a 16.5 2.42 2025
O rissa 31.7 1.83 2010
W est Bengal 68.1 2.21 2009
B ihar 86.4 2.11 2039
K erala 29.1 1.34 * 1988
M adhya P rad esh 66.2 2.38 Beyond 2060
U tta r  P radesh 139.1 2.27 Beyond 2100
All Ind ia 846.3 2.14 2026
Sources : Population and Growth Rates: 1991 Census Hand Book; Population Projections for India and 
States 1996-2001; cited in Kurian (1998) Regional Disparities in India (mimeo) .
Notes : (*) Kerala and Tamil Nadu have already achieved the TFR of 2.1.
Similarly, another set of projections to show the decades required to attain universal 
literacy are shown in Table 6.8. Data from the 1991 Census showed that in order to
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achieve universal literacy Kerala would require 1.2 decades, Madhya Pradesh 5.6 
decades, Uttar Pradesh 7.1 decades, and Bihar 9.7 decades. Universal female literacy, 
according to Census projections, would be attained in Kerala in 1.3 decades, but it would 
take 7.3 decades for Madhya Pradesh, 9.2 for Uttar Pradesh, and 12.1 decades for Bihar.
Table 6.8
Decades Required To Attain Universal Literacy
S tates P ro jection  (1991)
P ersons M ale Fem ale
A n d h ra  P radesh 6.6 5.4 7.9
K a rn a ta k a 4.5 3.8 4.9
M a h a ra sh tra 3.9 3.4 4.2
H ary an a 3.7 2.9 4.4
O rissa 6.3 5.6 6.9
W est Bengal 4.7 4.1 5.1
B ihar 9.7 8.1 12.1
K erala 1.2 1.1 1.3
M adhya P radesh 5.6 4.2 7.3
U tta r  P radesh 7.1 5.3 9.2
All Ind ia 5.6 4.6 6.5
Source: 1991 India Census cited in Reflection Paper on Diversities and Disparities in Human Development; United Nations 
Development Programme; New Delhi
6.2 SOME MORE DETAILED STATE ANALYSES
The following analysis owes much to the very detailed analysis contained in 
several papers by Sachs and Bajpai (various years) paper on reform oriented states in 
India. Among the reform-oriented states, we talk briefly about Andhra Pradesh, 
Karnataka and Maharashtra.
The Andhra Pradesh government has taken important measures to improve 
public finances and sector policies. In particular, it has increased the cost of subsidised 
rice from Rs. 2 to Rs. 3.5 per kg, and reduced per-family allocations by 25 percent. It has 
also raised power tariffs by 20-60 percent to non-agricultural consumers, and by 10-25 
percent in the case of agricultural tariffs. Subsequently, facing strong opposition to these
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measures the government had to reduce these tariff levels by about 40 percent. While 
this was a significant reform initiative, the revised average tariffs for farmers still covers 
only 9 percent of production costs.
Other measures include tax increases; the first steps toward the reform of the 
power sector and significant increases in irrigation charges along with important 
institutional reforms, such as the creation of a Water User Associations and the 
devolution of operation and maintenance to them. Additional measures being 
implemented include containment of the wage bill, further reduction of food subsidies, 
relaxation of prohibition, privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SoEs), further 
adjustments of water and power rates, and other revenue enhancement efforts.
The key fiscal objective is to achieve fiscal sustainability through a change in the 
composition of public expenditure. That is, a significant reduction of rice subsidies and 
employment in the state government and a corresponding increase in expenditure in 
social and infrastructure sectors particularly in primary education and health, nutrition, 
irrigation and road sectors. Fiscal reforms are being accompanied by significant changes 
in sector policies—restructuring of the power sector; improvement of service delivery in 
primary education, primary health and nutrition; strengthening of operating and 
management in roads and irrigation sectors, and acceleration of users participation in the 
management of public canal irrigation network. If successfully implemented the reform 
program would put Andhra Pradesh on a path of faster economic growth and social 
development. Several of the above mentioned initiatives of the state government are 
being supported by the World Bank, which has approved a loan to the state government 
for policy reform at the state-level.
The Karnataka government has been pursuing a progressive industrial policy 
and provides an attractive package of incentives and concessions. The Industrial Policy- 
incentive package was formulated keeping in view the liberalisation of industrial and 
trade policy initiated by the government of India in July 1991. Karnataka’s liberal 
industrial policy has been in operation for several years now and has attracted substantial 
investment flows in the industrial sector.
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Industrial projects with large investments are under implementation in different 
locations. The government is focusing on upgrading of the industrial infrastructure in 
these locations. Improvement of transport and communication links, water and power 
supply, effluent treatment, and development of human resources are some of the key 
areas of the state government’s focus.
Private sector initiative for development of infrastructure in areas like power 
generation, express highways, industrial parks and townships, airports and ports is being 
encouraged to build good infrastructure. The government is working towards evolving a 
suitable policy to improve investment in these sectors. Due to accelerated industrial 
development, demand pressures on key resources viz. land, power and water have 
increased tremendously, and therefore the government is formulating a pragmatic policy 
for conservation and optimum utilisation of these resources.
Karnataka has been termed as the ideal location for high technology industries, 
particularly in the fields of electronics, telecommunications and informatics sectors. The 
government’s effort currently is to maintain its pre-eminent position in these sectors.
The state government plans to further consolidate this resource and towards this end 
upgrade the skills of, and training in technical institutions. The involvement of the 
private sector in this important activity is being strongly encouraged by the government.
Development of entrepreneurship among the local population in particular, in 
rural areas and among disadvantaged groups, viz. weaker sections of the society, 
including women is being strengthened. Since investment by the industry in research and 
development, quality upgradation, improvements in productivity etc. is far from 
adequate, the government is encouraging investments in these activities. The state is 
focusing towards increasing export of value-added goods and services. Presently, the 
share of the state in exports from the country is around 4 % and state is undertaking 
measures to increase its exports substantially. To achieve this, efforts towards 
improvements in productivity, research and development and quality upgradation are 
being encouraged by the private sector.
In order to maximise the potential of, and the entrepreneurial spirit prevailing in 
the state of Maharashtra, the government launched the New Industry, Trade and
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Commerce Policy, 1995. The guiding principles behind this policy are the integration of 
different sectoral development schemes into a cohesive plan for overall development and 
the evolution of a common and transparent framework of governance. The Government 
has recognised that for any large developmental activity to succeed, participation of the 
private sector is imperative. It is only through private initiative that the necessary 
financial and technical resources necessary for large-scale developmental activity can be 
mobilised. The new policy has therefore sought to accentuate the role of the private 
sector in development and a shift in the government’s role to provide full support to 
private sector initiatives.
The state government is undertaking numerous measures for the empowerment 
of the people at all levels. The traditional approach of dependency and centralisation of 
authority is sought to be replaced by dynamic empowerment inherent in such an 
approach. The government through this policy has made an attempt to realign its role 
from that of a controller to a facilitator in the process of all-round development. The 
policy explicitly states the intent to bring about a change in the mindset of people of 
Maharashtra so that they are not content merely with the current level of employment 
and entrepreneurship but extend these to new levels to meet the development needs of 
the State.
Since the process of liberalisation began in July 1991, India has witnessed a 
steady flow of foreign direct investment and Maharashtra has been a significant 
beneficiary of this process. Of the total foreign direct investment proposals, amounting 
to Rs. 1291.35 billion cleared between August 1991 and August 1997^Maharashtra has 
attracted Rs. 155.98 billion. This represents a 12.07 per cent share of the total foreign 
direct investment in India. In terms of total domestic industrial investment, Maharashtra 
remains in the forefront. Between August 1991 and October 1997, the estimated 
domestic investment was Rs. 7292.12 billion of which Rs. 1692.1 billion or 23.20 per 
cent was in Maharashtra. Indeed, Maharashtra continues to remain a favoured 
destination among both foreign as well as domestic investors.
Haryana, Orissa, and West Bengal are in the intermediate reformer category. 
While these states have not undertaken wide-ranging reforms, however, they have 
implemented a series of reform measures that have separated them from the others.
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Power sector reform, for example, is an area where Haryana and Orissa have undertaken 
numerous steps.
In June 1997, the Haryana state assembly approved the Haryana Electricity 
Reform Bill that lays down the legal basis to establish an independent regulatory 
commission and to unbundled The Haryana State Electricity Board (HSEB) into a 
generating company, a transmission company and a number of distribution companies. It 
is expected that the distribution network will be fully privatised by 2002. These 
measures will also be accompanied by tariff adjustments, comprehensive financial 
restructuring, and the implementation of a large investment program (about US$ 1.8 
billion spread over ten years) that includes transmission and distribution rehabilitation 
and expansion, generation plant modernisation, demand side management and end-use 
energy efficiency improvement. The World Bank has agreed to support Haryana's efforts 
to the extent of US$ 600 million over a period of eight to ten years, through a series of 
Adaptable Program Loans (APL), an new lending instrument approved in September 
1997.
Haryana's power sector reform program involves the following: First, the 
unbundling and structural separation of generation, transmission, and distribution into 
separate services to be provided by separate companies. Second, the incorporation of the 
new companies under the Companies Act. Third, privatisation of the distribution system. 
Fourth, private sector participation in generation and transmission utilities. Fifth, 
competitive bidding for new generation. Sixth, the development of an autonomous 
power sector regulatory agency. Seventh, supply and end-use efficiency improvements 
and enhanced environmental protection. Finally, reforming the electricity tariffs at the 
bulk power, transmission, and retail levels.
Additionally as part of the reform process, the state government has invited bids 
from private promoters -  domestic and foreign -  to set up small hydro-electrical power 
projects in the state. The state announced incentives for these producers that include 
exemption from electricity duty, sales tax exemption for plant and machinery purchased 
for the project and a Rs 2.25 per unit sale price to the HSEB with a five per cent annual 
escalation rate. The Haryana State Energy Development Agency (HSEDA) has also 
come up with incentives for power projects based on non-conventional energy sources.
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The Haryana government is promoting private investment to harness non-conventional 
energy sources for generating electricity. The state government has identified biomass, 
waste recycling, mini hydel plants, wind and solar powered plants as approved power 
sources.
In 1992-93, the average tariff for agriculture was 25.5 paise/kWh. It has been 
raised over the years and was placed at 50.0 paise/kWh in 1997-98. In the Industrial 
sector, the average power tariff for 1992-93 was 171 paise/kWh and has been raised to
319.0 paise/kWh in 1997-98. Refer to Tables 10 and 11 for agricultural and industrial 
tariffs respectively.
Orissa has been the leader in power sector reforms at the state-level in India. The 
State government enacted an amendment to India's national electricity acts of 1910 and 
1948: the Orissa Electricity Reform Act, which became effective on April 1, 1996. 
Subsequently the state government established the Orissa Electricity Regulatory 
Commission, India's first state-level regulatory commission in the power sector. The 
commission announced its first tariff decision and issued its licenses to the transmission 
and distribution company (GRIDCO) in March 1997.
The Commission's Tariff Order inter alia authorises GRIDCO to adjust its tariffs 
effective from April 1,1997. The Commission restructured residential and agricultural 
tariffs so as to contain cross-subsidisation.
Keeping in view the policy of the central government to attract private 
entrepreneurs, Orissa State has worked out an innovative policy to provide basic 
infrastructure projects including the buying of land through the Orissa Power Generating 
Corporation. The state's chronic power deficit is being tackled by nine hydro projects 
with a total generating capacity of more than 7,000 MW.
The Orissa reform legislation contains several reform features. These are: First, 
restructuring - The former Orissa State Electricity Board (OSEB) has been corporatised 
and is designed to be managed on commercial principles in its new form GRIDCO. 
While the newly formed GRIDCO has been put in charge of transmission and 
distribution, the hydro power- generating stations owned by the government has been
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taken over by the Orissa Hydro Power Corporation (OHPC). Second, unbundling - The 
reform structure has incorporated principles of functional unbundling with regard to 
generation, transmission and distribution to be managed by separate 
corporations/companies. Privatisation - The Orissa Energy Reform (OER) Act, 1995 
aims at fostering private participation in generation and gradual privatisation of 
transmission and distribution. Third, regulatory commission - An important component 
is establishment of the Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission for ensuring 
achievement of objectives given in the Orissa Electricity Reform Act, 1995. Fourth, 
licensing - Government ownership and direct control has given way to a licensing 
system in respect of transmission and distribution activities. Finally, tariff - determining 
tariff, which would ensure commercial rate of return for investment in the electricity 
industry while protecting rights of all categories of consumers with respect to cost, 
efficiency and quality of service.
The power tariff on agriculture in 1992-93 was 30.9 paise/kWh. In 1993-94 it 
was dropped to 21.2 paise/kWh. The subsequent year, 1994-95, the power tariff on 
agriculture rose to 53.1 paise/kWh and was raised to 55.0 paise/kWh in 1996-97. The 
average tariff for industry has also been increased. The 1992-93 tariff stood at 89.1 
paise/kWh and was raised to 220.3 paise/kWh in 1996-97
Economic reforms, and labour policy reforms in particular, at the state-level, 
have a substantial unfinished agenda. While a handful of the states have demonstrated 
their commitment by implementing reforms in certain sectors of the state economy, a 
majority of them have still to initiate any significant policy changes. Of course, even the 
reform-oriented states have succeeded to varying degrees in taking on reforms in areas, 
such as labour market reform, fiscal reform in general and reduction of revenue deficits 
in particular, state-owned enterprise reform, and SEB reform, except in Haryana, and 
Orissa. The state governments have continued with several subsidy schemes in various 
sectors irrespective of whether or not the subsidies are reaching whom they are meant 
for. While Haryana and Orissa have undertaken some hard reform measures in the power 
sector, however, they have not initiated any major policy reform in other sectors of the 
economy.
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Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh are in desperate need of 
reform. All of are land locked states thereby reducing their growth potential 
considerably. By contrast, all our reform-oriented states are coastal states, and hence can 
develop as major platforms for labour-intensive manufacturing exports. Statistics bear 
testimony to the fact that state capability to make economic decisions varies across state 
boundaries.
6.3 WHAT EXPLAINS THE VARIATION?
What factors help to explain differences in economic policy choices among these 
state-level democratic governments? Scholars studying differences in initiating and 
consolidating economic reform offer several explanations. Some focus on the benefits of 
an autonomous state that can shield itself from interest groups opposed, at least in the 
short term, to market-oriented reforms. Haggard and Kaufman (1995) distinguish 
between the initiation and consolidation of market-oriented reform. For successful 
initiation of reform, they contend that centralised executive authority is important for 
overcoming political stalemates, selecting and backing a cohesive policy-making team, 
and overriding bureaucratic and political opposition to policy initiatives. The 
consolidation of reform, by contrast, rests on reducing the executive's power through the 
evolution of checks on executive discretion. Haggard and Kaufman also assert that 
political parties are needed in the consolidation phase to organise the bases of support to 
form a new coalition of beneficiaries.
Like Haggard and Kaufman (1995), Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) also stress 
the importance of centralised executive authority, but their work includes a critical role 
for the executive's party to dominate the legislature. The interaction between a powerful 
executive and his/her party's majority hold in the legislature lifts potential roadblocks to 
the passage of unpopular reforms. Williamson (1994) also emphasises autonomy for 
the initiation of market-oriented reforms, but autonomy for the policy makers and not the 
executive. Williamson claims that bureaucrats and technocrats are necessary for 
initiating and sustaining market-oriented reforms. A coherent team of policy-makers 
embodying the common core of wisdom associated with the "Washington consensus" is 
vital for insulating themselves from groups often harmed by neoliberal policies.
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Unlike backers of autonomous state arguments, Heilman (1998) contends that it 
is not short-term losers of reform that hinder the initiation of full-scale market oriented 
policies and precipitate calls for an insulated state. In fact, it is the political "winners" 
those actors that gain from partial implementation of reforms - who hamper furthering 
the reform process. Early winners of partial reforms including commercial bankers who 
obtain arbitrage opportunities in distorted financial markets and local officials who 
collect monopoly rents by restricting market entry into their regions are the main losers 
if the reform process expanded. These winners lobby government officials against more 
extensive reform. Others contend that the magnitude of the economic crisis contributes 
to policy reform. Grindle and Thomas (1991) endorse the crisis hypothesis, which 
suggests that economic crisis leads to the adoption of more drastic economic measures 
including neoliberal reforms.
This chapter tests the applicability of these arguments to the above ten state 
governments in India, from 1985-1997 to explain why these states differ in their degree 
of market openness. These states make for useful comparisons. Since the 1980s, they 
have varied widely in their ability to initiate and sustain market reforms despite the fact 
that most of their policy makers and governmental leaders have pledged their support for 
more orthodox reforms.
Using a Time-Series Cross-Sectional (TSCS) data set, this study constructs a 
model of policy choice for the ten states. It includes a number of variables that represent 
political and economic constraints on policy choice. The findings suggest that a 
centralised executive and a highly polarised party system are important for initiating and 
sustaining more orthodox policies. A centralised executive provides leaders with 
opportunities to install their preferred policies. The degree of polarisation affects the 
executive's policy preferences toward orthodox policies. A highly polarised system may 
encourage executives to use the appointment of bureaucrats, who favour neoliberal 
policies, as a strategy to bolster their political survival.
6.4 THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC REFORM
Since the 1980s most states in India have initiated elements of market-oriented 
neoliberal reforms. The policy of inward-oriented economic development based on
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import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) that India had adopted in the 1950s - 1980s 
produced severe economic problems. These problems included balance of trade and 
payment deficits and capital scarcities. Despite the abandonment of ISI policies by India 
since the late 1980s, there are differences in the policy choices made at the state-level by 
the different state governments.
Some states initiated more extensive (or orthodox) market-oriented reforms 
including privatisation of state assets, price liberalisation, eliminating inefficient 
industrial promotion programs, and instituting tax reforms. However, others initiated 
only partial reforms and continue to support protectionist policies that benefit a select 
few at the expense of many. This leads to the question of why these states differ in their 
economic policy choices, especially when most policy makers and governmental leaders 
in India (even Communist-ruled West Bengal) claim to endorse orthodox reforms?
There are several possible explanations for differences in economic policy choice. 
Many scholars focus on the importance of state autonomy and insulation for initiating 
more orthodox reforms. The basis for an insulated state relies on political survival 
strategies along with collective action issues. In much of the literature, it is assumed that 
under democratic rule, most leaders want to survive in office. Not to deny that they may 
have additional interests, but the prime interest of leaders focuses on their attempts to 
maximise career goals, with re-election representing an important element for fulfilling 
those ambitions. Leaders are aware that elections occur frequently and they need to 
institute policies that in the short term bring about better economic results if they plan to 
retain their governmental positions.
The initiating and sustaining of unpopular orthodox reforms, so the story goes, is 
considered politically suicidal for survival-minded leaders. Orthodox reforms that 
attempt to eliminate market imperfections and promote greater efficiency generate high 
short term costs and provide rewards mainly in the long term.
These costs come in the form of price hikes (as price controls are lifted and 
subsidies cut), high unemployment, and production decreases as industries based on a 
closed-market economy disappear and firms geared to a competitive economy are 
created. Those individuals who are likely to be sacked or to lose special perks because
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of market opening usually form a relatively small and concentrated group, and thus are 
better able to organise against reforms (and resolve a collective action problem) 
compared to more dispersed winners of reform.
As Haggard and Kaufman (1995, 9) state, "At the onset of reform, potential 
beneficiaries face high uncertainty about future payoffs and substantial barriers to 
collective action. Those who have gained from past policies, on the other hand, are 
certain about their preferences, feel the pain of adjustment immediately, and have 
typically overcome collective action problems."
For political leaders to ignore the complaints of this concentrated group, so the 
story goes, measures are needed to insulate political leaders and possibly their policy 
makers from pluralist interests. Haggard and Kaufman (1995) contend that the 
successful initiation of orthodox reforms depends on centralised executive authority. 
Under centralised authority, the executive is able to use special constitutional provisions 
and emergency powers to bypass pluralist pressures usually hurt by extensive reforms. 
However, according to Haggard and Kaufman, the consolidation of such reforms rests 
on conditions quite different from policy initiation. Stable bases of social support, 
coming mainly from political parties, are needed in order to consolidate these reforms.
Haggard and Kaufman claim that the degree of fragmentation and polarisation in 
the political parties explains the government's ability to sustain the reforms. Fragmented 
and highly polarised party systems make it difficult to forge stable electoral, legislative, 
and bureaucratic majorities that are necessary for consolidating reforms. It is in cohesive 
party systems that the reforms are more likely to be sustained. Similarly, Shugart and 
Mainwaring (1997) argue that a "strong" executive is important for getting an agenda 
enacted including initiating orthodox reforms. Strong constitutional powers inherent in 
the office of the presidency make it possible for the preferences of executives to be taken 
seriously in the passage of legislation.
However, unlike Haggard and Kaufman they also emphasise that executives need 
to have control over their own party and for that party to hold a majority of seats in the 
legislature during the initiation phase. The combination of a strong executive and the 
executive party's dominance in the legislature removes obstacles to initiating and
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consolidating reforms. Ultimately, they come down on the side of Haggard and Kaufman 
by claiming that the number of political parties (i.e., if it is a fragmented party system) 
makes a fundamental difference in whether market reforms are implemented.
Like state autonomy advocates, Williamson (1994) also stresses insulation for 
initiating and sustaining economic reforms. However, he focuses on the background of 
policy makers and how their commonly held beliefs insulate them from groups opposed 
to market reforms. Unlike the more institutionalist approaches, Williamson argues that a 
large contingent of bureaucrats and economists trained in ideas commonly associated 
with the "Washington consensus" enables policy makers to shield themselves from 
groups opposed to market opening. Building on Pinera's work on Chile (1991, cited in 
Williamson 1994), Williamson claims that the coherence of economic ideas held by the 
policy-making team is crucial for policy reforms.
Alternatively, Heilman (1998) presents evidence from the post communist states 
to show the limitations of state autonomy arguments. In fact, he argues that the most 
orthodox reforms in the region have been initiated and sustained in the most competitive 
political systems, where politicians are most vulnerable to electoral backlash by the 
short-term losers. Moreover, the main obstacles to reform have not come from the 
traditional short-term losers of economic restructuring - the unemployed, former state 
bureaucrats, and others - but rather from the "winners" of partial reform:
"from enterprise insiders who have become new owners only to strip their firms' 
assets; from commercial financiers who have opposed macroeconomic 
stabilisation to preserve their enormously profitable arbitrage opportunities in 
distortedfinancial markets; from local officials who have prevented market entry 
into their regions to protect their share o f local monopoly rents; andfrom the so- 
called "Mafiosi" who have undermined the creation the creation o f a stable legal 
foundation for the market economy" (Heilman 1998,204).
The winners block or stall more orthodox reform because it threatens to eliminate their 
special gains.
Unlike the others whose arguments rely on political criteria, Grindle and Thomas 
(1991) adopt a crisis hypothesis based on economic conditions to explain policy
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variation. They argue that whether a reform initiative is considered under conditions of 
perceived crisis is important. If elites perceive a crisis and market reform as a response 
to that crisis, it is likely that pressures will build to institute orthodox policy change. By 
contrast, if there is no perception of a crisis, change is more likely to be incremental. 
Crises apparently shock states out of traditional policy choices that are deemed to have 
failed and generate demand for reform.
Do empirical data substantiate the claim that state autonomy is important for 
initiating and consolidating of market-oriented reform? Or, is it the political winners of 
partial reform or economic crisis that explains differences in policy choice among the 
Indian states? A rigorous test of these hypotheses is necessary to understand why some 
states are able to implement their policy preferences while others continue to fall short of 
their policy goals.
6.5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND MODEL SPECIFICATION
This study examines annual data on policy choice for ten states in India between 
1985 and 1997. The analysis includes all the cases for which data are available (which 
are a sub-set of the 24 states studied in the previous chapter), and these represent a good 
cross-section within the region. The data is comprehensive for a part of the world in 
which collecting reliable information is a difficult task.
The data form a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data set that includes 
multiple observations for each state in the sample. Because of the nature of TSCS data, 
issues related to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are a concern. Using OLS 
estimates of the standard errors in a TSCS setting is problematic because these estimates 
may be misleading as a result of panel heteroskedasticity or spatial correlation of the 
errors. There are different ways of dealing with these problems. Beck and Katz (1996), 
for instance, recommend using OLS with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) once 
serial correlation is removed. Their solution to handling serial correlation is to include a 
lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation that permits an explicit 
evaluation of the long-term relationship between the variables. However, including a 
lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side involves costs. As Achen (2000, 6) 
points out, "The lagged dependent variable does bias the substantive coefficients toward
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negligible values and does artificially inflate the effect of the lagged dependent 
variable."
He suggests that unless there is a good theoretical reason for including a lagged 
dependent variable, it should not be used. Given the downside of using the lagged 
dependent model, it is not the most appropriate way to control for autocorrelation. 
Alternatively, autocorrelation can be addressed using the AR(1) correction common in 
most statistical packages. We will compare results using the AR(1) correction and 
without controlling for autocorrelation in this study. After testing for autocorrelation, 
OLS is then used to calculate the coefficients and PCSE is used to estimate their 
significance. The regression model is given below.
Economic Policy Choice = al + b 1 (Centralisation) + b2 (Legislative 
Dominance) +b3 (Fragmentation) + b4 (Polarisation) + bs (% o f trained 
bureaucrats) + b6 (Inflation logged).
As we will discuss in detail in the following sections, economic policy choice 
refers to the degree of orthodoxy of economic policies initiated by governments. 
Centralisation examines executive authority in policy making. Legislative dominance 
indicates the executive party's majority hold in the legislature. Fragmentation refers to 
the number of "effective" political parties while polarisation corresponds to the share of 
the vote received by leftist parties. The percent of trained bureaucrats calculates the 
proportion of economic policy makers who hold advanced economic degrees. Inflation 
(logged) assesses the effect of inflation on policy choice.
6.5.1 Dependent Variable
Variation in economic policy choices suggests that it is necessary to design a 
measure to differentiate policy intensity of market-oriented programs. Six factors are 
commonly associated with market reforms: 1) state deficit stabilisation; 2) state excise 
and subsidy reform; 3) labour market reform; 4) privatisation; 5) price liberalisation; and 
6) reduction in industrial promotion programs. The Indian cases are compared using a 
scale of 0-2 for each factor. If a state earns a 2 for any category, it is extensively 
reforming that element of the economy. By the same token, if the state receives a 0, it is
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not reforming that part at all. States that receive scores between 1/2 and 1 1/2 in any 
category are generally adopting a more gradualist approach to policy reform.
The scoring measurements are based on the CMIE's quarterly State Profiles and 
State Reports. These sources provide detailed descriptions of the policies chosen by each 
state in a given year. That does not suggest that computing the scores for these states is 
an exact science. However, given that these sources are specifically interested in the 
degree o f market openness, this makes them useful guides for designing measuring to 
differentiate economic policy choices. A summary of the degree of orthodoxy is 
provided for each state in the sample in Table 6.9.
Table 6.9
Summary Statistics of Degree of Orthodoxy in India, 1985-1997
S tate M ean Median Std. Dev. M inim um M axim um
M adhya Pradesh 8.81 12 3.78 4 12
M aharashtra 9.58 9.5 0.607 9 10.5
Bihar 5.23 5.5 2.27 1 7.5
Andhra Pradesh 11.5 11.5 0 11.5 11.5
W est Bengal 7.5 7 1.76 5.5 9.5
Uttar Pradesh 4.65 4.5 1.05 3.5 6
Karnataka 9.54 10.5 2.5 5 11.5
Haryana 7.12 10 4.53 1.5 11.5
Orissa 6.27 7.5 2.31 3.5 8.5
Kerala 4.92 5.5 2.54 1.5 8
Sources: CMIE: State Profiles and State Reports
6.5.2 Independent Variables
Indian states have chosen a wide variety of economic policies from 1985 to 1997. 
This chapter has already presented several hypotheses to explain these differences. This 
section specifies the data that is used to test the alternative explanations.
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Centralised executive authority, a key aspect of Haggard and Kaufman's 
explanation for the initiation of market reforms and part of Mainwaring and Shugart's 
model, is measured using many factors that are adopted by Shugart and Carey (1992, ch. 
8). In defining a strong executive, Shugart and Carey incorporate factors such as the 
veto and decree powers of the executive, and the leader's capacity to form and dismiss 
cabinets.
There are variations in the decree and veto powers and the ability to dismiss 
cabinet members that present some executives with more power than others. For 
instance, if the Chief Minister is able to control legislation without the possibility of an 
assembly revolt, certainly the executive is strong in that category. Moreover, decree 
powers refer to the "authority to make new laws or suspend old ones without the power 
of decree first having been delegated through enabling legislation" (Shugart and Carey 
1992,151). In essence, for centralised executive authority, the highest decree powers are 
reserved for the executive when rescission by the legislature is ineffective. This happens 
particularly when the Governor is a political appointee of the CM. Finally, if the process 
of cabinet formation depends entirely on the Chief Minister's choices without any need 
for confirmation of appointees by the assembly, the executive is strong in that category.
Another factor that is important for gauging the power of the executive is 
whether the electoral system operates in such a way that it nearly guarantees that the 
winning Chief Minister will have received a majority of the votes cast without taking 
recourse to coalition-formation (suggesting a popular mandate). If an electoral system 
clearly defines a winner with a majority of the vote, this will strengthen the power of the 
executive relative to a system that fosters no one person holding a popular mandate.
Using these four categories, we design a scale to measure the strength of the 
executive using 0-2 points for each category. 0 implies that the Chief Minister is weak 
for that particular category, while a 2 equals a strong Chief Minister. We take 
inspiration from values are based on measures from Mainwaring and Shugart (1997,49) 
and Jaggers and Gurr's (1995) Polity III data set. Mainwaring and Shugart provide 
insights for decree and veto powers in Latin America. Jaggers and Gurr's data set, which 
provides information for countries world-wide, offers three measures that are useful for 
determining the degree of centralised executive authority. First, they use a variable
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called monocratism to define the institutional (de jure) independence of the executive. 
Second, they use the level of external constraints to assess the operational (de facto) 
independence of the executive. And third, they measure the centralisation of state 
authority based on the geographic concentration of decision-malting authority. We 
modify it for the Indian state-level scenario.
Polarisation and fragmentation, part of the hypotheses developed by Haggard and 
Kaufman and Mainwaring and Shugart is measured using formulas devised by the 
authors. By fragmentation, the authors are concerned about the effective number of 
parties competing for votes. It is assumed that more political parties create impediments 
to the co-ordination required to initiate and sustain policy reforms. Party fragmentation 
"compounds the chances that executives will become politically isolated and powerless 
to pursue their agenda" (Haggard and Kaufman 1995,170). To measure party 
fragmentation (i.e., the effective number of parties), Haggard and Kaufman calculate the 
inverse sum of squares of the vote or seat going to each party. We use the inverse sum of 
squares for the parliamentary elections between 1985-1997 to assess the degree of 
fragmentation for the Indian cases.
By polarisation, we are interested in the ideological distance among parties. It is 
assumed that the greater the party polarisation, the more difficult it is to sustain orthodox 
policies. The authors recommend looking at the "presence of left and populist parties 
that have historically mobilised followers around anti-capitalist or antioligarchic 
protests" (Haggard and Kaufman 1995,167). Haggard and Kaufman classify which 
parties are leftist and compare the percentage of the vote won in the national elections 
for their cases. Thus, the higher the proportion of the vote won by the left, the more 
polarised the political system is, and the greater the likelihood that orthodox policies will 
not be sustained. For the sake of consistency, we will compare the vote won by the left 
in the parliamentary elections between 1985-1997.
To measure the effect of the executive party's holding a majority of seats in the 
legislature, a scale of 0-1 is designed inspired by data from The Political Handbook o f 
the World (various years), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), and Mainwaring and Shugart
(1997). A score of 0 indicates that the executive's party does not hold a majority of seats 
in either house of parliament. A score of 1/2 means that the executive's party possesses a
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majority in one house. A score of 1 indicates that the party holds a majority in both 
houses.
The effect of bureaucrats on policy making is often mentioned as a possible 
explanation for differences in economic policy choices, but it is rarely evaluated in a 
systematic way. The governmental officials who generally make economic policy 
decisions are from the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Industry, and the Ministry of Agriculture. We examine the background of the secretaries 
and joint secretaries within these respective departments to determine the proportion of 
Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officers in these ministries, as opposed to State 
Civil Service officials, who are traditionally more controlled by the local state politicians. 
The main source for the names of the secretaries and joint secretaries are the Civil Lists 
of the sample states. The State Public Service Commissions' list o f officer’s supplements 
the names of policy makers.
To assess the crisis hypothesis, the best proxy of crisis is the rate of inflation and 
the size of the state deficit. If a state is experiencing severe inflationary pressures, it is 
likely that the government is in crisis. The rate of inflation (logged) is obtained from the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) financial Statistics. The RBI uses the Consumer Price 
Index - the most frequently used indicator of inflation -, which is weighted. So that 
linear methods of estimation can be applied to the data, We use a logarithmic 
transformation of the rate of inflation. A summary of inflation data and the above 
variables is provided for each state in the sample in Table 6.10.
Table 6.10
Summary Statistics of the Averages of the Independent Variables, 1985-1997
State Degree o f 
O rthodoxy
Centralis
ation
Legislative
Dom inance
Polarisation Fragm entat
ion
% IAS  
O fficers
M adhya Pradesh 8.81 7.5 0.85 0.47 2.6 0.68
M aharashtra 9.58 3 0.35 0.29 4.24 0.66
Bihar 5.23 4.5 0.38 0.21 6.21 0.53
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Andhra Pradesh 11.5 8 0.75 0.27 2.44 0.82
W est Bengal 7.5 8 1 0.05 2.66 0.73
Uttar Pradesh 4.65 2.5 0 0.25 5.60 0.66
Karnataka 9.54 8 1 0.13 2.52 0.88
Haryana 7.12 3.5 0.77 0.14 2.81 0.48
Orissa 6.27 1.5 0 0.28 3.17 0.27
Kerala 4.92 3.5 0.60 0.14 3.22 0.35
To test fully the political winners' argument, it is necessary to have annual data on the 
Gini coefficient - one of the standard measures for inequality - and changes in the 
income share for at least a segment of the population. Unfortunately, annual inequality 
data is not available for the Indian states from 1985-1991. As a result, this hypothesis n 
cannot be tested in the regression model. However, using methods similar to
(1998), we are able to evaluate it. A key prediction of the political winners' approach is 
that states that have sustained partial reforms should "exhibit a greater concentration of 
gains to the winners and a higher level of transitional costs than those states that have 
pursued more comprehensive reforms”. (Heilman, 1998, 223).
To test his approach, Heilman uses a scale designed by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development that compares the comprehensiveness of reforms on 
nine dimensions. Based on the level of comprehensiveness, he then groups the states into 
four categories from advanced to slow reform, with high intermediate and low 
intermediate in between the extremes. It is expected that income inequality and 
concentration of gains is highest for the partial reform groups (i.e., the high and low 
intermediate groups).
We test the political winners' approach by using our six-dimension model of 
reform comprehensiveness. We then compare the change in the Gini coefficients from 
1989-90 to 1993-94 and change in income share of the top 10% as a multiple of the
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poorest 40% in 1989-94 (see Table 6.11). Because all the cases at least attempted partial 
reform between 1989-94, none are categorised in the slow reform group.
Our results suggest that partial reform groups do not experience higher inequality
than the comprehensive reformers. Gini coefficients for the low intermediate group 
0- A5 0-i<\
( , J are not much different than for the advanced reformers ( The change in
income share of the top 10% as a multiple of poorest 40% for the low intermediate
reformers (-2.95%) is actually slightly lower than for the advanced reformers (-1.86).
The higher intermediate group is barely higher in terms of inequality. However, if West
Bengal is removed from the sample, the higher intermediate group supports greater
income equality than the others.
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Table 6.11 
Economic Reform and Inequality
State Gini Coefficient 
1989-1990
Gini Coefficient 
1993-1994
% change In
Gini
1989-94
Change in 
Income Share 
Top 10% as a 
multiple of 
poorest 40% 
1989-94
ADVANCED
M adhya Pradesh 0.423 0.438 0.035461 0.043011
Andhra Pradesh 0.47 0.473 0.004246 0
Karnataka 0.345 0.33 -0.04348 -0.0989
Haryana 0.438 0.449 0.025114 n.a.
Average 0.41925 0.243875 0.005336 -0.01863
HIGH INTERMEDIATE
M aharashtra 0.484 0.434 -0.10331 -0.2619
West Bengal 0.45 0.518 0.151111 0.529412
Orissa 0.353 0.3 -0.15014 -0.24194
Average 0.451083 0.398625 0.017714 0.082959
LOW INTERMEDIATE
Bihar 0.535 0.512 -0.04299 -0.16185
Uttar Pradesh 0.445 0.466 0.047191 n.a.
Kerala 0.378 0.387 0.02381 0.102941
Average 0.452667 0.455 0.009337 -0.02945
6.6 RESULTS
The regression results accounting (and not accounting) for autocorrelation reveal 
some interesting findings (see Table 6.12). The effect of economic constraints is the 
opposite of what might have been predicted by the crisis hypothesis. As inflation 
increased to the point of near hyperinflation, the likelihood that governments would 
introduce more orthodox measures fell. The cases of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Kerala 
support the conclusion that economic crisis is not a precondition for orthodox measures, 
as these states experienced economic chaos in the early 1990s but failed to introduce
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more orthodox reforms. By the same token, the choice of more orthodox measures in 
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and West Bengal during periods of economic recovery is 
further evidence that economic crisis is not a necessary condition for the initiation of 
market reforms.
Table 6.12
TSCS Regression of Orthodox Policy Choices in India, 1985-1997
V ariab le W ithou t AR1 W ith  AR1
C oeff z-score C oeff z-score
(s.e) (s.e)
Centralisation 0.53 " 4 . o r r  ' 0.54
(0.132) (0.153)
Legislative -1 -1.26 0.456 0.509
Dominance (0.794) (.896)
Fragmentation -0.711 -0.362 0.2484 1.48
(0.197) (0.192)
Polarisation 5.54 5.76’” 3.3 1.75*
(0.963) 1.88
IAS Officers 2.72 0.945 0.985
(1.27) (0.959)
Inflation(log) -1.11 - ST‘ -0.264 -1.035
(0.374) (0.255)
Constant 4.96 3.75 2.64 1.6
(1.32) (1.65)
Legislative dominance also appeared to have little effect on the degree of 
orthodoxy. Maharashtra Chief Minister Sharad Pawar, an early supporter of market 
reforms, introduced policies without legislative backing. By getting the Governor to 
issue legislation days after he took office, Pawar prevented opposition legislators from 
blocking his profoundly neoliberal economic programs. In Haryana, Bhajan Lai's 
Congress (I) party held solid majorities in both houses of the legislature, yet his 
government did not adopt orthodox measures. In fact, Lai adopted heterodox economic 
policies in 1985. After the collapse of Haryana's economy in the late 1980s, Lai 
instituted gradualist neoliberal reforms. Moreover, the adoption of orthodox reforms by 
current Chief Ministers in Madhya Pradesh (Digvijay Singh), Andhra Pradesh 
(Chandrababu Naidu), Bihar (Rabri Devi/Laloo Prasad Yadav), and Karnataka (S. M.
190
Krishna) without automatic majorities in their respective assemblies shows the 
limitations of the legislative dominance variable.
The findings also suggest that fragmentation in the party system is not significant 
for the initiation of more orthodox reforms. Governments operating under fragmented 
party systems were no more likely to institute these reforms than were unfragmented 
ones. Unfragmented party systems in West Bengal and Karnataka failed to initiate 
orthodox reforms until the late 1980s. By contrast, Maharashtra's Pawar introduced 
orthodox reforms in a highly fragmented party system.
The results for political polarisation are the opposite of what conventional 
wisdom would expect. It is generally assumed that leftist parties are strongly against 
market-oriented reforms. Reforms that are intended to reduce the size of the state 
through privatisation, the elimination of price controls, and the scaling back of tariffs 
and subsidies for inefficient producers are likely to work against the interests of the left. 
Because of privatisation, many state employees will lose their jobs and families that 
depend on subsidised prices for basic staples and energy will pay higher rates as controls 
are lifted.
- 5
Thus, conventional wisdom holds that the larger the share of the vote earned by 
the left, the more obstacles to initiating market-oriented reforms. However, evidence 
from the sample states challenges conventional wisdom. In West Bengal, for instance, it 
is under the leftist Left Front Parties, founded years earlier by B. C. Roy, which initiated 
and sustained orthodox reforms in the 1990s. In Maharashtra, the left received nearly 
thirty percent in assembly elections but Pawar still implemented orthodox reforms. By 
contrast, governments in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh in the 1980s and Haryana in the 
1980s-1990s experienced difficulties in adopting orthodox reforms despite their low 
degree of polarisation.
The findings for the proportion of IAS officers in policy-making positions are a 
mixed picture. Based on the regression model not taking autocorrelation into 
consideration, the IAS variable is statistically significant for the adoption of market- 
oriented reforms. In the AR(1) model, however, the variable is no longer statistically 
significant. Part of the reason for this discrepancy may be collinearity that exists
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between the proportion of the IAS variable and centralisation. With such a high degree 
of collinearity between regressors, the estimates become highly unstable with changes in 
the model specification.
There is a 0.567 correlation between centralisation and IAS variables. Empirical 
evidence also tends to support the importance of IAS officers for more orthodox policies, 
Leaders in Madhya Pradesh (Singh), Maharashtra (Pawar), Andhra Pradesh (Naidu), 
West Bengal (Basu), Karnataka (Deve Gowda and Krishna), and Haryana (Bhajan Lai 
and Om Prakash Chautala) initiated orthodox reforms following the appointment of IAS 
officers to key positions. By contrast, the governments in Uttar Pradesh (Kalyan Singh), 
Bihar (Laloo Prasad Yadav), and Kerala (Nayannar) appointed fewer IAS officers and 
their policy makers implemented more gradualist policies despite their often stated 
preferences for orthodox reforms.
Centralised executive authority is statistically significant. In virtually all cases 
that adopted orthodox reforms, a strong executive remained at the helm. In Madhya 
Pradesh (MP), veto and decree powers along with an electoral mandate enabled Digvijay 
Singh to implement a coherent orthodox program in the early 1990s that had eluded his 
predecessors. The abandonment of the Left Front pact between West Bengal's two main 
Communist parties strengthened the executive's hold by Jyoti Basu in the late 1980s - 
early 1990s.
The 1980 Andhra Pradesh legislation approved by voters under N.T. Rama Rao 
and his pliant Governors, greatly expanded executive authority for future governments. 
Karnataka's centralised government during the Congress (I) reign provided almost 
unlimited executive control over policy decisions. Maharashtra's is an exception in that 
its Chief Minister had relatively weak powers. However, Chief Minister Pawar used 
ordinance powers normally associated with the Governor to implement his economic 
program.
6.7 INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
The findings in this model suggest that political institutions are important for 
explaining the initiating and consolidating of extensive market-oriented reforms in India.
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Consistent with the findings of Haggard and Kaufman (1995) and Mainwairing and 
Shugart (1997), centralised executive authority is significant for the adoption of market 
reforms. More surprisingly, a high level of polarisation also promoted economic 
liberalisation. Contrary to conventional wisdom, greater popular support for leftist 
parties encouraged more orthodox reforms. Williamson's (1994) work on the role of 
bureaucrats is also partially supported by the findings with respect to IAS officers. IAS 
officers helped to promote market-oriented reforms in MP, Maharashtra, Andhra 
Pradesh (AP), West Bengal, Karnataka, and Haryana. The most advanced reformers in 
our sample operated under a powerful executive, with significant party polarisation, and 
a high proportion of trained bureaucrats in policy-making positions. The question, of 
course, is how does a powerful executive, high polarisation, and many trained 
bureaucrats promote the initiation and consolidation of orthodox measures?
This chapter develops an argument that admittedly, at places, is speculative. The 
work of Geddes (1994) may provide some useful insights into how these variables are 
linked. Geddes develops a model based on the political survival assumption that 
governmental leaders are most interested in achieving office and advancing their careers. 
From this generally accepted assumption, Geddes emphasises the importance of 
government actors, their interests, and their incentives for explaining attempts 
differences in economic policy choices. Her main argument is that political institutions 
shape the incentives of government actors as they attempt to satisfy their career interests.
Appointments to economic policy-making positions, like other decisions, are 
affected by leaders' concern with survival. Who political leaders choose as their 
economic policy makers impacts their career goals. It is assumed that leaders will 
appoint the best qualified policy makers who, on the basis of their training, are most 
knowledgeable about the policies that promote economic growth - usually a precondition 
for enhancing a leader's survival. However, as Geddes (1994) demonstrates, the most 
qualified policy makers are often not selected because of short-term political 
considerations.
To understand appointment strategies chosen by political leaders, it is necessary 
to examine differences in governing institutions and polarisation in the party system. 
Differences in governing institutions and party strength influence the appointment
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decisions of survival-minded political leaders. Political and institutional environments 
determine which policy makers will contribute most to the leader's political survival.
It is highly speculative, but one might argue that centralised executive authority 
provides governmental actors with the ability to appoint policy makers who favour 
market reforms. Unlike collegial executives that foster consensual agreement and 
compromise, usually not the ideal setting for unpopular policies, centralised executives 
hold greater autonomy in their policy choice. Centralised executive authority also limits 
access points for interest groups, which have one access point to lobby for change, 
namely the political leader. Leaders, of course, cannot wholly ignore societal interests, 
as they face electoral challenges. Centralised executive authority, however, confers 
greater autonomy on leaders in their appointment strategies.
The executive's interest in initiating these reforms is affected by the degree of 
party polarisation. Factional party pressures that enable "political outsiders" to take 
office are an important element for the appointment of officers and the marginalising of 
competitors. Often it is parties from the left that benefit most from a large state sector 
and highly protected economy. These parties historically rely on the state's political 
resources to provide jobs for their party workers. For the political outsider, whose party 
loyalists receive fewer perks from a large state, but whose rivals within their own party 
or in other left parties gain mightily, it makes sense to appoint budget-cutting officers.
Karnataka probably best exemplifies the appointment of officers to marginalise 
leftist rivals in one's own party. During his Chief Ministerial campaign, Deve Gowda 
crusaded for policies commonly endorsed by previous leaders like Bangarappa and 
Hegde, including government intervention in the economy and support for workers. 
Following his electoral victory in 1989, Deve Gowda appointed an economic team that 
not only attempted to calm investors but also served to marginalise the 
institutionalisation of the Janata Dal (JD). Deve Gowda, a former loyalist-tumed- 
opponent of Hegde and a relative political outsider, wanted to limit the 
institutionalisation and organisation of the JD and redesign it in his own image. Deve 
Gowda reduced party influence by appointing minor political figures connected 
personally to him or IAS officers committed to liberalising the economy.
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AP under Naidu is another example of efforts to marginalise the left from his 
party and weaken the rival left-of-centre parties. In 1988, the film icon turned actor N.T. 
Rama Rao (NTR) won an election that was marred by claims of electoral fraud from 
former leftist Telugu Desam Party (TDP) members who had formed their own party only 
a few years earlier. In addition, he also witnessed a bitter division within his own 
government between bureaucrats who favoured greater economic and political 
liberalisation and those who advocated state-led economic development and resisted 
liberalisation. Naidu used economic policy-making appointments to marginalise the old 
guard, the leftist TDP, and bolster his own faction. In fact, Naidu reduced to 
obsolescence and irrelevance the nationalist-populist wing in the TDP. Privatisation of 
state assets reduced patronage options used primarily by the old guard close to NTR and 
former TDP members now loyal to NTR's wife, Lakshmi Parvathi.
Similarly, in West Bengal, a centralised Chief Ministerial system (especially 
prior to the reforms of 1991) helped to marginalise the ultra-left wing of the Communist 
Party (Marxist). Basu secured the party's support despite opposition from established 
party leaders. Basu used his opportunity to initiate more substantial liberalisation than 
was supported by the leadership or rank and file of his party. He appointed non-Bengali 
IAS officers to consolidate his power and weaken his opponents.
Maharashtra under Congress and then Shiv Sena/BJP rule further suggests that 
centralised executive authority and political polarisation are important elements for the 
appointment of officers and the consolidation of power. Pawar, especially, used the 
power of appointments to consolidate his one-man rule and diminish the standing of his 
rivals in the party, like Antulay and others of the old guard. Pawar, who had previously 
repudiated market-oriented policies, appointed suitable advisors and officers to 
neutralise the arguments and strength of his rivals. Prior to their election, the Shiv 
Sena/BJP combine, famously "remote-controlled" by Bal Thackeray, had opposed 
reforms. However, they followed a route similar to Pawar once they assumed office. 
However, loss of a degree of centralisation due to the coalition nature of the government 
meant that that ministry was far less successful in economic management than Pawar.
Uttar Pradesh (UP), in contrast, exemplifies a government with a weak executive. 
Chief Minister Kalyan Singh, a BJP "consensus candidate", appointed a low proportion
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of IAS officers, and a very high proportion of state civil service officials. He failed to 
initiate the required market reforms. The institutional setting helps explain Singh's 
appointments. Singh was not the most powerful, or most popular, leader in the BJP. 
However, he was chosen as the only senior Backward Caste BJP leader, in order to 
diminish BJP's image as an upper caste party. Because of that, and also in order to 
weaken his upper caste rivals in the state BJP, Singh appointed Backward Caste 
candidates wherever he could find them. These were usually in the state civil service. 
The BSP Government of Kanshi Ram/Mayawati that followed just exacerbated this 
phenomenon. The weak executive in cases like these is invariably forced to include 
members from his or her own party faction in the cabinet; other factions in the party; and 
sometimes opposition parties. Governments with participants from the different parties 
contribute to compromise in decisions, including policy-making appointments, as they 
can block the executive's selections.
6.8 CONCLUSION
What factors help to explain differences in economic policy choices among 
democratic governments? In light of the analysis contained in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, it is 
ever more important to understand why some leaders initiated and sustained market- 
oriented reforms, while others did not. Despite the fact that nearly all Indian leaders have 
pledged their support for necessity of reforms in the late 1980s and 1990s, many did not 
install their preferred policies.
Our investigation of 10 Indian states from 1985 to 1997 suggests that centralised 
executive authority is important for the initiating and sustaining of orthodox market- 
oriented reforms, which corroborates the claims of Haggard and Kaufman (1995) and 
Mainwaring and Shugart (1997). The findings on the importance of IAS officers support 
Williamson's (1994) work on trained technocrats. However, the association between 
high political polarisation and orthodox reforms challenges the conventional wisdom 
that greater support for leftist parties impedes the adoption of market policies. Indeed, 
centralised executive authority, technocrats, and political polarisation are associated with 
more orthodox measures.
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Building on the work of Geddes (1994), this chapter has developed an argument 
to explain how these variables are linked. Based on the political survival assumption that 
governmental leaders are most interested in achieving office and advancing their careers, 
it contends that political institutions shape the incentives of government actors as they 
attempt to satisfy their career goals. Appointments to economic policy-making positions, 
like other decisions, are affected by leaders' concern with survival. Differences in 
governing institutions and rival party strength influence the appointment decisions of 
survival minded political leaders. In what is admittedly speculative, this chapter argues 
that centralised executive authority provides governmental actors with greater autonomy 
in their policy choice and appointment strategies.
The executive's interest in initiating these reforms is affected by the degree of 
party polarisation. Factional party pressures that allowed "political outsiders" to win 
office are an important element for the appointment of officers and the marginalising of 
leftist competitors. Parties from the left, who use the state's political resources to provide 
jobs for their party workers, are generally the main beneficiaries from a large state sector 
and highly protected economy. For the political outsider, whose party loyalists received 
fewer perks from a large state, it made sense to appoint budget cutting advisor, e.g. 
Naidu.
Empirical work substantiated the claim that in systems with centralised executive 
rule, "political outsiders" were most likely to appoint IAS officers in order to 
marginalise their more entrenched rivals from inside their party. In Maharashtra (Pawar), 
Karnataka (Deve Gowda and Krishna), West Bengal (Basu), and Andhra Pradesh 
(Naidu), leaders used economic liberalisation to marginalise support for their rivals. In 
states without centralised executive rule or without political polarisation, and whose 
leaders did or didn't pay lip service to reforms (Singh in UP; Yadav in Bihar; Lai and 
Chautala in Haryana), the governments failed in their attempts to initiate their preferred 
policies.
More research is needed to understand the main factors that influence economic policy 
choice. Cross-regional work that tests the political and economic factors most commonly 
used to explain differences in policy choice is also imperative. Although it may be too 
soon to dismiss claims that a dominant executive is important for the implementation of
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orthodox reforms, other factors including political polarisation and bureaucratic 
influence also merit scholarly attention.
This chapter is only the beginning of a piece of work that must be taken much further.
In this chapter, we have merely initiated a thought process about the incentives to reform 
among Indian states. More detailed work on this topic is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
but will definitely be carried out at the post-doctoral stage.
*  *
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Cabinet approves amendment to Industrial Disputes Act
As part o f the much debated radical labour reforms, the Government on Friday 
conditionally approved discussions on a legal provision that would allow easier closure 
and lay-off o f workers in economically unviable units employing upto 1000persons.
The Cabinet which met here on Friday conditionally approved amendments to the 
Industrial Disputes Act 1947 to allow companies employing upto 1000persons, as 
against the existing limit o f 100, to retrench workers without getting the government 
permission.
However, the other major labour reform measure to amend the Contract Labour Act has 
not yet been cleared as the matter has been referred to a Group o f Ministers, an official 
spokesperson told reporters.
The Hindustan Times 
New Delhi, 22-02-2002
Labour on
It is well-known that Labour Minister Sharad Yadav was reluctant to moot the proposal 
to amend the Industrial Disputes Act to bring about labour law reforms on Friday. He 
was worried that the move may hurt his socialist image. He had even suggested an all­
party meeting before bringing in changes.
Just to show how reluctant he was, the minister had put forward arguments against the 
reforms in the group o f ministers' meetings earlier. He naturally could not oppose it at 
the cabinet meeting — it was, after all, his proposal.
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While Yashwant Sinha and the two Aruns, Jaitley and Shourie, were in favour o f  
changes, Pramod Mahajan, Sushma Swaraj and L.K. Advani were against.
Ultimately, it was Advani who came to the rescue. He reportedly suggested a middle 
path with the result that the cabinet accepted the reforms in principle — without any 
deadline! So it seems this reforms have been designated to the proverbial back-burner 
yet agin!
The Economic Times 
25-02-2002
Millions strike over economic reforms
NEW DELHI: Nearly 10 million employees o f state-run companies staged a one-day 
strike on Tuesday to protest economic reforms, shutting factories and banks and 
virtually paralysing financial markets and ports, unions said.
The strike was a fresh blow to the controversy-racked Hindu nationalist-led ruling 
coalition, at a time when economists are increasingly doubtful about its ability to push 
through economic reforms, especially labour reforms.
The stoppage followed cabinet approval o f changes to a 55-year-old law making it 
easier to lay off employees that is slated to be introduced in the current parliamentary 
session.
Unions fear the reforms will lead to big job losses in a country where there is no social 
security net.
"These policies are not in the interest o f workers. They have undermined the social 
security o f labour by thoughtless privatisation o f assets built over decades, ” Union 
leader W. Varadarajan said. "It's like selling the family silver to pay the butler."
Reuters [ Tuesday, April 16,2002 ]
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It is evident that not much has changed in the past few years since this thesis was 
begun. In fact, labour reforms remain as intractable an issue today as they were in 1991.
7.1 CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The objective of this thesis was to explain the evolution of the labour regulatory 
system in India, to assess the impact of job security regulations on employment and 
equity, and to analyse the reasons for labour policy reform being so difficult in a 
democracy like India.
In order to achieve this, we used a multi-pronged political economy approach, 
combining detailed historical and institutional analysis with fairly simple straightforward 
econometric analysis using four datasets.
To reiterate, this thesis asked the following questions:
• What are the foundations of labour legislation, especially employment 
protection/job security legislation in India? How can we best situate the 
evolution of labour regulations in the larger context of the evolution of the 
political economy of India over the last half century or more?
• What is the impact/folf^security regulations in India? How do we explain our 
results?
• Can we rank the different Indian states in order of strictness of job security 
regulations?
• If yes, then can we analyse a state-wise impact of differing levels of job-security 
regulations in different Indian states?
• If yes, then what are some of the political economy variables that could explain 
the differing success in achieving job security deregulation by different states of 
the same Indian Union?
Each chapter of this thesis is connected with the other, but is also supposed to be
a self-contained whole, in that it has a section on objectives of the chapter at the
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beginning, and a section on the conclusions of the chapter at the end. Below, we 
repeat the aims and conclusions of each chapter, thus re-telling the story that we 
have told in the previous six chapters so far.
7.2 OBJECTIVES AND CONCLUSIONS OF CHAPTERS
Chapter 2 traced the Evolution of Job Security Regulation In India. It
pointed out that, as in many other developing countries, the labour market in India is 
characterised by a large pool of ill-paid workers in insecure employment who are de 
facto unprotected by law, coexisting with a small unionised segment holding relatively 
secure, career-oriented jobs. It has often been suggested that in a situation of 
superfluous labour, stringent provisions of labour laws and power of trade unions 
together are to be blamed for the effort on the part of employers to avoid hiring regular 
employees and (to the extent possible) have the work done through subcontracting or by 
casual workers—efficiency wage theories notwithstanding (Mathur, 1989; 1991a; 1991b; 
1992; 1993a; 1993b). Available Indian data in recent times do indeed show such a rise 
in such insecure employment, both in absolute and in relative terms, although it may be 
difficult a priori to ascribe any specific portion of that rise to the factors mentioned 
above.
While the quantification of such effects is useful, it is equally important to 
decipher whether such phenomena, to the extent they exist, are socially acceptable, if not 
on moral at least on pragmatic grounds (Datta Chaudhri, 1994). For if they indeed are 
acceptable, enacting laws alone will not amount to much. The issue has to be analysed 
in the context of the complex pattern of inter-linkages between the social and political 
foundations of labour legislation in the country as well as its moral and ethical roots.
Also important is the manner in which public opinion is moulded in matters of what is 
ethical and what is practicable. Even more important are the connections between the 
two in popular belief, the linkages between social sanction and judicial decisions, and 
the actual operation of labour laws in the context of a highly fragmented labour market 
(Holmstrom, 1961; Solow, 1990).
During the course of this chapter, we discussed the inter-linkages between wages, 
earnings and terms of employment in India. We also discussed the philosophical
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foundations of labour legislation in India, and highlighted the implications of it labour 
legislation being the result of altruism from above, rather than hard-fought concessions 
from below. We then discussed the linkages between labour law and society and polity 
in India. We analysed the question: what do labour rigidities really mean for the Indian 
case, with its highly segmented market containing a small protected “rigid” section and 
very large and increasingly unprotected segments for the rest of the labour force. We 
then provided an exhaustive discussion of job security in India.
We carried that discussion forward by providing a history of job security 
regulation in India. We then moved forward from the chronological evolution of job 
security regulation, to the legislative evolution of job security regulation in India. We 
then discussed various issues related with the implementation of such regulations. We 
then provided a discussion about job security, labour flexibility and employment. We 
also speculated about how much security can and do job security regulations actually 
provide, thus setting the stage for Chapter 3, where qualitative fieldwork research is 
presented.
Chapter 2 concluded that, as most writers agree, that job security for industrial 
workers in the organised sector has been a major concern in India for perfectly 
understandable reasons. The colonial history of India generated a perception that 
industrial workers were victims of exploitation and needed state support. In the early 
post-colonial period, employment optimism was in the air and it seemed right to create 
ideal type of jobs in modem industries. A high degree of employment security also 
seemed quite consistent with the protectionist, import-substitutive industrialisation 
strategy which India adopted. “Employment security, moreover, was viewed as an 
instrument of guaranteeing income security to workers in an economy where no state- 
sponsored social security system existed.” (Ghose, 1996, p. 101).
Originally, the job security regulations were meant to protect industrial workers 
in large establishments. Legal interpretation, however, held virtually all large scale 
organised activities to be industries and thus widened the coverage of the regulations 
very substantially. The result is that industrial workers actually constitute a small and 
dwindling proportion of the employees benefiting from the regulations.
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There is little doubt that the job security regulations gave rise to a number of problems 
whose harmful effects were absorbed principally by industries and industrial workers.
As ILO (1996) points out, in the first place, they had a negative effect on growth of 
employment in organised industries and thus hampered the process of improvement of 
employment conditions in the economy as a whole. Second, they led to the accumulation 
of surplus labour in the organised sector. Third, they turned industrial disputes into 
political issues. Finally, they obstructed development of healthy industrial relations and 
collective bargaining systems at enterprise level.
The recent economic reforms have both undermined the basis of the implicit contracts 
on which the employment security system rested and brought into sharp focus the need 
for labour adjustment. Delicensing and trade liberalisation have stimulated price 
competition thus making it difficult to pass on the costs of employment security to 
consumers. Cost adjustment, of which labour adjustment is a part, has thus assumed 
importance. These developments also necessitate industrial restructuring which requires 
labour reallocation across industries. And what is important to realise is that these 
developments are not of once-for-all variety; in an open economy, they will be 
characteristic features. Rethinking the job security system has clearly become necessary.
In Chapter 3, we presented insights gained from (i) the Bombay Labour Flexibility 
Surveys, carried out in the late 1980s, and again in mid-1990s by myself and others; and 
(ii) qualitative research and fieldwork conducted by myself at the firm level in Bombay, 
Pune and Delhi during 1995-98. We also included selected excerpts from interviews 
carried out with representatives of both employer and employee associations. This 
chapter forms a precursor to Chapters 4, 5 and 6, which provide the results of 
quantitative analysis carried out on both primary and secondary data. We aimed to show 
that only a minute elite— in general better educated, male and more skilled—benefit 
from the plethora of labour laws, especially job security regulations. The majority of the 
labour force is increasingly casualised, and spends its working life in insecure, and 
often inhumane, conditions. Labour laws do not seem to be helping the large majority of 
the labour force. Throughout this chapter, we worked with and referred to interviews, 
personal observations and secondary data collected exclusively for the labour flexibility 
surveys.
204
Chapter 3 concluded by saying that the basic purpose of the surveys and our related 
largely qualitative primary research was to find out how employers cope with industrial 
relations systems and protective legislation both of which are alleged to have reduced 
their flexibility in adjusting their labour costs and work force to changes in product 
demand. This loss of flexibility, if true, is a matter of great concern in India because 
much of the stagnation in employment is attributed to it. Attempts have been made to 
support the allegations empirically drawing on the ASI data disaggregated at best to 
3-digit level. This is useful but not enough because whether employers possess or lack 
flexibility is likely to be revealed in an enterprise survey rather than in the industry 
aggregates reported by the ASI. To meet the challenge to unions and state intervention 
squarely, the research was largely restricted to Bombay where union movement is 
stronger and labour legislation is applied more effectively.
The review of macro level data revealed a substantial increase in shares of 
insecure labour categories in manufacturing employment. This informalisation of what is 
traditionally considered formal employment took place along with the growth, absolute 
and relative, of the traditional informal employment. Rates of unemployment were high 
particularly among the young entrants to the labour force. Registered unemployment, 
deficient in many ways, increased fast. Taken together, the macro level evidence showed 
that the labour market became conducive to adoption of flexible labour practices, but at 
a cost to the majority of the labour force.
Analysis of micro, firm level data showed that employers varied total 
employment, manual and non-manual taken together found that firms which experienced 
an increase in demand increased employment and it was the medium and the large firm, 
supposedly constrained by unions and protective legislation, that increased it more than 
the small firm did with all the flexibility at its command. As predicted by micro theory, 
firms that increased fixed capital per worker reduced employment and so did others 
which experienced a rise in share of labour cost. Importantly, it is the firm which 
increased the share of non-permanent labour that increased total employment. Changes 
in manual employment were associated directly not only with changes in share of 
non-permanent but also with those in shares of female and contract labour.
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We discussed the factors that influence levels of and changes in employment of 
flexible labour categories. Firms which increased capital intensity reduced employment 
of flexible labour be it non-permanent, casual, contract, female or the all-inclusive 
non-regular labour. Employers who reported their labour cost had increased as a share of 
variable cost, reported a higher share of non-permanent labour particularly, casual labour. 
In contrast, such employers reported proportionately fewer contract and women workers.
The supposition that, larger firms resorted increasingly to flexibilisation of 
labour was also borne out in respect of non-permanent labour but not in that of casual 
labour and female labour while the labour flexibility survey lacked data to test it in 
respect of contract labour. The surveys also found that unions were less likely to exist in 
firms that reported a higher share of non-permanent labour in particular and a higher 
share of other flexible labour in general but the generalised relationship was not 
statistically significant. Flexible labour being difficult to organise, the lower probability 
of union presence in firms reporting higher shares of flexible labour is quite 
understandable. Unions discouraged employment of non-permanent and non-regular 
labour. Unionised firms reported lower share of female labour but greater increase in it 
over the previous years. They also reported a greater increase in the share of casual 
labour. This behaviour of unions could be rationalised pragmatically. Casual labour 
could be given permanency later with the help of the law. It could also be that unions did 
not mind employers hiring flexible labour so long as they did not hire them in 
threateningly large numbers. Unions contributed to dynamic efficiency of the firms by 
encouraging technological change and widening of product range.
Having established from the detailed examination of the conclusions of the two Labour 
Flexibility Surveys, and of the insights gained from my own interviews, we established 
what seemed to be a trend for increasing casualisation, informalisation and insecurity. 
This leads us to strongly suspect that as hypothesised by Basu, Fields and Debgupta 
(2000) and also suggested above,job security regulations tend to hurt the large majority 
of the labour force. We next tested this hypothesis in Chapter 4.
At the beginning of Chapter 4, we reiterated the conclusions in the previous 
chapter that labour regulations have a selective impact. While giving protection to a tiny 
minority of the labour force, they actually lead to large scale informalisation for the
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majority of the work force, thus pushing them into insecure employment, which is badly 
paid and low skilled.
In order to assess the impact of labour market reforms on the poor, it was 
necessary to determine the impact of labour market regulations on labour market 
outcomes. The chapter aimed to do so. It first carried out a simple probit analysis on 
household level socio-economic data collected by the NSS of India. It found that as a 
suspected in Chapter 3, not all categories of labour benefit equally from the job 
protection offered through job security regulations. In general, high human capital, 
educated male workers working for larger firms seemed to comer any protection offered 
by employers, while all other overlapping categories, including low human capital, 
young and female workers worked in a variety of insecure jobs.
The chapter than carried out a simple OLS analysis on firm-level data collected 
by CMIE. Although the analysis was simple, the results were striking. We found that 
job security regulations hurt employment growth in all categories. This is a more 
powerful result than the partial equilibrium result discussed in the previous paragraph. 
Not only do job security regulations advantage certain categories of labour, thus 
cementing labour market segmentation, but they also have a negative overall economic 
by reducing employment in all categories. This means that the growth in regular 
employment is almost nil, while even casual employment in the organised sector (which 
offers better pay and conditions than employment in the unorganised sector and in 
agriculture), declines significantly when the cost of job security regulations rises. Thus, 
even from a general equilibrium point of view, labour regulations are harmful to labour.
In Chapter 5, we aimed to carry out a detailed state-level analysis of the 
national-level findings contained in Chapter 4. We first used the framework constructed 
by Montenegro and Pages (1999) to construct a job security index for twenty four of the 
twenty five Indian states. We then ranked these states according to the strictness of their 
job security regulations. After that, we used the analysis provided in Heckman and 
Pages (2001) to analyse the impact of this variability in job security regulations.
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We found that even a simple OLS estimation gave us highly significant results. 
We found that job security regulations affect almost all categories of employment in a 
significantly negative way, while they affect all categories of unemployment in a 
significantly positive way. This analysis further confirmed the general equilibrium 
conclusion we drew in Chapter 4, that job security regulations hurt labour by reducing 
employment and increasing unemployment in almost all categories. We suspect this is 
due to the negative effect they have on inward investment, although we have not done a 
rigorous econometric analysis of this causality in this thesis.
What lessons can be drawn from these results? Our evidence suggests that job 
security provisions are an extremely inefficient and inequality-increasing mechanism for 
providing either income security or earnings equity to workers. They are inefficient 
because they reduce the demand for labour; they are inequality-increasing because some 
workers benefit while many more are hurt. Their impact on inequality is comprehensive: 
Job security increases inequality because it reduces the employment prospects of young, 
female, uneducated and unskilled workers—the most vulnerable group. It also increases 
inequality because it segments the labour market between workers with secure jobs and 
workers with very few prospects of ever having a “good” job, with any amount of 
minimum wage and conditions. Finally, job security provisions increase inequality if, 
as predicted by some theoretical studies and most of the available empirical evidence, 
they increase the size of the informal sector. We have seen evidence of this both from 
the qualitiative and quantitative work presented in Chapters 3,4 and 5.
Having established the negative impact of job security regulations on labour and 
employment in the previous three chapters, Chapter 6, asked the question: What factors 
help to explain differences in labour (and other) economic policy choices among these 
state-level democratic governments? It outlines the different arguments in the political 
economy literature that offer answers to this question. Subsequently, this chapter tests 
the applicability of these arguments to ten state governments in India, from 1985-1997, 
to explain why these states differ in their degree of market openness. These states make 
for useful comparisons. Since the 1980s, they have varied widely in their ability to 
initiate and sustain market reforms despite the fact that most of their policy makers and 
governmental leaders have pledged their support for more orthodox reforms.
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Using a Time-Series Cross-Sectional (TSCS) data set, this chapter constructs a 
model of policy choice for the ten states. It includes a number of variables that represent 
political and economic constraints on policy choice. The findings suggest that a 
centralised executive and a highly polarised party system are important for initiating and 
sustaining more orthodox policies. A centralised executive provides leaders with 
opportunities to install their preferred policies. The degree of polarisation affects the 
executive's policy preferences toward orthodox policies. A highly polarised system may 
encourage executives to use the appointment of bureaucrats, who favour neo-liberal 
policies as a strategy to bolster their political survival.
7.3 AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY POST SCRIPT
In this section we provide a post script from institutional theory to the analysis 
contained in Chapter 6, thus discussing possible areas in which we may be able to 
continue the research begun in this thesis. The economic analysis of political 
phenomena has always been proposed as a partial theory. It is a story about sources of 
bias away from an outcome that would result from a hypothetical unbiased aggregation 
of citizen preferences. One should bear in mind that citizens engage in political 
participation for a host of reasons unrelated to their association with organised interests 
and have strongly held views about policy that are not related to their sources of income 
and their major personal consumption expenditures. Hence, a factor that may affect the 
pace of and commitment to regulatory reform is changes in other political issues that 
have a spill over effect on regulation.
The difficulty with drawing conclusions about specific policies from general 
political trends is that to do so assumes that the shift in public political attitudes is more 
or less uniform across all issues. Poll data indicate that such is not the case. The extent to 
which citizens express agreement with "reform" or deregulatory policies varies 
enormously across policy issues. One policy that still commands a large majority of 
support is labour regulation. Whereas that support does not imply that labour regulation 
cannot be significantly reformed, it does mean that elected politicians take a political 
risk if a reform is perceived as a significant threat to employment protection.
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To our knowledge, no long-term polling data exist for most other specific areas 
of regulation, and in any event, regardless of public opinion, most specific areas of 
regulation are not particularly salient to most voters. Indeed, the general lack of 
significant public interest in specific areas of regulation is the basis for the economic 
theory of regulation, which emphasises capture by organised interests at the expense of 
citizens in general. Consequently, to incorporate general political trends into the analysis, 
one must look for more specific issues that have some direct bearing on regulation but 
that are more general than any specific area of regulation.
One such issue is the increased emphasis in recent years on greater devolution of 
policy responsibilities to state and local government. The federal structure of the Indian 
government is very unusual, and the consensus view among political scientists is that a 
system in which different levels of government exercise significant, independent power 
is probably not stable.
The logic of the conclusion is that if the national or state government possesses 
the legal authority to control a policy, the factions that control the national or state 
government will insist on using that authority to force lower governments to adhere to 
the policy that is favoured at the national level.
In the history of the Indian Union, the role of states has ebbed and flowed in all 
policy areas, including regulation. Although the Nehruvian and Indira-Rajiv Gandhi 
periods are regarded as ones in which considerable power was centralised in the national 
government, most constitutional statutes are generally deferential to the states. For 
example, states have been given important roles in implementing nearly all social 
programs—education, health, and labour policy.
The dilemma posed by the trend toward more state and local authority is that 
devolution can work against regulatory reform, as illustrated by the discussions of labour 
deregulation and some product market deregulation. State and local governments are 
subject to the same kinds of representation biases as the Union government, but in the 
former case one additional bias is present: the absence of an incentive to be politically 
responsive to organised groups in other areas that sell within the state or local 
jurisdiction. Whereas state governments are generally prohibited from erecting barriers
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to interstate trade, they are relatively free to use regulation to discriminate against people 
from other jurisdictions. An excellent example is a practice only recently attacked in 
taxation—the practice of octroi.
Regulatory reform generally has gained more political momentum in the Union 
government, most likely because a source of political benefits from regulation is 
available to state authorities—discrimination against residents and businesses from other 
jurisdictions—that are not available to Central officials. Thus, if a state government 
essentially reflects the mixture of economic interests of the central government, it will be, 
on balance, less likely to undertake reform. Of course, that conclusion does not mean 
that all states and localities oppose reform, or even that all are less reform-minded than 
the central government. If a state contains an unusually large concentration of well- 
organised groups that advocate reform, those groups may be more successful in their 
home state than in New Delhi. But, on balance, lower levels of government are likely to 
be more parochial, thus leading to greater use of regulation to benefit local 
constituencies.
One of the as yet inadequately resolved issues in institutional economics in the context 
of underdevelopment is why dysfunctional institutions often persist for a long time—the central 
question that we have been analysing. Unlike the followers of the property rights school, who 
often displayed a naive presumption of the survival of the 'fittest' institution, either of the two 
strands of institutional economics (as identified in Bardhan 1989a) are quite clear in not 
ascribing optimality properties to the institutions as (Nash) equilibrium outcomes. North 
(1990), Bardhan (1989* and 190^1), and others have pointed to the self-reinforcing mechanisms 
for the persistence of socially suboptimal institutions when path-dependent processes are at 
work. Borrowing an idea from the literature on the history of technological change, they point 
out that there are increasing returns to adoption of a particular institutional form — when, the 
more it is adopted, the more it is attractive or convenient for the others to conform on account of 
infrastructural and network externalities, learning and coordination effects, and adaptive 
expectations — and a path chosen by some initial adopters to suit their interests may ‘lock in’ the 
whole system for a long time to come, denying later, maybe potentially more appropriate, 
institutions a footing (Bardhan, 1989a, p.8).
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In this path-dependent process North, more than others, has emphasised how the 
interaction between the ‘mental models’ the members of a society possess and the incentive 
structure provided by the institutions shapes incremental change. The path-dependent process is 
also made mor^ complicated by the frequent cases of unintended consequences in history. More 
than a century ^^M enger (1883) made a distinction between ‘pragmatic’ and ‘organic’ 
institutions. The former are the direct outcome of conscious contractual design — as in the 
institutional models in the theory of imperfect information or transaction cost -- while the latter, 
like in Menger’s theory of the origin of money, are comparatively undesigned, and they evolve 
gradually as the unintended and unforeseeable result of the pursuit of individual interests. Elster 
(1989) has referred to intermediate cases, where an institution may have originally come about 
unintended, but agents when they become eventually aware of the function an institution serves 
for them, consciously try to preserve it from then on.
Bardhan (19^9, p. 10) contends that the political stumbling blocks to beneficial 
institutional change in many poor countries may have more to do with distributive conflicts and 
asymmetries in bargaining power. He points out that the “old” institutional economists 
(including Marxists) used to point out how a given institutional arrangement serving the 
interests of some powerful group or class acts as a long-lasting barrier (or ‘fetter’, to quote a 
favourite word of Marx) to economic progress. As has been suggested in Bardhan (190J9) and 
Knight (1992), the new institutional economists sometimes understate the tenacity of vested 
interests, the enormity of the collective action problem in bringing about institutional change, 
and the differential capacity of different social groups in mobilisation and coordination. The 
collective action problem can be serious even when the change would be Pareto-superior for all 
groups. There are two kinds of collective action problems involved: one is the well-known free­
rider problem about sharing the costs of bringing about change, the other is a bargaining 
problem where disputes about sharing the potential benefits from the change may lead to a 
breakdown of the necessary coordination. There are cases where an institution, which nobody 
individually likes, persists as a result of a mutually sustaining network of social sanctions when 
each individual conforms out of fear of loss of reputation from disobedience.5 Potential 
members of a breakaway coalition in such situations may have grounds to fear that it is doomed 
to failure, and failure to challenge the system can become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
5 For a well-known static analysis of such a case, see Akerlof (1984). For a more complex model in terms of 
stochastic dynamic games explaining evolution of local customs or conventions, see Young (1998).
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The problem may be more acute when, which is the case with regulatory reform, there 
are winners and losers from a productivity-enhancing institutional change. The costs of 
collective action of such a change may be too high. This is particularly the case, as we know 
from Olson (1965), when the losses of the potential losers are concentrated and transparent, 
while gains of the potential gainers are diffuse (or uncertain for a given individual, even though 
not for the group, as suggested by Fernandez and Rodrik (1992)). There is also the inherent 
difficulty, emphasised by Dixit and Londregan (1995), that the potential gainers cannot credibly 
commit to compensate the losers ex post. There is the fear losers have that once they give up an 
existing institution, they may lose the locus standi in lobbying with a future government when 
the promises are not kept (‘exit’ from a current institutional arrangement damaging their ‘voice’ 
in the new regime in future), and so they resist a change today that is potentially Pareto- 
improving (in the sense that the gainers could compensate the losers).
One can also formalise the obstruction by vested interests in terms of a simple 
Nash bargaining model, where the institutional innovation may shift the bargaining 
frontier outward (thus creating the potential for all parties to gain), but in the process the 
disagreement payoff of the weaker party may also go up (often due to better options of 
both ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ that institutional changes may bring in their wake), and it is 
possible for the erstwhile stronger party to end up losing in the new bargaining 
equilibrium (how likely this is will, of course, depend on the nature of shift in the 
bargaining frontier and the extent of change in the disagreement payoffs) (Bardhan,
19f>- ft or ^  ,
Employment security legislation, as it exists today, is a classic example of inefficient 
institutions persisting as the lopsided outcome of distributive struggles. In India, as we have 
shown, the empirical evidence suggests that these legislations actually harm labour by reducing 
the demand for well-paid, secure, formal employment, while increasing resort to sub-optimal 
ways of escaping the legislative consequences. As a result, both employers and employees lose 
out. Human capital formation is hurt. Employers lose out on economies of scale gains, 
productivity gains resulting from skill enhancement, and in the failure to move their investment 
to the latest technology and/or more profitable avenues of investment. Employees lose out as 
they remain prey to exploitative labour contractors, and remain trapped in a vicious cycle of low 
productivity, low wage, low skill insecure jobs for life. And the state loses out, both in terms of
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lost revenue, as well as loans that have to be written off as firms declare sickness and 
bankruptcy, and are compulsorily taken over by the State.
Yet the tortuous history of labour reform in many countries suggests, for the Indian case, 
that there are numerous road blocks on the way to a more efficient reallocation of labour rights 
put up by vested interests for generations. Why don't the large employers voluntarily supply 
more skill oriented secure jobs, which are productivity enhancing, and use labour-intensive 
technology, so that they can and grab much of the surplus arising from this efficient 
reallocation? There clearly has been some reform in this area, but problems of monitoring, 
insecurity of job tenure and the employer's fear that the employee will acquire too many rights 
on the firm have limited efficiency gains and the extent of true job security for the vast majority 
of insecure informal labour. The labour market has been particularly thin for formal jobs (and 
in many cases, the gains go the opposite way, from distressed insecure labour to contractors and 
money-lenders). With low household savings and severely imperfect credit markets, the 
potentially more efficient informal labourer is often incapable of affording the going market 
price of a "good job".
Trade unions resist labour reforms because the levelling effects reduce their social and 
political power and their ability to control and dominate even non-labour issues. Large (and 
often overlapping) memberships of trade unions, confined to the tiny labour aristocracy, may 
give their leaders special social status or political power in a lumpy way (so that the status or 
political effect from having 100 members, with the power of patronage that this entails, given 
that a much larger number is baying at the citadel doors for entry into this select elite, is larger 
than the combined status or political effect accruing to 1000 new members, if it means that the 
power of patronage declines). Thus the social or political rent of union leadership for the large 
unions will not be compensated by the membership of the numerous members, with more secure 
jobs than they had before, but less secure jobs than were previously guaranteed by the present 
EPL. Under the circumstances the former will not be ready for any reform, and inefficient (in a 
productivity sense, not in terms of the Pareto criterion) labour markets persist.
Much depends also on the nature of political competition and the context-specific and 
path-dependent formations of political coalitions. An important aspect of political rent, that is 
overlooked in the usual calculations of the surplus generated by a given institutional change, is 
that all sides are really interested in relative, rather than absolute, gain or loss. In a power game,
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as in a winner-take-all contest or tournament, it is not enough for an institutional change to 
increase the surplus for all parties concerned to be acceptable. One side may gain absolutely, 
and yet may lose relative to the other side, and thus may resist change. If, in a repeated 
framework, both sides have to continue to spend resources in seeking (or preserving) power or 
improving their bargaining position in future, and if the marginal return from spending such 
resources for one party is an increasing function of such spending by the other party (i.e. power 
seeking efforts by the two parties are ‘strategic complements’), it is easy to see why the relative 
gain from an institutional change may be the determining factor in its acceptability (Bardhan, 
i m  i2).6
If distributive conflicts constitute an important factor behind the persistence of 
dysfunctional institutions, they also make collective action difficult at the level of the Central 
Government (for example, in its coordinating of macro-economic policy) and at the level of 
State governments and state-level community organisations (for example, in the enactment and 
implementation of EPL). At the macro level collective action is necessary in formulating 
cohesive developmental goals with clear priorities and avoiding prisoner’s dilemma-type 
deadlocks in the pursuit of commonly agreed upon goals. When wealth distribution is relatively 
egalitarian, as in large parts of East Asia (particularly through land reforms and widespread 
expansion of education and basic health services), it has been somewhat easier to enlist the 
support of most social groups (and isolate the extreme political wings of the labour movement) 
in making short-run sacrifices at times of macroeconomic crises and coordinating on 
stabilisation and growth-promoting policies (Bardhan, 19fiJ9). There is some cross-country 
evidence (Rodrik, 1998) that inequality and other forms of polarisation make it more difficult to 
build a consensus about policy changes in response to crises and result in instability of policy 
outcomes and insecurity of property and contractual rights.
The contrast with India is instructive in this respect. When society is extremely 
heterogeneous and conflict-ridden as in India and no individual group is powerful enough to 
hijack the state by itself, the democratic process tends to install an elaborate system of checks 
and balances in the public sphere and meticulous rules of equity in sharing the spoils at least 
among the divided elite groups. (For an analysis of the continuing fiscal crisis and
6 For a model o f power-seeking on these lines to explain why two parties may not agree to obviously mutually 
advantageous transactions, even when there are simple enforceable contracts and side transfers o f fungible resources 
to implement them, see Raj an and Zingales (1999).
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developmental gridlock in India as an intricate collective action problem in an implicit 
framework of non-cooperative Nash equilibria, see Bardhan (1984,1989). There may be what 
sociologists call ‘institutionalised suspicion’ in the internal organisation of such a state and a 
carefully structured system of multiple veto powers.
The tightly integrated working relationship of government with private business that 
characterises much of East Asia is very difficult to contemplate in this context. In the Indian 
context of a plurality of contending heterogeneous groups a close liaison and harmonising of the 
interests of the state with private business would raise an outcry of foul play and strong political 
resentment among the other interest groups (particularly among organised labour and farmers), 
the electoral repercussions of which the Indian politicians can afford to ignore much less than 
the typical East Asian politician. It is difficult for the ruling groups in India to have what Olson 
(1982) called an ‘encompassing interest’ (i.e. a structure that can internalise the distortions 
caused by its own policies). In general at the level of the macro political economy, inefficient 
and uncoordinated state interventionism (which is usually the villain in the schematic scenario 
of public choice theory) is often a symptom of deeper conflicts in society.
Below the aggregative or macro level, even more acute is the institutional failure at the 
state level, and this is often ignored in the broad state-versus-market debates. On grounds of 
leaving decision-making in the hands of those who have information which outsiders lack and 
increasing the flexibility of public programmes with respect to local conditions, the case for 
devolution of authority to state governments is very strong, but, apart from the usual 
administrative problems, a major problem that hinders most schemes of devolved governance is 
related to distributive conflicts. In areas of high social and economic inequality, the problem of 
‘capture’ of the state governing agencies by the local elite can be severe, and the poor and the 
weaker sections of the population may be left grievously exposed to their mercies and their 
malfeasance.
The central government can also be ‘captured’, but there are many reasons why the 
problem may be more serious at the state level. For example, there are certain fixed costs of
7 See Bardhan and Mookheijee (1998) for a theoretical framework for appraising the various trade-offs involved in 
delegating authority to a central bureaucracy as opposed to an elected local government, for delivery o f public 
services from the point of view of targeting and cost-effectiveness of public spending programmes in developing 
countries.
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organising resistance groups or lobbies: as a result, the poor may sometimes be more 
unorganised at the state level than at the national level where they can pool their organising 
capacities. Similarly, collusions among the elite groups may be easier at the state level than at 
the national level. Policy making at the national level may represent greater compromise among 
the policy platforms of different parties, and so on. In the cases where state government is 
captured by the powerful and the wealthy, instances of subordinate groups appealing to supra- 
local authorities for protection and relief are not uncommon.
In general, contrary to the presumption of much of mainstream economics, there need 
not always be a trade-off between equality and efficiency, as is now recognised in the literature 
on imperfect information and transaction costs. The terms and conditions of contracts in 
various transactions that directly affect the efficiency of resource allocation crucially depend on 
who owns what and who is empowered to make which decisions. Institutional structures and 
opportunities for cooperative problem-solving are often foregone by societies that are sharply 
divided along economic lines.
Barriers faced by the poor in the capital markets (through a lack of collateralisable assets 
which borrowers need to improve the credibility of their commitment) and in the labour market 
(where the labour aristocracy hogs the endowments of security and benefits) sharply reduce a 
society's potential for productive investment, innovation and human resource development. 
Under the circumstances, if the state, even if motivated by considerations of improving its 
political support base, carries out redistributive reform, some of it may go toward increasing 
productivity, enhancing credibility of commitments on the part of the asset-poor and creating 
socially more efficient property rights. Even the accountability mechanisms for checking state 
abuse of power at the local level work better when the poor have more of a stake in the asset 
base of the local economy. On the other hand, the state in trying to correct inequities has to be 
careful about incentive compatibility issues and its own political and administrative limitations.
It is thus very probable that the state-level variations seen in this and the previous 
chapter can be explained by this institutional analysis. As Harriss (1999) persuasively argues," 
it would seem perfectly sensible to compare Indian states as democratic regimes" (p. 4). He 
further argues that "There are differences between states in terms of the extent of industrial 
development, and hence in the development of both the industrial bourgeoisie and the working 
class. These differences may then be reflected, in turn, in variations in the nature and the extent
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of political mobilisation, and of organisation in civil society, both of which are likely to be very 
significantly influenced, in the Indian context, by caste and other ethnic identities. These 
political differences may exercise a significant influence on the functioning of the various 
(state-level) 'state systems'. This is one level of comparison, therefore, which we might describe 
as 'structural'. Another is that of'regime' in the sense, rather, of'government'." (p. 4)
Kohli (1987) also says, "Variations in regional distributive outcomes ... are a 
function of the regime controlling political power. Regime type, in turn -  at least in the 
case of India -  closely reflects the nature of the ruling political party. The ideology, 
organisation and class alliances underlying a party-dominated regime are then of 
considerable consequence for the redistributive performance of that regime"(p. 10)
An in-depth political regime analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis. An 
exhaustive and rigorous political analysis of this type would certainly be the subject of 
future research arising from the present thesis that the author would like to pursue. For 
the moment, we leave the reader with two tables (below), imported from Harriss (1999) 
that show the variation in regime type across some Indian states. An excellent analysis 
of this subject can be found in Harriss (1999) and also Kohli (1987). However, it is 
illuminating to compare our categorisation of states by reform-orientation with their 
classification according to political regime. It is tantalisingly obvious that important 
parallels exist. For the purpose of this chapter though, it is sufficient to show the inter­
state variation in regulation and reform-orientation according to the political economy 
factors described above.
Table 7.1
Typology of Political Regimes in Different States, Early 1980s
Category Characteristics States
A Upper caste/class-dominated Congress 
regimes
Bihar, Uttar Pradesh + (Madhya Pradesh, 
Orissa, Rajasthan)
B
Lower castes/classes recruited into 
Congress regimes
Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra + Andhra 
Pradesh)
C
Lower castes/classes strongly 
represented in non-Congress regimes
Kerala, West Bengal + (Tamil Nadu)
D
Competition between Congress and a 
'middle' caste regional party (excluding Puniab
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lower castes/classes?)
Source: Church (1984) in Harriss, 1999, Table 1
Table 7.2
Typology of Indian State Regimes in the Early Nineties
Category Characteristics States
A(i)
States in which upper caste/class dominance has persisted and 
Congress has remained strong in the context of a stable two-party 
system ( 'traditional dominance' rather than politics of 
accommodation vis-a-vis lower classes)
Madhya Pradesh, 
Orissa, Rajasthan a
A(ii)
States in which upper caste/class dominance has been effectively 
challenged by middle castes/classes, and Congress support has 
collapsed in the context of fractured and unstable party competition 
(both 'dominance' and the politics of accommodation have broken 
down)
Bihar, Uttar Pradesh*
B
States with middle caste/class dominated regimes, where the 
Congress has been effectively challenged but has not collapsed, and 
there is fairly stable and mainly two-party competition (the politics 
of accommodation vis-a-vis lower class interests have continued to 
work effectively, most effectively in Maharashtra and Karnataka, 
least effectively in Gujarat)
Andhra Pradesh, 
Gujarat, Karnataka, 
Maharashtra, Punjab**
C
States in which lower castes/classes are more strongly represented 
in political regimes where the Congress lost its dominance at an 
early stage
Kerala, Tamil Nadu, 
West Bengal0
Notes: a: These five states are classified as 'low income states', b: AP and Karnataka are 'middle income states', and 
Punjab, Gujarat and Maharashtra are 'high income states', c: These three states are 'middle income states'. Source: 
Table 2 from Harriss 1999
7.4 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
I will conclude by presenting very uncomplicated policy recommendations. It is 
not my intention to give minute and detailed policy suggestions, as we believe that that 
is not the objective of this academic thesis. However, very simply, it is fairly obvious 
that the system of labour market regulation in general, and job security regulation in 
particular, needs to be amended in India. As it stands, it harms labour both from a 
partial and general equilibrium point of view. The system needs to be made less 
exclusive and more inclusive.
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The only way to do this in an economically justifiable and politically feasible 
way is to replace this system with a new system that includes all categories of labour, 
but one that does not try to micro-manage all aspects of the labour-capital relationship. 
All workers must be afforded minimum pay and conditions, but that is as far as the state 
intervention needs to go. The enforcement of regulation needs to be tightened, while the 
minutiae of regulation need to be done away with. Simple regulations will be easy to 
monitor and enforce, and less prone to politicisation and rent seeking.
For this to be possible, another requirement is to delete the state from the labour- 
capital relationship by replacing the current time-consuming tripartite system with a 
system of collective bargaining. This will automatically remove a large source of 
political interference from the system.
Last, but very important, as far as possible, job protection must be replaced by 
employment insurance and more generalised social security as far as possible. Instead of 
preventing the efficient allocation of labour and capital, the state must let that happen. 
But, it if and when certain workers slip through the cracks into vulnerable situations, 
then the state must undertake, along with employers, through a social insurance or 
national insurance system, to provide a social safety net for those people in terms of 
insurance against risks of unemployment, disability, health and old age. Analyses 
carried out by Bhattacharya and Mitra (1993) have shown that a system of 
unemployment benefit applying to all workers in India will actually be much cheaper 
than the amount of resources lost in preventing inefficient firms to exit, and in keeping 
“sick” enterprises open and paying their workers, even if nothing is produced.
To conclude then, a deregulation of the job security legislation along with the 
provision of social insurance is the best alternative to the present system. It will improve 
both efficiency and equity. However, in order to achieve this reform, political courage 
as well as shrewd strategy is necessary. Otherwise the fate of “experts” like myself 
might be the same as the labour economist who was shot dead in Italy in March 2002 for 
suggesting greater labour market flexibility in that country!
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